

**SOMALIA**  
**INTER-AGENCY FLOOD RESPONSE OPERATION**  
**PHASE I**

**November - December 1997**



**An Evaluation by**

**Mark Bradbury and Vincent Coultan**

**July 1998**

**Sponsored by**

**Government of Sweden**

**Government of USA**

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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

ADRA	Adventist Relief and Development Agency
ACF	Action Contre la Faim
ACORD	Agency for Co-operation and Research in Development
AMREF	African Medical and Research Foundation
ARC	American Refugee Committee
CBO	Community based organisation
CFW	Cash for work
CISP	International Committee for the Development of Peoples
COOPI	Cooperazione Internazionale
COSV	Co-ordinating Committee for the Organisation of Voluntary Services
DAWA	Muntazmat Il Dawa Al Islamia
DBG	Diakonie Emergency Aid/Bread for the World
DFID	Department for International Development
EU	European Union
EWS	Early Warning System
FEWS	Famine Early Warning System
FFW	Food for work
IARA	Islamic African Relief Agency
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IMC	International Medical Corps
INGO	International Non-governmental organisation
IRC	International Rescue Committee
ITULD	International Union against Tuberculosis and Lung Diseases
JHA	Joint Health Authorities
LNGO	Local non-governmental organisation
LPI	Life and Peace Institute
LVIA	Lay Volunteers International Association
MSF	Medecins Sans Frontieres (Holland/Belgium/Spain/France)
NPA	Norwegian People's Aid
oda	Official Development Assistance
OFDA	Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance
SACB	Somalia Aid Coordination Body
SCF	Save the Children Fund
SCR	Swedish Church Relief
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
WC	World Concern
WV	World Vision
WFP	World Food Program
WHO	World Health Organisation

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## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

### **Introduction**

In late 1997, southern and central Somalia were hit by unprecedented floods affecting the lives and livelihoods of an estimated one million people. This Evaluation reviews Phase I of the international response to the floods - the Somalia Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation - between November and 31st December 1997.

The Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation was a complex and expensive logistics operation to distribute emergency assistance to scattered and isolated flood affected populations. It was also a test of the international humanitarian system's capacity to respond to an acute emergency in a country which has been without a government for six years.

Overall, Phase I of the Somalia Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation is evaluated as a success. Humanitarian agencies in Somalia demonstrated their capacity and capability to respond to short term humanitarian needs. While the initial objective of the operation to 'rescue' flood affected populations was not fulfilled, the objectives to ameliorate the immediate humanitarian effects of the floods and avert a nutritional and health crisis in the worst affected areas were, by and large, achieved. The opportunity was taken to apply past lessons learned from working in Somalia, and innovative programming was apparent in several areas. The inter-agency character of the operation was commendable and the level of commitment and collaboration that was achieved establishes an important precedent for future humanitarian operations in Somalia. This report seeks to record these achievements, as well as identify areas where the humanitarian system in Somalia could be strengthened.

### **A Review of the Humanitarian Framework in Somalia**

The floods that hit southern Somalia in 1997 precipitated the most acute humanitarian emergency in the country since the 1991-1993 famine emergency. The international community was taken by surprise and, in the words of the Coordinator of the Flood Response Operation, 'the system was shocked'. That the system was shocked is indicative of changes in international aid policy towards Somalia.

Somalia has been in the grip of a complex political emergency for over seven years. However, at the end of 1993, when the famine emergency in Somalia was deemed to have ended, Somalia's crisis was redefined in development, rather than humanitarian terms. This change was institutionalised in 1994 with the creation of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB), the United Nations Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS) and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT), within which strategic weight is given to managing the transition from relief to development.

With this policy shift, the international community's responsibilities towards the security and welfare of the Somali population are perceived to have changed. The common wisdom of 'Somali solutions to Somali problems', means that what were previously of international concern are now the responsibility of Somali leaders and the Somali people. Consigning responsibility to Somali populations to finance welfare services, through increased 'participation' and privatisation, occurs in the context of a decline in overall international assistance to Somalia. Evidence that Somali families and communities are able to sustain these services better than they were before the war is lacking.

Those areas of Somalia which meet the conditions placed on international assistance, namely to provide peace and security, are rewarded with a 'peace dividend' of investment in rehabilitation and development. One consequence of this, as noted by the UN, is a growing 'divergence' in life opportunities between populations in regions where a political settlement has been achieved, and those regions which remain politically unstable. Three quarters of the Somali population live in the latter regions. It is these areas that were worst hit by the floods in 1997.

By any international standards Somalia remains in a humanitarian crisis, with a large internally displaced population, some of the highest levels of maternal and child mortality in the world, pockets of chronic malnutrition, a generation of uneducated children, and debilitating diseases such as TB on the increase. A consequence of the decline in humanitarian assistance to Somalia is a reduced capacity within the humanitarian system to be prepared and able to respond to chronic needs. The consistent under funding of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal (CAP), and decline in non-UN channels of assistance, indicates an accommodation within the international community with chronic levels of vulnerability and distress.

#### Recommendations:

- I. The Evaluation supports the findings of the SACB Flood Emergency Management Team, that a mechanism should be established within the SACB or UN for emergency monitoring and preparedness, and for response and coordination (see Coordination below).
- II. The absence of such a mechanism reflects a weakness in the current humanitarian framework amongst donors and aid agencies in Somalia. The creation of such a mechanism, therefore, needs to be accompanied by a reaffirmation of humanitarian mandates, and a review of how the international community can meet its responsibilities to protect the rights of populations facing chronic levels of humanitarian need.

#### **Preparedness**

Somalia is a country with no government, no formal economy or organised national systems to contend with major disasters. It has become increasingly vulnerable to crises.

Humanitarian agencies, in spite of the substantial constraints, have maintained a capacity to monitor and address recurrent 'sectoral' crises through short-term emergency actions. However, neither the country nor the humanitarian system had the necessary capacities to contend promptly and fully effectively with a natural disaster on the scale of the flood emergency.

Principal findings:

1. Preparedness planning for crises in Somalia existed at two levels: (i) An information gathering and analysis function provided by FSAU to help relief planners identify and target populations vulnerable to likely risks and threats. (ii) The challenge faced by all agencies of securing adequate funds to maintain existing programmes, while ensuring access to relief materials, staff and organisational capacities to respond to recurrent crises. This forward planning focused on conflict and drought-related events.
2. There has been a long history of floods in Somalia; in 1961(major), throughout the 1970s, in 1981(when the two rivers joined), in 1987, and a series of smaller flood events since 1994, all of which exceeded the 'normal' range of flood recession farming. Research and project studies conducted pre-1991, provide clear warnings of the likelihood of large flooding events and their impacts. With the exception of an EC study in the Middle Shabelle in the mid-1990s, much of this research has been overlooked.
3. Some limited flood preventative and alleviation work has been undertaken in the intervening years. In 1996, ICRC, funded by USAID, carried out repair work to flood protection infrastructure in the lower Juba. However, much of this was damaged by the floods and will need to be renewed.
4. While it may not be considered cost-effective or appropriate to divert large resources to preparedness for arguably such rare events as 'superfloods', many interviewed during the Evaluation argued that a better balance has to be achieved and maintained within the system.
5. Past emergencies, since 1992 had been dealt with on a sectoral basis, with reported success. UNCU had the responsibility for developing the Plans of Action. With regards to a large multi-sectoral emergency, however, there existed no standing Task Force to pursue essential tasks to maintain the readiness of the system or to prepare for the coherent and inclusive participation of relief capacities in a response. Within the SACB for instance, the Steering Committee for the Sectoral Committees has only met on five occasions.
6. Some senior staff in the UN system, were not fully aware of available emergency capacities held internationally, even within their own organisations.
7. Efforts expended in attempting to secure military capacities during the floods could have been saved if commitments had already been secured in advance.

8. Some fortuitous 'pre-positioning' of drought-titled activities and commodities was evident. Regionally-held capacities, including materials and additional staff from a competent, experienced human resource pool were mobilised.

#### Recommendations:

- I. A rolling preparedness planning process should be maintained to facilitate timely, effective and co-ordinated responses by the humanitarian aid community and local authorities to sudden-onset crises in Somalia. Naturally, there are costs associated with maintaining systems in readiness for future crises, however, joint planning, training exercises and rehearsals are cost-effective and a clear case is made for such investment.. A central body should be assigned responsibility for developing and keeping alive a disaster preparedness planning process, involving all stakeholders. Consideration should be given to the UNCU for this role (see also Coordination).
- II. Flooding events in Somalia will continue. Given the emerging pattern of dramatic swings in global weather, 'superfloods' will almost certainly be more frequent than in the past. The return period of such a severe event is unknown, but given the combination of recent silting and erosion of protection measures even smaller floods will have successively serious consequences. Investment in the rehabilitation of prioritised flood protection works should be considered within the immediate programming of the humanitarian community. In the longer term, investment in more substantial infrastructure to manage the rivers and alleviate long and short-return flooding events must be a priority. Significant interventions should be guided by a technical review of flood dynamics in Somalia.
- III. Consideration should be given to the establishment of a strategic stockpile of generic emergency supplies and equipment for Somalia (see Supply Recommendation I). Materials held regionally in response modules would facilitate a prompt response to needs. Careful thought should be given to the location of pre-positioned emergency stockpiles to ease access problems during a flood disaster. In these floods, difficulties were experienced as far back in the supply chain as Kenya due to flood damaged roads.
- IV. Consideration should be given to maximising the holding of flood response materials in Somalia before and through October/November each year when the highest flows, often with multiple peaks, results in the worst flooding. Relatively smaller floods occur in May.

#### **Early Warning**

In a year when global weather patterns were exhibiting dramatic deviations from normal, the potential of unusual variability was also likely in East Africa. Adequate early warning

of imminent natural disaster provides the opportunity to safeguard lives and assets, and time to undertake measures which serve to mitigate unnecessary damage and expense.

**Principal findings:**

1. Humanitarian responses to natural disasters in East and Southern Africa have predominately been related to slow-onset drought events. Indeed, heavy rains at the start of a planting season are usually welcomed. Early warning systems have been developed to be sensitive at recognising light or failed rains at critical points in the agricultural calendar. Only in areas, such as Madagascar, where cyclones are a recurrent threat, have well developed early warning and rehearsed response systems been developed in concert to contend with sudden-onset disaster.
2. The El Niño phenomenon became fully re-established in 1997 and dramatic swings of global weather had been observed, particularly in the second half of the year. Much attention was focused upon the major food producing areas of the world, and the fires blazing in Indonesia and The Amazon. The little climate outlook data that was available for East Africa did not signal the strong possibility of drought, or flood.
3. The severity and extent of the rainfall that fell over East Africa was not forecast, either by local national meteorological services, or by international climate prediction centres. Impacts were exacerbated due to the deterioration of flood protection measures over the past ten years, a consequence of the insecurity and under-investment.
4. FEWS staff, who are disciplined in reviewing a wide range of sources of climate prediction information, and had just attended a conference of international experts on El Niño, 'were not expecting' floods of such severity. The data at their disposal did not justify issuance of a Severe Flood Alert.
5. Early ground reports of the severity of the event were considered exaggerated. The notion of 'Somalis crying wolf again' prevailed in the minds of some individuals in the aid sector. The accuracy of early reports was not immediately appreciated, which may have discouraged an earlier acceptance of the scale of the problem and a swifter response. Some expatriate aid workers had only been in-country for less than one year, and assumed that the heavy rains indicated a good start to the Deyr season. Up to three weeks went by in October before the scale of the flooding was fully recognised and response planning meetings commenced.
6. Inside Somalia, riverine communities were aware of the unusual pattern of the rains and were soon alerted to up-stream river cresting through their radio network and through traders. There is evidence that many anticipated the potential of widescale inundation and took early avoidance measures.
7. The BBC Somali Service, often used to communicate messages to Somalis, was not utilised in this instance to relay Flood Warnings.

8. Outbreaks of haemorrhagic fever are the normal epidemiological consequence of a flood in Africa. At an early stage FAO predicted that rains would cause Rift Valley Fever, but took no steps to issue a warning.

#### Recommendations:

- I. Specialists both from the humanitarian sector, including FEWS and FSAU, in concert with regional meteorologists should develop a sensitive and robust system of flood prediction, with an agreed national and regional alert mechanism established. There are several western systems that could be modified to the Somali context. The starting point for developing sensitive dependable systems must be on the ground in Somalia, and in the upper and intermediate catchment areas of the two principal rivers. At a minimum, a system of recording daily river stages and rainfall should be maintained in Somalia, and collated with data from Ethiopia and Kenya in order to help anticipate floods.
- II. Collaboration with the Meteorological Services of neighbouring countries would allow access to specialists, particularly climatologists who understand the mechanisms through which ENSO tele-connections affect regional and local climates. By monitoring ENSO onsets and providing regionally or locally tailored forecasts, climatologists could provide reliable early warning of flood disasters or other events with socio-economically important impacts, such as conditions conducive to disease. Preparedness for adverse ENSO impacts will become increasingly important over time. Donors should consider supporting such regional developments.
- III. Warnings should be issued to alert key contacts with access to pre-identified vulnerable populations, providing the timing and scale of likely floods. A combination of radio broadcast and direct HF links to communities might be employed.

#### **Coordination**

Access was identified as the main challenge to the Flood Response Operation. Access is about more than overcoming the constraints of physical geography. It involves securing the consent of 'stakeholders', both those assisting and those being assisted. With a large number of stakeholders involved, this required common operational objectives and an effective system of coordination and management.

#### Principal findings:

1. The Flood Response Operation successfully combined 'strategic' and 'operational' coordination, balancing the interests and needs of the various stakeholders, while providing the requisite operational support services for the delivery of assistance. A common 'framework of consent' among stakeholders for the intervention was achieved by: obtaining donor and regional government support; establishing common and agreed

objectives; establishing a division of responsibilities among international agencies and between international agencies and Somali 'partners'; and, by and large, fulfilling its commitments.

2. Donors proved ready to support the Somalia Flood Flash Appeal and the Flood Response Operation in a manner that they had failed to do with the CAP. An important factor in this is that the floods were a natural disaster requiring life-saving response, and this was more acceptable to donor mandates.

3. The collaborative, inter-agency nature of the operation, with a mix of aid agency and donor representatives involved in its management and implementation was innovative. This approach was enhanced by operating under the umbrella of the SACB, whilst rightly recognising the UN's leadership role in the humanitarian community in Somalia.

4. The designation of UNICEF as lead agency for overall coordination, and WFP for logistics were obvious choices. An initial lack of clarity over agency mandates and responsibilities within the SACB and the UN system caused confusion and delayed the response. That UNICEF had been designated lead agency in non-food emergencies in the 1996/97 CAP, seems not to have been understood by donors.

5. Donor support and pressure critically determine the scope for humanitarian action, in terms of effective coordination and access. In the opinion of the Evaluation Team, the fraught relations between UNICEF and WFP apparent during Phase I, and which at times threatened to undermine the ethos of collaboration, had as much to do with funding pressures, as inherent inter-agency or personal rivalry.

6. The influence of the Coordinator was apparent in all areas of the operation, and his contribution and commitment is rightly acknowledged. The Evaluation Team were concerned, however, that a personality-dependent system of coordination can reflect a potential weakness within the system of coordination.

7. The creation of a Flood Response Management Team outside of the normal SACB forums ensured greater efficiency in decision-making. In the view of the Evaluation Team, some problems encountered within the Management Team could have been eased with pre-agreed coordination arrangements for emergency operations. In this respect, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UNOCHA), with its responsibilities for the coordination of humanitarian operations, should have played a more active role in shaping the Management Team, and in monitoring its performance. Pre-agreed arrangements for the coordination of emergency operations would have ensured smooth hand-over of responsibilities from Phase I to Phase II of the Flood Response.

8. Donors and implementing agencies found common ground in the strategy to regulate entry into the response operation of NGOs who were not operational or had no previous experience of Somalia, in order to mitigate mistakes that inexperienced agencies might

make. This was achieved by restricting the funding environment for NGOs. While recognising that unregulated aid interventions can affect security and established working relationships, a policy to limit interventions needs to be based on a rigorous assessment of need. The presence of NGOs, both international and Somali, was vital to the success of the relief operation. However, their presence and capacity between regions varied - a legacy of the prevailing security situation and donor policy in Somalia. The virtual absence of UN and NGOs in Mogadishu, Middle and Lower Shabelle and Bay meant that these regions were less well served.

9. The decentralisation of decision-making to agencies in Somalia was important to the effectiveness of the operation. There is a need, however, to strike a balance between flexibility in day to day decision-making and the need to ensure adherence to common policy and professional standards.

#### Recommendations:

- I. The system for coordinating and managing emergency preparedness, monitoring and responses in Somalia needs to be strengthened. The SACB and UN should undertake a review to establish the most appropriate structure for this. In this respect the role of the United Nations Coordination Unit (UNCU) in coordinating humanitarian activities should be reviewed, and consideration given to strengthening it. (See also Preparedness, Recommendation I)
- II. The aim of such a review should be to establish clear terms of reference for an emergency management structure, in which the respective roles and responsibilities of agencies are clearly delineated, resource needs defined, mechanisms for funding agreed, and systems for monitoring and accountability established. The review should consider the formulation of principles to guide humanitarian operations in Somalia. Such a review should be a consultative process under the auspices of the SACB, and involve UNOCHA.

#### **Assessment**

Disaster assessment provides a swift and reliable identification of impacts, needs, internal capacities and priorities of affected populations, and information from which to formulate recommendations which define and prioritise actions and resources needed for an appropriate response.

#### Principal findings:

1. Floods of this scale, by their very nature, frustrated access for assessment.
2. The use of aerial surveys, while indispensable, was characterised by poor standardisation of assessment methodologies and team composition, leading to contradictions and some controversy.

3. With no hydrographer consulted in the assessment phase, or onboard during the aerial surveys, important insights were missed. Some reported large areas of standing rain water. What was not apparent from the air was that this water was in fact moving. This was important for predicting later impacts, and should have again triggered the issuance of warnings.
4. The districts of Bay and Bakool were deemed less flood affected by the aerial assessment teams. Little information of a verifiable nature emerged from these areas, due to prevailing security concerns. Although flooding levels were not high, what was overlooked, as became evident later, was that even shallow standing water will effectively kill crops and sever access routes for weeks.
5. Also under-assessed was the flooding in the Shabelle valley. While not nearly so dramatic, the floods still had serious long term impact on an area more densely populated than the Juba valley. Evacuations of expatriate staff following the serious security incident involving CINS, led to key staff being absent during what should have been the peak response period in this area.
6. Little rigorous on the ground assessment took place. UN security restrictions in the Juba valley were an additional frustrating factor in the early days, before these were lifted. Nevertheless, INGOs maintained a most valuable presence in the affected areas and contributed much to the wider assessment process. Understandings gleaned from household food economy analysis allowed appropriate refinements to be made to early assessments of needs.
7. With no pre-agreed understanding as to who would be responsible for undertaking the assessment, early reporting opportunities were lost, and the magnitude of the flooding event was not swiftly recognised. While the use of remote-sensing imagery provided a useful overview of the situation, more effort could have been made to undertake visual assessment. The availability of a helicopter at an early stage would have been ideal.
8. In spite of the rising waters, some communities decided to stay on their land until the very last moment, fearful of looting if they left early. Flash flooding over land, particularly in Bay, caught people by surprise and led to loss of life.

Recommendations:

- I. For improvement of disaster assessment readiness, there should be prior agreements on team composition and respective responsibilities, assessment methodologies, and reporting requirements for the presentation of findings. A responsible entity should be assigned the role of co-ordinating such preparedness actions and arranging joint training. (See Coordination Recommendation I).
- II. Closer links with those carrying the Early Warning function would permit pre-disaster assessment opportunities.

## **Response Implementation**

Implementation of the Somalia Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation commenced in early November 1997, three weeks after the onset of the flooding in Somalia. Over twenty organisations contributed to Phase I of the operation. The obstacle of accessing flood affected populations was overcome through a heavy reliance on aircraft. WFP were assigned the role of servicing a Joint Logistics Operation.

### **Principal findings**

1. The fast onset of the flooding event, the lack of preparedness, the scale of the flooding and the impracticality of mounting ground-based operations, left agencies with little option other than to resort to an expensive airlift and airdrop operation.
2. Response planning commenced quickly once the enormity of the crisis was recognised. However, three weeks passed before implementation was evident. It was during this period that flood victims were in need of immediate rescue.
3. The overall purpose, structure, and planning of the Joint Logistics Operation was collaborative and well conceived, with the Regional Office of WFP providing the Country Team with invaluable assistance throughout the operation. The consolidation of materials in Nairobi, and their forward delivery provided effective support to other agencies.
4. Air logistics operations were managed with great professionalism. The inclusion of complementary specialists within the Logistics/Communications and Security Group led to the success. The understanding of the Kenyan Government, the availability of fixed-wing aircraft in the regional marketplace, the positive response of donors to the appeal and their close involvement in planning and problem-solving all contributed positively. Airlift, air-sprinkle and air-dropping operations were undertaken without serious incident.
5. Several issues emerge from the exercise of securing and operating the helicopters. While there are many helicopters available around the World that meet the required specification, most are in the hands of the military. Commercial heavy-lift helicopters are available, but the market is specialised. UNICEF had little knowledge of this market. They were unfortunate in selecting a company that failed to honour the contract. UNICEF Somalia should re-examine why it chose to undertake a procurement exercise in a specialist area, and why Copenhagen did little to support their efforts. Support from the Military Civil Defence Unit in Geneva may have been greater if UNICEF's contract had not looked so secure. As the Logistic Service providers to the Joint Operation, WFP should have been given the task of securing the helicopters in the first place. However, WFP also has relatively little experience in the rotary-wing marketplace. Much of the UN experience resides within the Department of Peace Keeping Operations.

6. Helicopters would have been of enormous utility in early/mid October, when they could have rescued people from drowning (the initial objective), and for rapidly identifying isolated communities and delivering small amounts of critical relief commodities to them. Once the helicopters arrived, six weeks after the start of the flooding, they fulfilled this secondary role.
7. Once the operation was established, the provision of assistance to isolated communities in the Juba was achieved by the use of a fleet of imported boats. Although more thought might have been given to the hire of local boats and boat operators, the imported boats and their operators did help build confidence with the Somali communities and avoid large population movements to the main centres of distribution. Contagious disease spread may have been reduced through the success of this strategy.
8. WFP should have been more selective in its hiring policy. It was clear that one or two individual expatriate boat operators were ill-suited to the environment. Training of Somali boat operators could have commenced earlier.
9. It was clear that as the operation continued a high degree of complementarity was achieved between the helicopters, air-drop teams and the boat operations.
10. The presence of established national and international NGOs along the main axis of the affected regions led to WFP promptly forming new working partnerships. Without these on-the-ground capacities, the operation would not have been so effective.
11. Although ICRC was not officially part of the Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation, they provided a significant and complementary contribution.
12. Adequate levels of supervision were maintained throughout Phase I. What was weaker was the ongoing monitoring of impact.

**Recommendations:**

- I. A competent body within the UN system should be assigned by OCHA to take responsibility for maintaining a global database of commercial helicopter operators who can provide response agencies, at 48 hour notice, with helicopters of 2 Mt. payload and a 500 mile range.
- II. Given the undoubted utility of helicopters in search and rescue activities, and the likely recurrence of flood, earthquake and hurricane disasters in countries where western military assets are unlikely to be released, donors should consider funding commercial arrangements to secure such specialised equipment on an immediate call-forward basis on behalf of the UN.
- III. A systematic monitoring system needs to be in place, to continuously re-evaluate the needs and ongoing appropriateness of emergency responses. To assist in

lesson learning, arrangements to record 'best practice' should be incorporated in the system. Given the wealth of experience gained during the floods, everyone involved should have been asked to record best practices developed or witnessed during the operation. In future emergency operations in Somalia this should be formalised in a standard and mandatory after-action questionnaire and a full debriefing. Since many relief workers soon move onto other contracts, programme managers should safeguard and distill the detailed findings to improve future performance.

## **Supplies**

The operation called for assembly of a wide range of relief items, additional transport, and related equipment and supplies to allow an effective response to the needs of flood victims.

### Principal findings:

1. Minimal levels of supplies were pre-positioned in the flood affected areas prior to the floods. Some commodities already in the field were flood-damaged, and were distributed promptly to avoid further spoilage. Modest levels of pre-positioning in Kenya were evident. The majority of international supplies arrived in Nairobi in time for onward transport to Somalia during Phase I. With many donations and purchases originating in Europe, however, some delays were inevitable. Local purchases were made in Kenya, with quantities of locally appropriate seeds, for flood recession planting, secured in Mogadishu.
3. The standard relief package of ready-to-eat food, shelter material, ORS, basic drugs and blankets was appropriate. Given that flood conditions were favourable to the rapid breeding of mosquitoes and other biting insects, more mosquito netting should have been provided.
4. Specification of some of the boat equipment utilised, was inappropriate. This was not always due to poor specification of needs, but a consequence of the willingness to accept free donations from donor nations. Some radio equipment proved ineffective, due in part to the poor training of operators.

### Recommendations:

- I. Consideration should be given to establishing and maintaining a strategic stockpile of emergency equipment and materials in East Africa, a pooled resource serving an alliance of all agencies, holding standard, proven items. Decisions on types of equipment and materials to be held and cycled should respect views of both operational staff and recipients. For example, mosquito nets should be included in all flood relief packages.

- II. Standard specifications for equipment should be issued prior to Appeals with offers of unsuitable equipment being rejected. With regards to the boats, a cost effective route would be to have the ideal specification of boat produced locally within the region, with donor support. Ex-military equipment could be field-tested prior to the next emergency and held in stock.
- III. All technical supplies should be accompanied by sufficient spares to ensure safe and durable use in field conditions, and full training provided as necessary.
- IV. All specifications and necessary pre-arrangements for access to specialised equipment and services should be re-examined in readiness. Much of this activity can be achieved as part of a joint preparedness training exercise.

## **Security**

Insecurity and the absence of national authorities are substantial constraints on programme implementation in many areas of Somalia. This remained so during the flood response.

### **Principal findings:**

1. Past lessons in relation to working safely in Somalia were broadly heeded. These included: the assignment of response functions to established agencies, who had good local knowledge and relationships; access negotiations with militia leaders to protect the humanitarian space required for the operation; assessments by specialist security staff and the establishment of a security management system with specific safety practices and standards.
2. A 'dividend' of the floods was that most roads were impassable, rendering militia transport immobile. Also, given that most people in Southern Somalia were severely affected by the disaster and pre-occupied with survival, incidents of insecurity were much reduced.
3. As the joint operations escalated, original security restrictions imposed upon UN staff were relaxed to allow relief efforts to be accelerated. The concept for security cover allowed for work unaccompanied, so long as field staff had necessary communications to permit the call-out of an air-mobile security officer.
4. Although many radios were issued for the operation, a shortfall in number, inappropriate frequency allocation and inadequate training, led to the concern that staff could not call for assistance or evacuation. In addition, the initial lack of coordination between Nairobi, Garissa and the field seriously undermined the UN's ability to log and keep track of international staff moving around in the flood affected region.

5. Prior to the arrival of the first helicopter on 6th December, the original security concept was seriously challenged. The eventual arrival of the helicopters lifted security cover to a level regarded as 'reasonable' by the security staff. Each helicopter carried a security officer, although communication with the aircraft once in-flight was not possible.

6. A total of fifteen serious security incidents within Phase I were reported to the Evaluation Team, including kidnapping, aircraft landing accidents, looting and rioting, and occasions where guns were aimed, on one occasion fired, at agency staff. The UN After-Action Report concluded that they should 'consider themselves lucky that an international staff member was not killed or seriously injured'.

#### Recommendations:

- I. In all large-scale emergency operations field personnel should be provided with compatible pre-programmed hand-held VHF radios, and navigational aids (as necessary). HF frequency allocation and training should be reviewed. All personnel should receive a full security briefing, and new personnel should receive a thorough introduction to political and sociological issues in Somalia, supported by written materials.
- II. Security clearance should be achieved through one central officer, to whom all personnel be required to report prior to entering Somalia.
- III. All future aircraft contracts should include a clause stipulating that functional multi-frequency HF radios are installed, and that captains and first officers are fluent in English.
- IV. Clarity must be jointly established as to which organisations and authorities will lead in key operational roles, and who will follow.
- V. An arrangement should be established to secure immediate guaranteed access to appropriate communication equipment. To ensure that equipment is of adequate standard, a UN office should be charged with administering an approval process prior to procurement. An audit and rational augmentation of existing-held stockpiles of sector-specific equipment and materials should be regularly undertaken to facilitate future rapid humanitarian start-up operations. An alternative to stockpiling and maintaining radio equipment would be a standing arrangement with a specialist service provider, such as Cable & Wireless, who can provide communications in emergency areas at short notice.
- VI. Standby staff rosters should be re-examined quarterly to ensure availability of appropriately experienced personnel at short notice.

## **Operational Principles and Standards of Behaviour**

The probability of aid being integrated with the dynamics of violence are high where there is no agreed framework or principles for the delivery of aid. The elaboration of Operational Principles and Standards of Behaviour, drawn up by the Life and Peace Institute (LPI), to guide the Flood Response operation was an innovative aspect of the operation. Guided by the maxim 'do no harm', the Operational Principles sought to ensure that the agencies worked through and strengthened community institutions and capacities. The Standards of Behaviour aimed to establish a common set of practices among implementing agencies and so minimise the risk of an uncoordinated intervention.

### **Principal Findings:**

1. In seeking to condition the role and behaviour of the aid providers, rather than the aid recipients, the LPI Principles and Standards represent a significant development from the *SACB Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia*. They confer responsibility on humanitarian agencies to regulate their activities, to mitigate the potential negative impacts of humanitarian interventions in conflict environments.
2. The Principles and Standards for the Flood Response Operation share similarities to other principles of humanitarian action, including, among others, the Ground Rules of Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), and the Joint Policy of Operations in Liberia. They differ in not specifying the rights of populations in distress to receive assistance, or the rights of humanitarian agencies to provide assistance. This is an important omission, as rights and protection are critical issues in humanitarian emergencies.
3. Although the Standards of Behaviour were intended to form part of an 'agreement' between the Flood Response operation and participating agencies, no agency signed them. Time given for the development and dissemination of the Principles and Standards was minimal. Despite this, most agencies operated in the spirit of the Principles. Within districts and regions agencies did seek to work with local structures and adhere to common administrative policies.
4. While the Principles and Standards outlined an approach to working with disaster affected populations, agreements on standards for the delivery of assistance were not developed.
5. Since the end of Phase I of the Flood Response Operation, there has been no follow up by LPI or other agencies on the efficacy of the Principles and Standards. This raises a question over the seriousness of this endeavour.

### Recommendations:

- I. In Somalia principles to guide international humanitarian engagement are notable by their absence. This should be rectified. The formulation of a common set of operating principles, code of conduct for humanitarian assistance agencies, and standards of service delivery would strengthen the humanitarian system in Somalia, and help address problems associated with the delivery of aid in a complex political emergency.
- II. The formulation of principles should be a consultative process. It should involve a comparative review of the 1996 IASC draft guidelines for UN humanitarian relief operations in Somalia, the SACB Code of Conduct, the LPI Principles and Standards, and principles and codes developed elsewhere such as the Ground Rules in Sudan. Mechanisms for the dissemination and monitoring of adherence to such principles will need to be considered.
- III. Donors might consider making future funding of agencies conditional on adherence to agreed principles and acceptable standards of service delivery.

### **Working with Local Structures**

Quality of access is critical in determining the effectiveness of humanitarian operations. How to create and sustain humanitarian access in the face of insecurity and belligerent military factions has been a key challenge for aid agencies since the outset of the civil war in Somalia. A criticism of relief agencies during the UNOSOM era was that they marginalised Somalis and failed to engage local structures and capacities. The Flood Response operation sought to rectify this through the Operational Principles which emphasised engagement with and support to local structures in the delivery of assistance. LPI was tasked to assist the response teams to identify legitimate local structures for the operation to work with.

### Principal findings:

1. The Flood Response was, in general, positive towards involving local structures in the planning and distribution of relief assistance. Without military or security infrastructure to protect the operation, local knowledge and established working relationships were important in obtaining local consent to operate in an area. However, the extent to which the Flood Response operation engaged with local administrations varied from one district to another. Factors determining the degree of engagement included: the extent to which local authorities were perceived as 'legitimate' by international agencies; the level of conflict within the community; the capability of the administration. Ultimately, however, it was the degree of political settlement (imposed or otherwise) in an area that determined whether local administrations were engaged with, or were capable of engaging in the international operation.

2. The view that 'Somali solutions to Somali problems' is the best way forward in Somalia, and the principle of working with local structures and supporting local capacity, leaves unanswered how external agencies judge *which* Somalis, *whose* problems and *whose* solutions are legitimate to support. The issue of legitimacy is pertinent given the ideas to strengthen local disaster preparedness and response mechanisms. While it may be appropriate to strengthen local institutions and mechanisms for responding to a natural disaster, it may not be appropriate (or feasible) to strengthen them for responding to a politically induced disaster.

3. Some groups suffered more than others during the floods. The Evaluation Team was unable to investigate claims that certain groups were discriminated against. Most agencies expressed satisfaction with equity of relief distributions. However, the Evaluation Team found little systematic monitoring of distributions during or after Phase I of the operation to corroborate this. If causes of vulnerability and livelihood insecurity are related to access and political and social status, then the critical issue humanitarian agencies should be addressing is not capacity building or sustainability, but protection.

#### Recommendations:

- I. The approach of 'working with local structures' assumes certain long term positive outcomes in terms of strengthened structures and increased capacity. These are beyond this evaluation to assess. As a means of determining 'best practice' in relief operations, there may be merit in reviewing the impact of this approach through research in flood affected communities at a future point in time. At a minimum, reporting on how and who agencies worked with should form part of reporting procedures of relief agencies. The participation of 'beneficiaries' in the evaluation of relief operations should be integral to the approach of working with local structures.
- II. The principle of 'working with local structures' should be balanced with an assessment of the implications of working with local elites and authorities, and how this may impact on the humanitarian entitlements of vulnerable populations. In delivering humanitarian aid through local authority structures, criteria need to be developed for assessing their 'legitimacy', and well as their capacity to manage the delivery of assistance.
- III. In a conflict-induced, complex emergency like Somalia, where the destruction of property and population displacement is a strategy of warring parties, protection is a critical issue. Humanitarian assistance agencies and their operations should be evaluated not only in terms of what they deliver and how efficiently, but also in terms of the protection they provide vulnerable populations. The FSAU provides some assessment of the political and social dimensions of food security. Such analysis should be extended to other sectors.

## **Somali Responses to the Floods**

Humanitarian interventions are commonly criticised for neglecting the capacities of disaster victims, for encouraging dependency, and fueling war. Such criticism has given rise to policies that are often based on untested assumptions.

### **Principal findings:**

1. Somalis did 'shoulder responsibility' during the floods. This occurred both in a spontaneous manner, and through planned collective and collaborative efforts. Spontaneous efforts included life-saving rescues, flood protection, housing displaced families, and preserving food stocks. The largest collective Somali response to the floods occurred in Mogadishu, where concerned citizens formed a Flood Committee which raised US\$100,000, and distributed some 125 Mts. of supplies to displaced populations throughout southern Somalia. The Flood Response Operation encouraged and supported some of these local initiatives, but did not engage with the larger collective efforts, as in Mogadishu.
2. Some effort was made to utilise local resources. Several agencies purchased supplies in country. However, for various reasons most supplies provided by the inter-agency response were brought from outside Somalia. Some limited and ad hoc support was given to facilitate the continuation of trade and markets. However, more could possibly have been done to support this.
3. During the floods there were undoubtedly examples of opportunism and selfish actions by people. However, there is a danger of confusing 'opportunism' with 'coping' or 'survival' strategies. In several places agencies hired local boats before the foreign boats arrived. This was controversial. Some considered the opportunism of boat owners undermined the self-help ethos that the response operation was promoting. Other argued that more use could have been made of them, and that conditions placed on the hire of local boats in effect penalised those least able to help themselves in normal circumstances.
4. Crises become acute when they outstrip coping mechanisms. The objective of promoting coping strategies and local capacity carries with it a danger of over-reliance on capacities which may not exist. Withholding outside assistance to motivate local initiatives potentially penalises the most vulnerable. Support for local capacities should be based on empirical assessments of capacity and need rather than policy assumptions.
5. Assumptions about the impact of aid were apparent in concerns that the floods would cause displacement within and outside Somalia, and that the relief operation might further encourage this. To assist people in their home locations to prevent migration-induced stress, or unhygienic displaced camps is a reasonable strategy. As a strategy to prevent dependency it is more questionable. Evidence of the 'pull' factor of relief assistance is limited. It is the 'push' factors - violence, depletion of assets, economic poverty etc. - that

are more critical reasons why people move. However, there is little to support the assumption that humanitarian aid encourages dependency. Somalia is not suffering from an over-abundance of aid on which Somalis could become dependent.

6. The assumption, based on past experience, that humanitarian aid can exacerbate levels of violence and fuel war was not borne out in the Flood Response Operation. There are few examples during the flood operation where violence can be linked to the provision of assistance. Levels of looting and opportunism were minor. In part this was due to the approach taken by the operation to work with local authority structures, and to the impact of the floods on local militia. Another reason lies with the nature of the crisis. This was not a conflict-induced disaster, with looting and asset stripping a strategy of warfare. One needs to look beyond humanitarian aid for the causes of violence and conflict in Somalia.

#### Recommendations:

- I. The Flood Response Operation correctly responded to the opportunity to support local cooperation and self-help efforts in response to the disaster. However, much aid policy in Somalia is based on certain lessons or assumptions about the impact of humanitarian aid on disaster affected populations. Empirical evidence to support these assumptions is limited. If real lessons and best practice are to be learned further research is required.
- II. Reporting on 'best practice' should form part of the regular reporting procedures of aid agencies. Further research is recommended on the issues of aid dependency, coping strategies, and the impact of aid on violence. (See also Response Implementation, Recommendation IV.)

#### **Building Solidarity, Reconciliation and Peace through Relief**

In addition to meeting life-saving needs, the Flood Response Operation was seen as an opportunity to forge alliances between divided communities to bring about and consolidate reconciliation and peace.

#### Principal findings:

1. The Evaluation Team is unable to conclude whether activities to promote solidarity, reconciliation and peace will have any long term impact. To assess their social impact would require a study over a longer time period. From a brief review, it would appear that where authority was contested before the floods it remains contested, and where communities were united before the floods they remain so.
2. Humanitarian aid is normally conceived in terms of the unconditional provision of relief based on need. Adding the objective of peace carries with it the danger of imposing

conditionalities on assistance. The implications of the 'peace dividend' approach to rehabilitation and development have been noted.

3. The broadening of the objectives of humanitarian relief to include peace building is a common trend in much aid policy in complex emergencies. The failures of 'humanitarian diplomacy' in many countries to bring about sustainable peace suggests a misunderstanding of the nature of complex political emergencies. The floods were a fundamentally different from the politically and militarily induced famine of 1991-1993, when food insecurity was not the result of vagaries in weather conditions, but the 'harvesting' of people. It would be a mistake to assume that relief can be linked to solidarity and peace-building in all disaster situations.

### **Media and Public Information**

The mobilisation and creative use of the media and public information channels was an essential part of the Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation.

#### **Principal findings:**

1. Resource strapped aid agencies are commonly criticised for 'unseemly competition' and their undignified portrayal of disaster victims in the media to raise profile and funding. Cognisant of such criticisms, guidelines for a coordinated media strategy were drawn up by the information officers of agencies participating in the Flood Response Operation. This strategy appears to have averted inter-agency competition, thus proving that it is feasible to raise resources and deliver a relief programme without resorting to a 'sticker war'.
2. The media strategy generated considerable coverage of the floods and the Flood Response Operation in its first few weeks. Drawing a direct link between media coverage and the response of donors, however, is difficult. Donors were already working closely with the operation through the SACB. What a coordinated media strategy did provide the operation was some control over the so-called 'CNN factor'. It was the Response Operation that directed the media to cover the floods in the Juba and the arrival of the helicopters, rather than the Shabelle.
3. The 'SACB' and 'Inter-Agency Response' are not brand names, and thus did not generate the kind of public response that known agencies might expect to. While averting competition, the inter-agency approach may have limited fundraising potential. Public donations to the Flood Response were minimal.
4. Radio broadcasts were used effectively for public health warnings about Rift Valley Fever, for cholera prevention, and warning about airdrops. The extent to which the operation was able to influence Somali behaviour through the media to self-help and solidarity is not clear. TV images of floods in the Juba valley did raise awareness among

people in Mogadishu of the critical situation, and may have helped mobilise the Mogadishu Flood Relief Committee.

5. Despite on-going efforts of some agencies, Somalia has a negative international image as a result of the perceived failure of the 1991-1993 UN intervention. The relationship between conflict, humanitarian aid and aid agencies in countries in crises has also come under media scrutiny. From the evidence of newspaper articles reviewed by the Evaluation Team, reporting on Somalia during the floods was generally positive. Time pressures meant that information officers and journalists were unable to capitalise on the opportunity the renewed media interest in Somalia provided to present a wider analysis of the context.

6. The creation of a Flood Website was an innovative aspect of the Flood Response Operation, indicating the potential of the Internet for the rapid dissemination of information about an emergency as it develops.

#### Recommendations:

- I. Based on the experience of the Flood Response Operation, there would be merit in agencies working in Somalia to developing standard guidelines and principles for working with the media. In formulating them reference should be made to principles or standards of reporting existing within individual agencies, or such as those contained in the *International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and NGO Code of Conduct for Disaster Response Programmes*.
- II. Further consideration should be given to the potential use of the Internet for the rapid dissemination of information in future emergencies. This should involve a review of the type of information included in a website, a system for monitoring the accuracy of information, and the possibility of links to other websites. Outside Somalia there are a number of Somalia websites which could be targeted for information dissemination.
- III. The website proved to be a useful source of information for this Evaluation. The potential of using such a tool for compiling and consolidating key information in future emergencies should be considered.

#### **Funding**

From a peak in 1992, a decline in humanitarian assistance to Somalia had left the UN, ICRC and many NGOs in Somalia by mid-1997 in a fragile financial situation. Six weeks prior to the floods the UNCT warned that under funding of UN requirements in the 1996/97 CAP could precipitate a humanitarian crisis.

### Principal findings:

1. Donors responded rapidly to the Flash Appeal for the Somalia Floods. The Response raised more than the US\$13 million requested. Total contributions made in response to the flood emergency will never be known. Those made through and by Islamic NGOs, for example, are not recorded. In some regions - notably Lower Shabelle - their input may have been of equal value to that invested by agencies in the Appeal.
2. The majority of donor contributions in cash and kind went to the Flood Response operation in the Middle and Lower Juba, with other areas receiving only minimal proportion of resources raised through the Appeal.
3. Although donors were 'generous and swift' with their pledges, a delay in translating pledges into a transfer of funds - sometimes up to six months - was a constraint to the operational agencies. OCHA and UNDP were equally slow in the transfer of funds. On the basis of this experience, direct contributions to agencies would have been more efficient. Donations in kind were received quicker than cash contributions. However, as few donors paid for their freight this caused delays in the arrival of some supplies.
4. Much of the fundraising for the operation was done in Nairobi. According to donors, much of the success in raising resources was put down to the Coordinator's understanding of donor needs in terms of proposals and formats.
5. The Coordinator was also helped by the fact that the operation took place under the auspices of the SACB, that donors were involved in formulating the Plan of Action, and that donors decided to place funds with the UN. The positive media support through the work of the information officers was important. Furthermore, the floods occurred at the end of the year when donors are often looking to spend unused funds, and there were no other acute crises at that time that needing funding. In launching the Appeal, however, no funding strategy was elaborated with OCHA, or agencies' headquarters. This led to some lack of clarity about requirements.
6. A significant feature of the Flood Operation was the policy of donors to channel their funds through the UN rather than NGOs. This policy is generally judged by donors, UN and NGOs to have been correct, even though the response of some international NGOs is considered by some donors to have been swifter and more efficient than the UN. However, the rationale to control the entry of NGOs was driven by policy rather than an assessment of needs on the ground.
7. The Flood Response provided an opportunity for the UN to test the concept of joint programming and joint funding which had been introduced in the 1996/97 CAP. As overall Coordinator of the operation, with responsibility for the receipt and management of funds, UNICEF was expected to fulfill the role of Fund Recipient Manager (FRM) assigned to it in the 1996/97 CAP for non-food emergencies. While the Response demonstrated the value of coordination and collaboration, for administrative, political and

programmatic reasons the implementation of joint programming is perceived as problematic. Forcing agencies to coordinate does not necessarily lead to coherent policies, or correct strategies.

9. The generosity of donors to the Flood Response needs to be set in a context of declining humanitarian assistance to Somalia. Agencies recognise the need to better articulate to donors the impact of their work and ensure a more rational use of resources. However, in the global context of declining oda, such 'technical' solutions by themselves are insufficient. Donors need to be convinced that short term funding for acute emergencies, should be complemented by sustained support to address the chronic needs in Somalia.

#### Recommendations:

- I. The mechanisms for the funding of emergency operations need to be clarified and pre-agreed by agencies, as part of a review of mechanisms for emergency coordination and management. As part of this reasons for delays in the transfer of funds needs to be addressed.
- II. With the shift to developmental programming in Somalia, the use of the CAP as an appeal for humanitarian assistance has changed. Flash Appeals are utilised instead to raise funds for an acute emergency within a chronic emergency. The presentation of the CAP as an 'integrated programme' document should be reviewed. As an appeal document for a country in a complex emergency there should be a prioritisation of humanitarian needs.

#### **Response Effectiveness**

Phase I of the Somalia Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation represented the first integrated relief intervention in Somalia for many years. In many sudden-onset crises, difficulties arise in passing definitive comment on both the effectiveness and the cost effectiveness of the response. With little base-line information, it is not possible to isolate the particular effects of the intervention - the relationship between inputs and measurable effect over time.

#### Principal findings:

1. Phase I of the Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation was a complex and expensive logistics operation to distribute ready-to-eat food items and emergency supplies of shelter and medicines to scattered and isolated populations. The floods seriously impaired ground movements for everyone, including the humanitarian community.
2. The initial ambition of 'air-rescue of persons stranded in areas of immediate risk to life' was not achieved. The operation did, however, serve to support displaced and vulnerable people wherever they could be accessed, and so minimise movement in search

of sustenance and shelter. The slow start to the response, and delays in identifying outlying pockets of people and then reaching them, undoubtedly did result in a continuance of fatalities. However, the majority of people who died as a direct consequence of the flooding probably did so at the time of the sudden flash floods, before the response operation even commenced.

3. Many Somalis were able to salvage assets from the rising flood waters, including food from underground stores. Some in-country stores of 'drought-titled' food aid was rescued and immediately distributed. The assistance made by and through Islamic NGOs, and through Somali religious leaders and businessmen also goes unrecorded.

4. The floods seriously impaired ground movements for everyone, including the humanitarian community. Consequently, the operation was characterised by a heavy reliance upon aircraft, with up to 40% of overall expenditures related to aircraft charter and related logistics. Any idealised approach was compromised by the urgency of the situation, and the lack of 'lead-time' for planning and pre-establishment of necessary capacities.

5. The helicopter operation, once underway, proved an effective though not necessarily a cost-effective means of ensuring that populations were identified and their immediate needs met. Given the high hourly rates, large savings and greater useful flight time could have been secured if the helicopters had been based nearer to the affected populations. The prevailing insecurity in Somalia, and flooding of roads in Kenya precluded this option. The helicopters were not insured to overnight on Somali soil.

6. A significant dividend of the use of aircraft was that 'flight deliveries' helped implementers avoid the slowly emerging pockets of insecurity, and the problems inevitably linked with over-land operations. Another trade-off between expense and efficiency was that without helicopters, air-drops zones could not have been established so promptly in many isolated areas, and so safely conducted.

7. The 'imminent' though long delayed arrival of the helicopters may have reduced investment and an expansion of the boat operations, which were proving effective.

8. The Management Team were approached by Somali traders with interest in chartering or subsidising aircraft to deliver their own commodities, so they could quickly re-establish their business activities. While the traders requests were denied on this occasion, an examination of this approach to assisting disaster affected communities is called for. The operation did little overtly to incorporate measures to improve the functioning of local markets.

9. Overall, given the scale of the event, the lack of early warning, and any tailored preparedness to help overcome the hurdle of access, a most valuable and welcomed response was mounted, at a cost that is as low as can be reasonably expected.

**Recommendations:**

- I. Given the high cost per beneficiary of the operation, a clear case is made for investment in early warning and preparedness mechanisms, and flood protection measures within Somalia. (See also Preparedness recommendations)
- II. Agencies should be called upon to adopt consistent standards in reporting achievements. A specific and agreed set of reporting formats, shared between all agencies could be devised, with input from sector managers across all organisations. This would facilitate transparency, accountability and processes for evaluating performance within the system. Recent work undertaken by the SPHERE project may be of assistance in this regard. (See also Response Implementation).
- III. If humanitarian agencies are to defend their appeals to donors for resources, agencies need to be able to demonstrate a measurable impact of their operations on peoples lives and livelihoods over time. A rigorous system of base-line measurement and impact determination should form an integral part of emergency operations. Consideration should be given to commissioning of empirical detailed research of the kind undertaken by The Refugee Policy Group and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention after the 1991-1992 famine emergency (Hansch et al, 1994 November), as normal component of large-scale emergency operations.

## **PART I**

### **1. INTRODUCTION**

#### **1.1 The Inter-Agency Response to 1997 Somalia Flood Emergency**

In late 1997 the people of southern and central Somalia, without government for six years and in the throes of a prolonged drought were hit by a new disaster - floods. Throughout October, November and December torrential rains, caused by weather and tidal patterns associated with the El Nino phenomenon, swept much of the Horn of Africa. Three large masses of rain water from the Ethiopian highlands combined with a water mass from Kenyan and heavy rain in southern and central Somalia, caused the rivers Shabelle and Jubba to overflow and burst their banks in several locations. In November 1997 the waters of Jubba the Shabelle met for the time since 1981, causing the worst flooding in Somalia since 1961.

The floods affected all of Somalia's southern regions and the lives of an estimated one million people. The rains and flood waters wiped out homes, crops, food stocks and livestock. As people scrambled to higher ground on islets and dykes, over a quarter of million people are estimated to have been immediately displaced. By mid January 1998 more than 2,200 people were reported to have died from drowning, exposure and health-related consequences of the floods.

On November 7th, United Nations (UN) agencies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) combined to present an assessment of the flooding to an extraordinary meeting of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) in Nairobi. The SACB endorsed a plan of action for a response, in four phases, by the international community to the flood emergency. The Representative of UNICEF Somalia was designated the Coordinator of Phase I - *Emergency Rescue and Relief* - of the Inter-Agency Somalia Flood Response Operation and the Flood Response Management Team. The World Food Programme (WFP) was assigned responsibility for the management of the logistics operation.

The focus of Phase I of the operation was the Jubba valley where the flooding was most devastating. The Shabelle valley and areas away from the rivers were considered less of a priority. Access to the affected populations was biggest challenge to the responding agencies. For eight weeks, from November to December 31st, when Phase I was brought to an end, essential life-saving supplies were distributed to flood affected populations by a combination of helicopters, fixed wing aircraft, boats, donkey carts, tractors and on foot.

Some 27 international agencies participated in the flood response operation, and international donors contributed over US\$13 million in cash and supplies. Outside of the inter-agency appeal an unknown, but significant amount of assistance was contributed through other channels by governments and private charitable organisations.

In Somalia, international agencies and Somali organisations, local authorities and individuals collaborated in assessing needs, and planning and implementing emergency activities. In many places Somalis responded on an individual and collective basis. In Mogadishu a voluntary committee comprising religious leaders, businessmen, NGOs and concerned citizens raised monies and distributed an estimated 125 mt of goods to flood affected populations.

In January 1998, two weeks after Phase I was concluded, the main partners involved in the Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation met to review and draw out key lessons from the relief operation. The general conclusion of the meeting was that the operation had been successful and had met its objectives of the rescue and relief of flood affected populations (SACB, 1998, January).

## **1.2 Evaluation Objectives and Methodology**

### **1.2.1 Objectives**

This Evaluation was commissioned by the Governments of Sweden, USA, and Britain. UNICEF provided the necessary logistical and administrative support. The Evaluation was carried out by two independent consultants, and follows and builds upon the findings of the meeting and the report of the SACB Joint Flood Response Management Team in January 1998.

The Evaluation covers *Phase I* of the Inter-Agency Response to the 1997 Somali Flood Emergency. That is the *Emergency Rescue and Relief* phase, from November to 31st December 1997. The broad objectives of the Evaluation, as set out in the terms of reference (see Appendix I), were:

- To evaluate the Phase I Inter-Agency Emergency Response Operation in Somalia.
- To draw and document lessons learned, so as to inform future emergency interventions in Somalia, and possibly elsewhere.

More specifically, the Evaluation Team was asked to investigate, at a minimum, the following elements of the operation:

- Content of and adherence to the policy principles guiding the operation.
- Early warning systems.
- Modalities for assessment of emergency situations and target beneficiaries.
- Coordination of the operation.
- Implementation of the operation, including
- Supply issues.
- Fundraising strategy and modalities.
- Involvement of and participation by local partners and communities.
- Security implications and arrangements.
- Mobilisation and role of the media.
- Monitoring of the operation.
- Effectiveness of the operation in reaching the target population, and cost-effectiveness of the operation.

## 1.2.2 Scope of the Evaluation

In Nairobi the Evaluation Team reviewed the scope of the Evaluation with the donors and key agencies. From these discussions, the Evaluation Team understood that the study should be a 'system-wide' evaluation. This, therefore, is not an evaluation of the performance of individuals involved in the Flood Response Operation, but of a system-wide response. Where comments are made on individual agencies they should be seen within the wider inter-agency response.

Inevitably within this wider system individual agencies have expressed interests in particular elements of the operation. The Swedish Government, for example, who took a lead in initiating the study, expressed an interest in the principles of the operation, adherence to the 'Do No Harm' principle, how the operation worked with Somali communities, and the linking of relief and peace-building. Several stakeholders expressed an interest in the function of the SACB and the respective roles of UN agencies, ICRC and NGOs in this inter-agency operation. Several UN agencies expressed interest in the effectiveness of the funding mechanisms for joint UN appeals and operations. A key question for many was:

*How does the international community respond to an acute emergency in a country where there is no government?*

The Evaluation Team was struck by the concern expressed by many interviewees that the Evaluation was confined only to looking at Phase I. The problems experienced in Phase II - *Continued Relief* - the absence of a Phase III - *From Relief to Rehabilitation* - and the long term impacts of the floods, were for many in critical need of investigation. Coming in the wake of a prolonged drought and an on-going complex emergency, the floods of 1997 have left people in southern and central Somalia even more vulnerable to the vagaries of weather and political instability. While some of these concerns are strictly outside the terms of reference for this study, the Evaluation Team has sought to address many of them in the report.

The flood emergency was the first major humanitarian disaster in Somalia since the acute famine emergency of 1991-1993. In the intervening years significant developments have taken place within the international system responsible for providing assistance to populations affected by conflicts and natural disaster. Among others these include: a reduced willingness to undertake military intervention on humanitarian grounds (a direct outcome of the experience of UNOSOM in Somalia); a reduction in global transfers of official development assistance (oda); a reduction in donor spending on humanitarian assistance; a trend towards containment and refolement policies; the UN reform process; the adoption of conceptual models that link relief and development; ambivalence about the impact of humanitarian aid expressed in the 'do not harm' dictum; a proliferation of principles for humanitarian action; reforms within the NGO community to set standards and improve performance of humanitarian agencies (ODI, 1998). Some of these developments are reflected in some aspects of the Inter-Agency Response to the floods in Somalia. Where appropriate the report comments on these.

### **1.2.3 Lessons Learning**

Emphasis is placed in the terms of reference on this being a 'lessons learning' Evaluation. In this spirit, the authors have sought to reflect the views and analysis of the various stakeholders and actors involved in the operation, and interviewed during the course of the Evaluation. The report seeks to add to this with an independent analysis. It must be stressed that the Evaluation is only able to report findings and lessons. Learning and acting upon them is the responsibility of the relevant donors, humanitarian agencies and Somali citizens.

### **1.2.4 Methodology**

The basic methodology employed during the Evaluation was open-ended and semi-structured interviewing, combined with a documentary review. The Evaluation involved interviews and documentary review in Nairobi, southern Somalia and Geneva (see itinerary, Appendix I). The Evaluation Team provided a summary feedback to agencies in Nairobi. A draft report was presented to UNICEF for comment and feedback from participating agencies, before the report was finalised.

One interviewee quipped that the Evaluation was as long as the Phase I operation. Of course, Phase I involved upward of 27 agencies and 60 international employees, not to mention Somali partners, beneficiaries and external actors such as the media. And it generated a mass of documents. To ensure a representative cross-section of views are reflected in the evaluation required time. Over the period of the evaluation interviews were conducted with over 120 people (several more than once) individually or in group discussions.

### **1.2.5 Limitations of the Evaluation**

The Evaluation Team was unable to visit any areas in the Middle and Lower Juba. For contractual reasons the Evaluation Team came under the UN security umbrella. The outbreak of fighting in Kismayo in March 1998 between factions of the Harti, Ogadeni, Marrehan and Habr Gedir, meant that Lower and Middle was deemed to be out of bounds. Some 75% of assistance was targeted at the Juba and a major part of the Inter-Agency Flood Response took place in the Middle and Lower Juba. The fact that the Evaluation Team was unable to visit this area severely limited the scope of the Evaluation. Similarly the Team was unable to visit Mogadishu to meet people involved in the Mogadishu Flood Committee. On the other hand the team was able to spend more time in Hiraan and the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions, which received little mention in the SACB report on Phase I.

Efforts were made to meet all agencies involved in the operation. Unfortunately several international NGOs (INGOs) invited to a group meeting in Nairobi were unable to attend. In addition several people involved in the operation have since left their posts and it has not been possible to meet with them.

A key limitation with the Evaluation recognised by the Evaluation Team was the limited time spent in discussion with 'beneficiaries'. In part this was due to the lack of clarity made in arrangements for the visit to Somalia. With the exception of Bardera,









none of the locations visited were aware of the Team's arrival. Time available for visits outside the urban centres was limited.

Empirical evidence on the impact of the Phase I operation, on numbers of people reached, and on who benefited from the operation is difficult to obtain. Quantifying the total international investment in this system-wide response to the floods has also proved difficult. Assessing the 'legitimacy' of local authority structures, and cross-checking anecdotal stories for their validity is not feasible in so short a time. The authors therefore view this as more of a 'review' than an Evaluation. Nevertheless, for consistency with the terms of reference, the term Evaluation is retained.

### **1.3 Structure of the Report**

The principle findings of the Evaluation are presented in the Executive Summary. Findings and lessons learned are also incorporated within each section of the main report, so that these sections may be read separately.

**Part I** describes the objectives of the Evaluation. The sudden onset humanitarian emergency precipitated by the floods 'shocked' the international humanitarian system that has assumed 'caretaker' responsibility for Somalia. **Part II** assesses why the system was shocked. It does this by examining the political, operational and aid policy environment that pertained in Somalia towards the end of 1997, and the system of preparedness and early warning that existed prior to the floods. **Part III** documents and reviews Phase I of the international response to the Somalia floods. This covers the design of the Inter-Agency operation, its coordination and implementation, security issues, Somali participation in the flood response operations, and the funding of the operation.



## **PART II: THE HUMANITARIAN SYSTEM IN SOMALIA**

### **2. BEFORE THE FLOODS**

#### **2.1 Introduction**

The floods that hit Somalia at the end of 1997 were a shock to the Somali people and the international community alike. In Somalia traditional systems of flood warning were taken by surprise, as were international and regional early warning systems. This is not surprising; fast on-set disasters are by definition a shock. Significantly, however, the floods were seen as a shock to 'the system'.<sup>1</sup> That is, the international humanitarian system that has assumed 'caretaker' responsibility for Somalia.<sup>2</sup> This section assesses why 'the system' was shocked by examining the aid policy environment that pertained in Somalia towards the end of 1997.

#### **2.2 A Redefinition of the Crisis in Somalia**

A 'complex political emergency' has pertained in Somalia for seven years.<sup>3</sup> The flood emergency was the first major humanitarian disaster in Somalia since the acute famine emergency of 1991-1993, and the Inter-Agency Flood Response was the first large-scale humanitarian operation since UNOSOM (United Nations Operation in Somalia). Since 1993, international aid policy towards Somalia has changed. These changes reflect both the evolving political, military and economic situation within the country, and developments within the international humanitarian system.

In 1992 the emergency in Somalia was described by one US diplomat 'as the worst humanitarian crisis faced by any people in the world.' The acute humanitarian crisis is perceived to have ended in 1993.<sup>4</sup> Its end was signaled by the decision to withdraw of US troops from Somalia and the collapse of UNOSOM's mandate. The end of the emergency and the international response to it was formally marked by the *Fourth Coordination Meeting on Humanitarian Assistance for Somalia* and the *Addis Ababa Declaration* of December 1993, and the creation in February 1995 of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB), a donor-led forum for the coordination of aid (SACB, 1997, May). While maintaining a commitment to the provision of humanitarian assistance, the primary 'task' of the SACB was to switch the focus of international involvement in Somalia from 'relief to 'development' (ibid). From this point, Somalia's crisis was defined in developmental rather than humanitarian terms.

#### **2.3 Aid Coordination**

The very definition of a 'complex emergency' requires a system-wide response. Various aid and security coordination models have emerged to provide this.<sup>5</sup> In Somalia the mechanism for aid and security coordination that emerged post-UNOSOM was the SACB. The mandate ascribed to the SACB in 1994 was to:

operate until such time as Somalia re-establishes institutional machinery for national development management and aid coordination, and for coordination of development assistance with its international partners. (SACB, 1994, February 1-2).

The SACB is probably unique among international institutions for aid coordination. It is a donor-led forum, and is said to reflect a commitment made by donors in 1993 to Somalis to improve coordination (Kaspers, 1998, July 8). It is a voluntary association. With a membership that includes 39 embassies and donors, 19 UN agencies, the World Bank, ICRC, 55 international NGOs (INGOs), and 20 Somali NGOs (SNGOs), the SACB represents a significant constituency (SACB, 1998 March).

Opinion on the SACB is divided. It is lauded by most of its members for having improved aid coordination in Somalia post-UNOSOM. Some UN members consider it a valuable forum in which donors are engaged in strategic thinking and policy can be agreed on consensual basis. International NGOs are generally supportive of the SACB as it provides them a venue to participate in policy formulation, which they believe a UN-led forum would stifle. Certain sectoral sub-committees, such as health, are considered to have been very successful in establishing 'best practice' on issues such as incentive levels, or standards in cholera treatment.

While technical coordination may have improved, many member - donors, UN and NGOs - also express other concerns about the SACB. Typically, it is criticised for having grown too large and for having diluted itself in sub-committees which consume the time of agencies in Nairobi. Furthermore, the donors influence over policy formulation is not matched by sustained funding levels.

Unlike UN-led institutions, such as UNOSOM or OLS, the SACB is not the outcome of a Security Council resolution. It has no international legal status or mandate. It is thus unable to advocate on international laws in Somalia, and cannot be held accountable to them. This is problematic in a conflict-induced humanitarian emergency like Somalia where protection is a key humanitarian issue.

## **2.4 SACB Code of Conduct**

Likewise, the 1995 SACB *Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia* has no legal status. It has not been signed by SACB members or parties in Somalia. The sole leverage the SACB has on its application is to withhold assistance to areas which do not meet its conditions. Kidnappings and attacks on agencies in late 1997 and 1998 suggests that the SACB is unable to enforce the Code in Somalia. Application of the Code by SACB member agencies also varies.

Although the SACB is tasked with monitoring the coordination of relief and resettlement, no code has been written for humanitarian aid. While the Code of Conduct protects agencies there is no code for protecting the entitlements of populations in need. Recognising this omission, an IASC mission to Somalia in 1996 drafted guidelines for a Code of Conduct for humanitarian relief interventions. This stated:

The fundamental principle of humanitarian assistance is that people in need have a right to receive aid and that it is the mandate of assistance agencies to provide that. (IASC, 1996, February).

This Code was not developed further, and the absence of one is problematic. The voluntary nature of the SACB is seen by some of its members as a strength. However, the absence of an

internationally monitored mandate or set of principles leaves the SACB subject to the interests of its members. The claims of improved coordination are therefore undermined by lack of donor coherence. In the absence of a Somali government, donors choose where, who and what to invest in, often according to a very different interpretation of needs, policy criteria, or national interests.

Examples of regions where donor have shown particular interest include: the EC in Middle Shabelle and Hiraan, the Italian government in Lower Shabelle, the US government in Lower and Middle Juba and Bay. These interests have an impact on the running of agency programmes. More importantly they can impact on the entitlements of populations. With a large number of agencies working in Somalia each with their own mandates, accountability and the monitoring of performance is problematic. The probability of aid being integrated with the dynamics of violence are high where there is no agreed framework or principles for the delivery of aid.

## **2.5 The Primacy of Development**

The formation of the SACB institutionalised the shift in aid policy from relief to development. The EC, the largest single donor to Somalia, was entrusted with the chair of the SACB.(EC, 1997). The EC Somalia Unit was formed in 1993 when 'large parts of Somalia were moving towards relative stability' (EC, 1997). For the EC Somalia Unit, the SACB has been crucial for formulating a common strategy that donors are willing to invest in (Kaspers, 1998 July 8). Through the SACB the EC has been able to shape aid policy in Somalia through two rehabilitation programmes (1993-1995 and 1996-1998) of 38 million ECU and 47 million ECU respectively.

Within the UN system, the United Nations Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS) was created in February 1994 to support the SACB and Somali efforts to 'manage the process of rehabilitation and development' (SACB, 1997 May). The 'developmental' orientation of the international aid system for Somalia was further strengthened in late 1994 with the formation of the United Nations Coordination Team (UNCT), and the fusion of the office of the Resident Representative of UNDP and UN Resident Coordinator with that of the Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia.

As has been noted elsewhere, the agency origins of the Humanitarian Coordinator serves to reflect the dominant aid policy toward the country.<sup>6</sup> In Rwanda the experience of integrating development and emergency functions within one UN office is reported to have been positive (Lautze et al., 1998). In Sudan different conclusions were reached (Karim et al, 1996). In Somalia, UNDP not surprisingly gives rehabilitation, development and good governance strategic weight over humanitarian concerns.

## **2.6 Linking Relief, Development and Peace**

In refocusing aid policy from relief to development, the difficulties of formulating a unified aid strategy in a country with varying political and security environments was overcome through 'zonalisation' (IASC, 1996). Conceptual models to link relief and development, such as the relief-to-development continuum, were adopted to guide policy. In 1994, UNDP's programme in Somalia was focused on 'the integration of Sustainable Human Development into the relief to development continuum' (UNDP, 1994 October).

Although the notion of a linear continuum is recognised as problematic in a volatile country like Somalia, the continuum is manifest in the gradation of Somalia along a continuum from 'zones of crisis', through 'zones transition' to 'zones of recovery', as described in the 1996/7 *Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal* (CAP) (DHA, 1996, December). Linking relief and development is evident in the UNOPS' programmes which seek to operationalise the 'bridge' between relief and development in 'transitional zones' such as Gedo and Hiraan. Continuum thinking is also apparent in the approach taken by the EC-Somalia Unit in the first and Second Rehabilitation Programmes.<sup>7</sup> The UN, like the EC, acknowledges this positive shift of emphasis towards developments as:

a trend away from band-aid relief work towards building sustainable capacities inside Somalia (UNCT, 1998 June).

Programme strategies are based on certain 'lessons learned' by aid agencies working in Somalia since 1990 (OCHA, 1998 March: 5-7). Among others, these include the ideas that humanitarian aid can create dependency, fuel conflict and undermine local capacity. The strategies and principles adopted by the aid system, such as 'Somali ownership', 'decentralisation', 'modest levels of aid', 'do no harm', 'sustainability', 'capacity building' and 'peace-building' are intended to address these lessons.

## 2.7 Dependency

Dependency in particular is seen as one of Somalia's greatest ills. Pre-war Somalia was considered the classic aid-dependent state. The long term international financing of welfare services is commonly considered to have engendered a 'culture of dependency'. The international intervention during the famine years is said to have exacerbated this. The large-scale emergency projects during the UNOSOM era are said to have left the Somali population:

totally depending on the aid system to which they felt they were entitled as beneficiaries (QuestConsult, 1997).

This culture of dependency, it is argued, can be overcome, and development made sustainable, if Somalis take greater responsibility for their own development. Sustainability is defined in financial terms, in local capacity to finance and maintain projects (OCHA, 1998 March: 7).

A weakness with the dependency notion is that it over-estimates the current importance of aid in Somalia. The major investments in Somalia in recent years, such as telecommunications, have been made by Somalis. In Lower Shabelle the banana trade is estimated to be worth over US\$9 million annually. The combined budgets of agencies operational in the region is probably a fraction of the banana trade.<sup>8</sup> In 1997 private remittance companies in Mogadishu were estimated to be making inward transfers of up to US\$17 million a month (UNICEF, 1998 March), probably well in excess of current aid transfers to Mogadishu. It would take a much more generous welfare system to make people 'totally' dependent. Those who define populations as 'dependent' are the very people who control aid, including local officials, NGOs the UN and donors. A significant factor behind

this drive to overcome the 'dependency syndrome' and to build sustainability is a desire by the international community to reduce direct subsidies for welfare.

## 2.8 Behavioural Change

A recent element in the 'shift from an emergency approach to a more development-oriented approach' is the promotion of behavioural change (UNICEF, 1998: 10). The rationale for this is the 'important lesson' that '*development usually requires change in human behaviour*' (Langenbacher, 1997, October 13). Furthermore,

The need to address this amidst the complexity of the Somali mixture of clan, custom and religion, has brought increasing recognition of the imperative to know more about the people and their society. (ibid).

An improved cultural understanding is a commendable objective. Implicit, however, in this is the idea that a change in human behaviour would require a change in Somali culture. A cultural interpretation of Somalia's developmental needs is very narrow, and neglects other historical and contemporary, political and economic factors.

As an educational strategy, behavioural change has a role in programmes such as cholera prevention or diarrhoea management. However, it is also used as a strategy to address the 'root causes' of chronic problems such as malnutrition, through better feeding or hygiene practices (UNICEF, 1998). Whether root causes of malnutrition are better addressed by affecting behavioural practices or through improving income opportunities and access to food, as suggested by FSAU data and ACF surveys in Mogadishu (Broudic, 1997, October), is debatable.

At another level, as suggested by the above quote, the emphasis on behavioural change reflects a psychological and cultural analysis of the conflict in Somalia, a general feature noted of current aid policy (Duffield 1997). This was only too evident in many of the interviews conducted during the Evaluation. Interviewers readily offered evidence of Somali cultural traits - such as 'Somalis perceive death differently' or 'Somalis think more about their camels than their wives or children' - to explain responses of agencies during the floods, or the general conditions in Somalia. There is a need to distinguish between opinion and facts. To explain the Somali conflict, looting, aid diversion or dependency in behavioural terms is too simplistic. It also fails to address the 'behavioural problems' of the international community. When regional governments supply arms to competing factions in Somalia, or when donors pick and choose where to invest on the basis of national interests, one may question whose behaviour needs changing?<sup>9</sup>

## 2.9 Making Assistance Conditional

The refocusing of aid policy from humanitarian to development concerns envisaged in the Addis Ababa Declaration was based on two premises. First, in late 1993 Somalia was seen to be at a 'historic crossroads' (SACB, 1997: 16). The nutritional and health crisis which led to over 200,000 excess deaths had peaked in October 1992 (Hansch, et al, 1994). The violence and asset stripping that caused famine conditions had declined. Although military confrontations have continued in some contested areas, the levels of violence witnessed in 1991-1993 have not been repeated.<sup>10</sup> While many areas remain insecure and 'ungoverned',

the restoration of stability in some regions and the emergence of authority structures has created conditions considered conducive to rehabilitation and development. Second, as the Addis Ababa agreement noted, 'international reserves of patience and funds were running out' (SACB, 1997:16). Henceforth the way forward in Somalia was to be 'determined by the Somali people themselves'.

Therefore, while essential emergency assistance remained unconditional, certain important conditions were placed on the shift from relief to development. These were spelled out in the 1993 *Addis Ababa Declaration*, in the 1995 SACB *Code of Conduct for International Rehabilitation and Development Assistance to Somalia*, and the UN's 1996/97 CAP (UNDHA, 1996a December). They are:

- that 'legitimate' regional bodies should be in place to partner international donors (SACB, 1994 April 18-19);
- that responsible authorities should ensure that peace and security prevail (SACB, 1997, May);
- and that 'the main resources required to improve the conditions of these communities will come from Somalis themselves' (UNDHA, 1996b, December: 5).

These conditionalities were a response to the massive diversion and abuse of aid that took place during the 1991-93 famine. They have been important in mapping out the relationship between the international community and Somalia.

#### a) Governance and Security

These conditions serve notice that the presence of legitimate authorities is critical in determining whether emergency or rehabilitation funding can be used. Clearly, in the absence of 'recognised' authorities the ability of aid agencies to scale up from individual or household level interventions is limited. Judging the 'legitimacy' of local authorities, however, remains a vexed question. Although 'governance' has become a key word, there is little agreement over its meaning and application, sometimes even within the same agency. While some argue for agencies to work with district authorities as the only legitimate bodies that exist, others suggest that they exist solely to 'talk to foreigners'. Institutional imperatives are often apparent in these arguments.

The international community's main measure of legitimacy is the capacity of an authority to provide security, as spelled out in the SACB Code of Conduct. The trend to invest in north east Somalia and Somaliland is an example of this. Making rehabilitation assistance conditional on security and peace, however, conveniently ignores issues of justice. Furthermore, security is narrowly defined in the Code of Conduct in terms of a 'safe and secure environment' *for aid agencies*. As the SACB advises donors and implementing agencies where a safe and secure environment exists, the SACB in effect judges where governance is legitimate. This is problematic given that the SACB is a voluntary association subject to the interests of agencies, donors and individuals. As noted by several interviewees, one consequence of this is that 'needs' are defined on the basis of political expediency and the interests of donors rather than objective need. Despite important changes in the coordination and disbursement of aid since UNOSOM, Somalia remains vulnerable to the vagaries of regional and international political and commercial interests.

The impact of such political conditionalities on people's entitlements can be severe. For example, between 1995 and 1997 Middle Shabelle was considered a model 'transition zone'. Major investments were made there by the EC and the UN. Renewed insecurity in the region in 1997 led to the withdrawal of agencies by late 1997. The SACB redefined the Middle Shabelle as a 'zone of crisis' and EC rehabilitation funds were stopped. This brought the hospital to a virtual standstill. Without a referral centre the health system is weakened, although in the opinion of many health needs have not declined.<sup>11</sup>

#### b) International Responsibility

These conditionalities imply a change in the perceived responsibilities of the international community towards the security and welfare of the Somali people. What were previously taken as the international humanitarian community's responsibility, are now the responsibility of Somali leaders. This assumes a level of concern among Somali warlords for their people that has been notable by its absence. And, in its absence, an ability among the rest of the population to meet their own security and welfare needs which is not there.

#### c) The Peace Dividend

The 'reward' for meeting these conditions is the so-called 'peace dividend', in the form of rehabilitation and development.<sup>12</sup> Although it is claimed that there is no clear correlation between humanitarian and political policies, this approach conforms with the approach of IGAD to peace-building in Somalia. That is, to invest in areas with a commitment to peace (Stephen, 1998, May 22). It is an approach that the Secretary General has also endorsed. In the UN's words:

the most important work of the UN is to invest in the rehabilitation and development of the social and economic fabric of relatively peaceful areas (UNCT, 1998, June).

Currently about 40% EC funding (including ECHO) is said to be spent in the south and 40% in Somaliland.<sup>13</sup> However, from 1999, it is expected that the majority of the EU rehabilitation budget (ECU 30 million) will be invested in northern Somalia (Kaspers, 1998 July 8). It is reported that most educational money is being invested in the north, and that there are now more INGOs working in the northern regions than in the south.<sup>14</sup> In 1996/97 the largest proportion of overall international assistance to Somalia (c.US\$30) million was spent on emergency programmes in the crisis zones (OCHA, 1998 March: 2). However, over half of this was accounted for by ICRC.<sup>15</sup> At the same time the UN estimates that it spent 2.2 times more per person in 'the peaceful northern areas' (UNCT, 1998, June). Furthermore, of the funds spent in the south a third were spent on disaster relief programmes in central and southern areas affected by floods and drought, with two thirds on recovery and development programmes. Thus, in its own words: 'UN expenditure in 1997 favoured development-oriented activities' (ibid).

While a positive benefit of the peace dividend may be increased investment in zones of recovery in north east Somalia and Somaliland, this is only comparative to southern regions. The negative side of this policy is seen in what the UN itself recognises as the growing 'divergence' between Somalia's northern and southern regions (OCHA, 1998, March). The divergence is evident in southern Somalia where 'periodic' and 'localised' humanitarian emergencies, and 'chronic' humanitarian needs in health education and water are

characteristic of a 'complex emergency.' (ibid:1). Where the international aid community establishes rehabilitation, development or good governance as its objectives, the system rewards the achievement of peace and stability. It collectively punishes those populations where peace and stability has not been achieved. These are in Somalia's southern regions which have three quarters of the country's population.

Interestingly, the funding trends, if accurate, contradict claims that aid encourages dependency, fuels conflict and undermines local capacity. According to this logic, it is the northern areas where there is greater aid investment and aid agency presence, rather than the south, that one would expect to encounter problems of dependency, conflict and weak local capacity.

## 2.10 A Decline in Humanitarian Assistance

Read positively Somali solutions to Somali problems denotes support for Somali self-reliance and independence. Read negatively, it signifies a disengagement from the problem. Interviews conducted during the course of the Evaluation point to the latter. Most aid workers expressed concern at the lack of international interest in Somalia, and even donor representatives complained that the funds for Somalia were declining.

The 1993 Addis Ababa conference in fact forewarned that funds for Somalia were running out. And since 1993 there has been a dramatic decline in aid resources to Somalia. From an annual budget of US\$1.5 billion for UNOSOM II in 1993 (Makinda, 1993: 79), foreign assistance to Somalia has fallen below pre-war and pre-UNOSOM levels (UNDHA, 1996a, December: 13). Since 1993, the CAP has raised less than a third of the funding requirements of UN agencies. (See table below). Although the 1996/97 CAP received over 36% of funding requirements, of this only US\$22 million was new money. By June the CAP for 1998 had received pledges amounting to only 8% of requirements. Since 1993, the CAP in fact has only accounted for 28% of total humanitarian assistance to Somalia, with a significant proportion channelled through ICRC and NGOs. However, in 1996/97, assistance through non-UN channels had dropped to less than half that in 1993.

**Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia 1993-1997 (US\$)**

Year	UN APPEAL	INCOME FROM APPEAL	% APPEAL COVERED	HUMANITARIAN AID VIA NON-UN CHANNELS	TOTAL
1993	148,086,950	36,869,152	24.9%	165,213,170	202,082,322
1995	93,189,173	28,653,976	30.7%	30,773,705	59,427,681
1996/97	100,558,830	38,978,660	36.1%	70,186,526	109,165,186
TOTAL	341,834,953	104,501,788	30.5%	266,173,401	370,675,189

Source: DHA/OCHA. 1994, 1996, 1998. Note: No information was available for 1994.

From a massive US\$51 million at the height of the famine in 1992 UNICEF Somalia has seen its decline in income to US\$8 million in 1997 (UNICEF, 1998 January). Since 1993 expenditure has outstripped income. The carry over of funds from 1991 and 1992 has enabled


UNICEF to continue higher levels of programming than they would normally be able. In 1996/7 funding for basic education was entirely based on carry over funding with no new money (Spring, 1997, September 26). However, carry-over funds are running out, and the underfunding of 'emergency' programme means that the 'capacity of UNICEF to respond to 'loud' emergencies are seriously hampered' (ibid).

Several factors account for the decline in funding. It is estimated that perhaps 90% of UNOSOM II budget was for military and security support, and that only 4.5% of the total expenditure of UNOSOM II went into the Somali economy (ROAPE, 1995: 273). The dismantling of UNOSOM's security infrastructure therefore accounts for a large decline in funding. Without the security many NGOs withdrew from Somalia, thereby reducing channels for the disbursement of aid. In 1994 the crisis in the Great Lakes meant that international humanitarian priorities changed.


Important also has been the redefinition of needs in Somalia in rehabilitation and development terms. Reductions in emergency funds have not been paralleled by an increase in development assistance, as donors have been unwilling to contribute development funds in the absence of a political settlement.<sup>16</sup>

Finally, the reduction in assistance to Somalia reflects an global decline in the transfer of official development assistance (oda). Following the sharp increase in emergency aid expenditure by donor governments in the late 1980s and early 1990s, since 1995 these have declined (Macrae, 1996).

Some agency's believe that funding levels may have stabilised. UNICEF, for example, argue that the decline in funding can be stemmed by improving the quality of their programmes and demonstrating impact (Paganini, 1998 May 20). For UNICEF, this has involved revising sectoral strategies and, importantly, making a distinction between 'humanitarian', 'rehabilitation', and 'development' activities. A more pessimistic view is that despite such changes funding will continue to decline, and that agencies in Somalia will have to compete more with the needs of other disaster affected countries in the region.



Source: DHA/OCHA (ibid)



(Source: OCHA, 1998 March)

## 2.11 'Jointness'

One response by the UN to the decline in resources in Somalia has been efforts to rationalise its operations through joint services (air and security), joint assessments and joint programming. This follows the recommendations of the 1996 IASC mission to Somalia, whose main objective was to develop a resource mobilisation strategy (IASC, 1996).<sup>17</sup> The joint UN offices being established in places such as Beletweyne are therefore as much about budget cuts as more appropriate programming.

The 'jointness' championed by the UN, however, has been the least successful aspect of the CAPs, with donors reluctant to fund joint programmes, despite their apparent encouragement of the concept (UNDP, 1998). The inter-agency response to the floods in Somalia provided an opportunity to test the joint programming concept.

## 2.12 Funding Policies

Beneath some of the resource problems faced by agencies in Somalia is a lack of coherence among donors and between agencies and donors in funding policies. Some donors are prepared to make rehabilitation funds available. Others will only fund humanitarian activities. While some donors support joint programming, others do not.

In the context of a continuing complex emergency, it is interesting to note that emergency funding requirements in the CAP have declined. In the 1996/7 Inter-Agency Appeal, emergency funding requirements by UN agencies constituted 10.7% of overall requirements for Joint Programmes, and 24.9% for individual UN agencies (UNDHAA, 1996 December). In 1998, emergency funding requirements constituted only 3.7% of overall requirements (OCHA, 1998, March). In the opinion of many people interviewed during the Evaluation, the

down turn in emergency funding requirements in the CAP does not necessarily reflect a decline in needs.

The changes in the mechanism for raising emergency funds, reflects a change in the approach and objectives of humanitarian community in Somalia. In 1996 the CAP in Somalia stopped being a purely fundraising mechanism. Instead, the appeal process was used to formulate a strategic framework for Somalia. According to OCHA, the CAP is intended to reflect 'a common humanitarian strategy' (Boutroue, 1998 August 13). To the extent that it succeeded, the CAP for Somalia is compared favourably to those for other countries. (Beigbeder, 1998, August 13). One consequence of this, however, is that what was once a special appeal for a country in a complex emergency has, in effect, become a regular country programming document for the UN in Somalia. Subsequently, donor contributions to the CAP have declined and UN agencies have come to rely to a greater degree on their own agency contributions to fund their activities. In 1996/97 UN agency contributions accounted for US\$ 57 million (34%) of total assistance to Somalia (see pie chart). While the funds for emergency preparedness are sought through the CAP, the strategy is to use Flash Appeals for raising funds for extra-'routine emergencies', or so-called 'loud emergencies'. In other words, to raise funds for an acute emergency within a chronic emergency.

### **2.13 A Decline in Humanitarian Response Capacity**

One consequence of the decline in funding is that the capacity of the humanitarian system to be prepared and able to respond to crises in Somalia is diminished. The end of UNOSOM saw a large-scale withdrawal of agencies from southern Somalia, and contraction in programmes. Prior to UNOSOM's departure in 1994, for example, UNICEF had supported 70 health clinics in the Juba valley. The difficult operational environment in the south and the northwards drift of resources means that INGOs 'are voting with their feet' (Spring, 1998, June 3). In 1993 40 INGOs were recorded working in southern and central Somalia (INGO Consortium, March 1993). There are currently some 26 INGOs. The limited capacity of those remaining to undertake emergency response was noted by many people interviewed. During the floods only two INGOs had their own emergency stocks at hand.

Within the UN, the capacity of the UNCU as the focal point for emergencies is limited, and responsibilities for large-scale emergencies are delegated to technical agencies like UNICEF. In 1996, however, the response capacity of UNICEF was itself down-graded with the dismantling of USERT (UNICEF Somalia Emergency Response Team).<sup>18</sup> In this context the restructuring of UNICEF's programme in southern Somalia, which will mean a reduced presence on the ground, was of concern to several agencies interviewed during the Evaluation.

Efficient and effective systems have been created to respond and contain the so-called 'periodic' and 'localised' humanitarian crises such as drought, or annual cholera outbreaks (OCHA, 1998, March). These systems are being improved with the establishment of nutritional alert sites and improved analysis provided by FSAU. However, Somalia's humanitarian crisis is more chronic than the descriptions localised or periodic suggest.

## 2.14 Accommodating Chronic Vulnerability and Distress

It is within an environment of limited and declining resources that the shift towards development, the emphasis placed on 'Somali solutions to Somali problems', and notions of 'aid dependency', can also be understood. As international resources for sustaining welfare services decline, responsibility for meeting them is being passed on to Somalis through participation and privatisation. While rationalised in terms of sustainability, Somali ownership and good governance, there is little evidence that Somali populations are able to sustain welfare services any more than they were before the war. The cost recovery programme in Merka hospital, for example, is reported to meet 1-2% of the hospital's financial needs (Kavali, 1998, June 18). An inability to meet such costs should not be confused with an unwillingness to do so or dependency. In an on-going complex emergency like Somalia, there is a risk that as programmes move from relief to development, the emphasis placed on sustainable services means that people's entitlements and access are actually cut.

Despite the redefinition of the crisis in Somalia and a view that the period of humanitarian emergencies is over, in the opinion of many people interviewed during the Evaluation the situation in Somalia post-floods is showing a down-turn with increased conflict in many areas, and greater vulnerability in food security for much of the population. Rather than there being a progressive move along the continuum, in much of the country things appear to be slipping back. Crop assessment reports in July 1998 and the economic crisis in the northern regions as a result of the livestock export ban is raising the spectre of a new nutritional crisis in parts of the country in 1998. In June 1998 alone, 10,000 displaced were reported to have arrived in Mogadishu from Bay (Anglade, 1998 June 16). Indeed, the UN itself recognises that:

Most of what is considered rehabilitation work in Somalia would, in any other context, constitute an emergency action. (OCHA, 1998, March 9)

While it may be true that Somalia never was the world's poorest country,<sup>19</sup> the following statistics indicate that Somalia by any standards it remains in a state of chronic disaster (UNICEF, 1998, March 30).<sup>20</sup>

- Numbers of refugees and internally displaced (idps) have declined since 1993. However, there remain 200,000 IDPs in Somalia and 407,500 Somali refugees in the region (ibid). With over 22,000 displaced families in Mogadishu south and 3,000 in Mogadishu north displacement remains a chronic problem.
- Infant, child and maternal mortality rates are among the highest in the world.<sup>21</sup>
- Primary school enrollment is one of the lowest in the world, with attendance even lower. Three quarters of primary schools offer only 4 out the 8 primary grades. Almost the entire population of children between the ages of 10-18 years have never been educated.
- An estimated 90% of curative health care is accessed only through private clinics.

- Cholera has been endemic in Somalia since 1994. Prior to 1994 the last outbreak was 1985, and the early 1970s. Some 60,000 people are estimated to have been affected since 1994. An effective response mechanism means that a fatality rates have been kept as low as 4.6%, which compares favourably with other countries in the region,
- Somalia may have the highest incidence of tuberculosis in the world. Even before the war it is estimated that 80% of the adult population was infected, and increasing by 12,000 cases per year. The prevalence is estimated to be much higher now. It is a major complication in malnutrition; a third of children in therapeutic feeding centres in Mogadishu are reported to have TB (Anglade, 1998 June 16). There is a major danger of an HIV-initiated TB explosion.
- While malnutrition rates in northern regions are reported to be low, significant pockets of moderate to severe malnutrition exist Mogadishu, in Bay and Hiraan and among other population groups in the southern zone of Somalia (Camberley, 1997).

The immediate causes of malnutrition are disease and levels of food security. However, as malnutrition is most prevalent among certain socio-economic groups, *access* to food and health services, rather than food availability is the main determinant of malnutrition.<sup>22</sup> This is important. In a complex political emergency characterised by human rights abuses, asset stripping and illegal acquisition of land, the crisis in Somalia is not so much a problem of development per se but of protection. It is in this context that absence of a coherent humanitarian framework for Somalia is of concern.

The use of the CAP as an annual programming tool, noted earlier, reflects an accommodation with the chronic levels of need in Somalia. The failure of donors to meet funding requirements suggests that levels of need in Somalia have somehow become 'normal', rather than exceptional, requiring special attention and funds. One reason given for this is that the threshold in Somalia was set very high in 1991 to 1993, and crises have to reach nearly these proportions again before donors respond (Langenbacher, 1998 June 5). This apparent acceptance by donor governments of high levels of distress has been noted in other countries (Duffield, 1997; Bradbury, 1998).

Donors may want to see sustainable results for their money, but this is to misunderstand the 'realities' of Somalia. Part of the issue seems to lie in the definition of what constitutes a humanitarian emergency. Emergencies are still for the most part conceived of by donors and aid agencies within a classic 'natural disaster' model. That is short term and something that effects all equally. In protracted crises like Somalia, the notion of 'emergencies' as being a transitory phenomenon has become less relevant.<sup>23</sup> A characteristic of complex emergencies is that they arise from a political crisis in which certain groups are vulnerable to the predatory actions of others. The challenge is how to respond to chronic vulnerability and distress arising from a political crisis. The choice which appears to have been made by donor governments is to withdraw, until Somalis find a solution.

With this accommodation the humanitarian entitlements of populations in need are eroded. This is apparent in the changes in the criteria for discharging under five children from Supplementary Feeding Centres (SFCs). In Mogadishu SFCs have become part of the food economy of families (Largard, 1998 June 9). UNICEF were not prepared or able to continue paying for this. In 1997 the criteria for discharging children from SFCs was changed - from

discharging children once they had attained 85% weight for height, to discharging those who had attained 80% w.f.h. This resulted in a 50% reduction in the numbers of children in SFCs in Mogadishu. While SFC's may not be sustainable, they have not been replaced by an alternative response. The frustrations of working in a complex emergency are obvious. When feeding centres become employment centres first and life-saving centres second, one is left questioning the purpose of the intervention. However, should the grinding realities of working in a complex emergency be a reason for cutting entitlements, or a reason to increase assistance? To close SFCs because they provide people with employment in a situation where employment opportunities are lacking is, in effect, to blame and punish mothers and children, the marginalised and the weakest.

## **2.16 Conclusions**

Everyone, including Somalis, were shocked by the scale of the floods. They were the worst floods since 1961, and unlike 1961 there was no government to respond. The SACB/UN having assumed the mantle of 'international caretaker' (albeit in exile) had a responsibility to show that it can 'take care' in Somalia. During Phase I of the Flood Response operation it demonstrated a certain capability to do this. However, many people in southern Somalia remain in a state of chronic vulnerability and distress. As suggested by the UN, it is inadequate for donors to respond solely to headline grabbing natural disasters, such as floods, that leave long term chronic needs in their wake.

The report on Phase I of the Flood Response by the Flood Emergency Management Team concluded that the lack of a mechanism within the SACB to monitor and take action during emergencies was a constraint to the timeliness of the international response (SACB, 1998, January). The Evaluation team concurs with their recommendation that a mechanism should be established within the SACB or UN for emergency monitoring and preparedness, and for response and coordination. In this respect the role of the UNCU should be reviewed.

But this by itself is insufficient. It is not simply a matter of better coordination. Somalia has an abundance of coordination forums. Rather the absence of such a mechanism reflects a certain weakness in the current humanitarian framework among donors and aid agencies in Somalia. The creation of such a mechanism, therefore, needs to be accompanied by a review of this framework, and the international community's commitment to fulfil its humanitarian responsibilities in Somalia. There needs to be an understanding of the costs, for example, in shifting from relief to development, from meeting 'life-saving needs', to addressing 'root causes' through development and governance programmes. The costs, we suggest, can be seen in some of the highest levels of infant mortality in the world, the lowest levels of primary education in the world, endemic cholera, chronic malnutrition in Somalia's southern regions, and so on.

It was suggested by more than one interviewee during the Evaluation that humanitarian aid postpones solutions, and it may be necessary for Somalia to 'hit rock bottom' before Somalis themselves are ready to address critical issues of governance. Many Somalis are already at rock bottom. If the aid community accepts this thesis it has come a long way from the principles of humanitarianism, and the right of all people in distress to assistance.

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Interview. Paganini, 1998, May 19

<sup>2</sup> The UN defines its role as 'international caretaker' (OCHA, 1998 March 5).

<sup>3</sup> Longer if one traces the start of the civil war to 1988.

<sup>4</sup> In fact the famine is assessed to have peaked by October 1992, before the intervention of UNITAF (Hansch, et al. 1994, November).

<sup>5</sup> While their differences to some extent reflect diverse operating environments, they are also illustrative of the ad hoc nature of the international community's response to complex emergencies. They also reflect the particular interests of foreign countries at a historic point.

<sup>6</sup> The Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Somalia is formally appointed by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) but is an employee of UNDP. There are no OCHA employees in UNCT.

<sup>7</sup> See the 1997 Evaluation of the European Commission First Rehabilitation Programme in Somalia by QuestConsult.

<sup>8</sup> At the time of the Evaluation there were only three INGOs with a significant presence in Lower Shabelle, a few SNGOs and WHO.

<sup>9</sup> Some Somalis argue that the common accusation that 'Somalis treat aid agencies as milch camels' is inappropriate, for Somalis consider milch camels are clean.

<sup>10</sup> The withdrawal of the remaining UNOSOM forces in early 1995 did not lead to the expected resumption of fighting. The contested areas where significant fighting has occurred include Mogadishu continuously, Hiraan in 1994, Bay and Bakool since 1995, Gedo in 1996 and 1997, Kismayo and the Lower and Middle Juba in 1997.

<sup>11</sup> Interviews: Heinonen, 1998, May 28; McTyre, 1998, June 23; Dr Abdullahi Sheik Hussein, 1998, June 24

<sup>12</sup> See also the 1997 Evaluation of the First Rehabilitation Programme of the European Commission by QuestConsult.

<sup>13</sup> No figures were available from the EC to corroborate this. A large percentage of funds spent in Somaliland are spent in Berbera.

<sup>14</sup> The Evaluation Team was unable to obtain any accurate data to illustrate trends in regional distribution of assistance to Somalia. Neither UNDP or UNICEF were able to provide such information. The lack of such data in the SACB or UN would seem to be an important omission.

<sup>15</sup> ICRC accounted for CHF 25.3 million or US \$16.8 million.

<sup>16</sup> A three year UNDP rehabilitation programme, for example, was funded for US \$36 million from UNDP core funds. No new funding is available to extend the programme for a further year. The budget for year three therefore will be used to cover years three and four (Lazarus, 1998, May 30)

<sup>17</sup> A back drop to this is also the global reform of the UN.

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<sup>18</sup> This had been created in 1994 in the expectation of further population displacements. Some of the stocks used during the floods came from those stockpiled by USERT.

<sup>19</sup> Somalia's pastoral economy has always been underestimated.

<sup>20</sup> Unless noted, the following statistics are drawn from UNICEF 1998, March 30.

<sup>21</sup> IMR: 125/1,000; child U-5 MR: 211/1,000; MMR 1,600/10,000 live births.

<sup>22</sup> The FSAU define vulnerability of populations in terms of 'access'.

<sup>23</sup> Short term (6 months or even 1 year) emergency funding is not an appropriate response to permanent emergencies. The decision by ECHO to increase their funding period from six to nine months reflects this reality (Sayer, 1998 June 9).

### **3. PREPAREDNESS**

#### **3.1 Introduction**

Somalia is prone to a range of natural and manmade 'shocks' to a livelihood system exhibiting progressively weakening resilience. Causes have included political instability, civil unrest, and natural calamities resulting in sickness and famine. Somalis have been forced from their homes to neighbouring regions, even fleeing across borders. Some events are relatively predictable and containable, and prior to 1991, were responded to with the involvement of the then government apparatus. For instance, during the floods of 1981, Somali Airforce helicopters were immediately deployed to rescue stranded victims (Carter, June 11).

Floods are relatively common in Somalia, with many older Somalis interviewed by the Evaluation Team remembering a major event in 1961 when the Juba and Shabelle rivers joined (and almost as serious as 1997). Since then there have been smaller events in the 70's, another major event in 1981 (when the rivers again joined), one in 1987, and a series of small but damaging floods since 1994. The general impression received was that progressively smaller flood crests have been leading to uncontrolled and damaging inundation, largely due to the cumulative lack of investment in maintenance of flood control infrastructure and the general disruption of systems by insecurity.

Since 1991 the Nation State has retreated in Somalia. Recent times have seen the emergence, of political, self-ruling regional entities. Indeed, a surprisingly vigorous economic environment favours a small though significant proportion of the people. There exists few resources to cope with disasters, and few revenues are collected to fund public-welfare initiatives. Somalia remains a very poor country where, in the near absence of preventative or mitigative investments, vulnerability to natural calamities continues to increase.

So-called 'failed and frayed States' present a dilemma. The UN and INGOs, have been forced to assume increasingly 'caretaker-government' responsibilities in such countries. In Somalia, the international community find they have assumed the onerous responsibility of both helping stem further decline in the country's development, whilst administering relief capacities to address crises as they recur. Aid funding supports sectors as diverse as the 'national' health system, air traffic control, and themes such as the promotion of governance and international negotiation on behalf of livestock traders. There is no early prospect of central government being re-instated, or return of a formal economy, and with evident recent diminution of aid flows to Somalia it is unclear as to how the near 10-year long crisis of under-investment in capacity-building, disaster prevention and mitigation measures will be resolved.

#### **3.2 Capacities**

The Somalia Aid Co-ordination Body under a hierarchy of chaired committees provides a forum bringing together the 'held capacities' of the humanitarian

community<sup>1</sup>. For purposes of disaster response, the operational agencies with any scale and reach number around fifteen. The principal actors include WFP, UNICEF, UNDP/SRP and ICRC, supported by FAO, WHO, UNDP/UNDOS and FSAU, and the well-established INGOs. Each of the operational entities have active programmes on the ground, and have jointly developed a considerable understanding of Somalia.

A number of the larger agencies hold regional stockpiles of emergency materials and supplies and operational equipment for response intervention, the latter comprised mainly of staff support and communication equipment. To bolster regionally-held stockpiles, to help compensate for the lack of availability of materials in the local marketplace, a number of donors hold stocks in the USA and Europe. Additional staff and services are held in pools of staff and consultant rosters and in pre-agreed understandings with international specialist service providers.

To resource disaster responses, agencies can draw upon a wide range of funds. First-action funds can often be released from the agency's current working capital, usually requiring HQ approval, bolstered in turn by various forms of Emergency Revolving Funds. An Appeal process, either jointly as in the CAP, or individually by agency to the public or international donor agencies is initiated simultaneously. A WFP mechanism, with donor blessing, permits short-term food loans within or between regions, only requiring additional funding if commodities have to be carried over extended or more expensive delivery routes.

In spite the particular challenges of working in such a context, agencies have developed the expertise to respond in a timely and effective manner to common recurrent crises in Somalia. A frequent scenario has been drought leading to the distress and displacement of Somali farmers and pastoralists, with access often complicated by insecurity.

Notwithstanding the decline of funding availability for Somalia these past 4 years, resulting in smaller regionally-held capacities, some excellent elements of preparedness planning are evident within the system. One notable model is the co-ordinated and well developed approach taken by the health sector agencies in relation to cholera preparedness planning and response. Another, is the increasing reliable monitoring and vulnerability mapping of population groupings in Somalia.

### **3.3 Monitoring and Vulnerability Mapping**

The Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU), managed by WFP Somalia, and funded by EC Somalia Unit monitors vegetation and climatology, agriculture and livestock, trade and logistics, market prices, nutrition/health and population movements in Somalia. With roots in the food economy approach as the analytical and interpretative framework for food security assessment developed by SCF (UK), it shares findings monthly with all agencies and diplomatic missions in Nairobi, and also issues occasional special topic publications under the title, FSAU Focus.

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<sup>1</sup> The donor set, represented by 35 Embassies, High Commissions and Consulates, USAID, EC and ECHO; 19 UN or affiliate organisations and The World Bank; 57 International NGOs and 20 Local Somali NGO's.

### **Food Economy Analysis**

Household food economy analysis explores the different ways that households access food. In Somalia/Somaliland households access food through: production (crops, livestock), purchase from the market, gifts (including relief); wild foods (fishing, hunting, wild fruits, nuts, vegetables). To assess food purchases it is necessary to look at sources of income and expenditure patterns. Main sources of income are: sale of crops, livestock/livestock products, self-employment, labour (both agricultural and urban), trade, gifts (including remittances). Expenditure tends to be on food, clothes, soap and other household items, agricultural inputs and education.

The food economy analysis divides the population into food economy groups and then into wealth groups: poor, middle and better-off, using local definitions of wealth. A food economy group are people who share similar methods of accessing food and are at risk to similar events (floods, droughts, livestock disease...). The main food economy groups in Somalia/Somaliland are: pastoral, agro-pastoral, urban, flood and pump-irrigated farming, rain-fed farming. Different food economy groups and wealth groups are vulnerable to different degrees to crisis. Information by both food economy group and by wealth group can be used to improve the targeting of interventions.

The approach initially looks at the different ways that people access food in a 'normal' year - a year post 1990 that was not good, not bad in terms of food access. In a normal year it is assumed that the household food basket is sufficient to provide 1900kcal per day. It is also assumed that income should be more than or equal to expenditure. This encourages a more thorough investigation of all sources of food and income in order to create a picture that 'adds up' and makes sense.

The approach then moves on to look at how these ways of accessing food change in a poor year. Both the baseline and information on changes in a poor year can be combined with on-going monitoring data (food economy, crop production, nutrition, health, market price and NDVI data) and contribute to: assessment of the current food security situation; the identification of vulnerable populations; the targeting of appropriate food and non-food responses by donors, UN agencies and NGOs. It should also help lead to a more dynamic perspective on how access to food changes in good and bad years from one year to the next.

Source: Jane Macaskill, SCF-UK/FSAU, draft from an forth-coming article, 'An overview of the food economy groups in Somalia/Somaliland'

While not avowing to provide an early warning mechanism for fast-onset natural disasters of the nature of the 1997 floods, the FSAU does issue Cereal Supply Outlooks and Food Needs Assessments as a base for future food aid programming. In spite of the delays inherent in publication of its findings, the forecasting assists a wide community of aid planners in preparing for and adequately responding to the socio-economic impacts of drought. The incorporation of cultural and social factors in their reporting contributes in the broadest sense to preparedness, in that it helps the whole assisting community appreciate and understand far better the dynamics of Somali society and imbues sensitivity in any response efforts. The lag period between observing then analysing and releasing data, does not detract from the utility of the FSAU function in helping anticipate slow-onset crises.

#### **Principal findings:**

1. Both Somalis, and the international assistance agencies were ill-prepared to respond immediately and effectively to a flooding event of such magnitude.
2. Preparedness planning for crises in Somalia existed at two levels. (i) An information gathering and analysis function provided by FSAU to help relief planners identify and target populations vulnerable to likely risks and threats. (ii)

All agencies were addressing the practical planning challenge of maintaining adequate funding streams, and appropriate held-levels of relief materials and organisational capacities to respond to recurrent natural crises, although with a focus on drought-related events.

3. There has been a long history of floods in Somalia; in 1961 (major), throughout the 1970s, in 1981 (when the two rivers joined), in 1987, and a series of smaller flood events since 1994, all of which exceeded the 'normal' range of flood recession farming. Research and project studies conducted pre-1991, provide clear warnings of the likelihood of large flooding events and their impacts. With the exception of an EC study in the Middle Shabelle in the mid-1990s, much of this research has been overlooked.
4. Some flood preventative and alleviation work has been undertaken in the intervening years. In 1996, ICRC, funded by USAID, carried out repair work to flood protection infrastructure in the lower Juba. However, much of this was damaged by the floods and will need to be renewed.
5. While it may not be considered cost-effective or appropriate to divert large resources to preparedness for arguably such rare events as 'superfloods', many interviewed during the Evaluation argue that a better balance has to be achieved and maintained within the system.
6. Past emergencies, since 1992 had been dealt with on a sectoral basis, with reported success. UNCU had the responsibility for developing the Plans of Action. With regards to a large multi-sectoral emergency, however, there existed no standing Task Force to pursue essential tasks to maintain the readiness of the system or to prepare for the coherent and inclusive participation of relief capacities in a response. Within the SACB for instance the Steering Committee for the Sectoral Committees has only met on five occasions.
7. Some senior staff in the UN system, were not fully aware of available emergency capacities held internationally, even within their own organisations.
8. Efforts expended in attempting to secure military capacities during the floods could have been saved if commitments had already been secured in advance.
9. Some fortuitous 'pre-positioning' of drought-titled activities and commodities was evident. Regionally-held capacities, including materials and additional staff from a competent, experienced human resource pool were mobilised, if belatedly.

#### Recommendations:

- I. A rolling preparedness planning process should be maintained to facilitate timely, effective and co-ordinated responses by the humanitarian aid community and local authorities to sudden-onset crises in Somalia. Naturally there are costs associated with maintaining systems in readiness for future crises, however, joint planning, training exercises and rehearsals are cost-effective and a clear case is made for such investment. A central body should

assigned responsibility for developing and keeping alive such a process, involving all stake-holders. Consideration should be given to the UNCU for this role (see also Coordination).

- II. Flooding events in Somalia will continue. Given the emerging pattern of dramatic swings in global weather, 'superfloods' will almost certainly be more frequent than in the past. The return period of such a severe event is unknown, but given the combination of recent silting and erosion of protection measures even smaller floods will have successively serious consequences. Investment in the rehabilitation of prioritised flood protection works should be considered within the immediate programming of the humanitarian community. In the longer term, investment in more substantial infrastructure to manage the rivers and alleviate long and short-return flooding events must be a priority. Significant interventions should be guided by a technical review of flood dynamics in Somalia.
- III. Consideration should be given to the establishment of a strategic stockpile of generic emergency supplies and equipment for Somalia. Materials held regionally in response modules would facilitate a prompt response to needs. Careful thought should be given to the location of pre-positioned emergency stockpiles to ease access problems during a flood disaster. In these floods, difficulties were experienced as far back in the supply chain as Kenya due to flood damaged roads.
- IV. Consideration should also be given to maximising the holding of flood response materials within Somalia before and through October/November each year when the highest flows, often with multiple peaks, result in the worst flooding. Relatively smaller floods occur in May.

## **4. EARLY WARNING**

### **4.1 Introduction**

The United Nations International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction promotes early warning systems as a means of reducing the need for post-disaster relief. Preventing disasters or reducing their impacts is a recognised and preferred approach to disaster response. The World Bank and U.S. Geological Survey calculate that a predicted \$400 billion in economic losses from natural disasters over the 1990's could be reduced by \$280 billion with a \$40 billion investment in prevention, mitigation and preparedness strategies. Such measures can be especially cost-effective when based on disaster early warnings, which, if reliable, indicate circumstances where there is a high probability that a disaster will occur.

A large proportion of Africa's natural environment is farmed, harvested or managed by farmers. Many renewable resources, from topsoil to wildlife, are broadly under rural sector management. Rural communities need the best climate advice to help them protect and sustain ecological resources in the face of climatic extremes. While richer countries can "trade themselves out of trouble" or call upon strategic reserves, for poorer countries bereft of such buffer capacities, improved understanding of climatic variability, and application of appropriate management techniques, are crucial to both survival and achieving sustainable developmental goals. International agencies can greatly assist in the issuance of alerts to the most severe climatic events.

Across Africa in general, early warning surveillance, monitoring and food economy/security analysis is drought-impact oriented. Arguably droughts are more common, are devastating for a wide set of populations of differing economy groups, and have longer-lasting impacts. They are clearly slower onset events than flash floods, and as such are more amenable to the set of tools available to forecasters.

Alerts, if arising from reputable systems, can influence timely mitigative actions, and the body of experience gained over time can contribute to ecologically more sustainable asset production and other adaptive measures. In many cases, early warnings have prompted timely preventive interventions, in cases of drought-associated animal and human morbidity and mortality. Warnings, of essence, need to be issued and heard, understood and heeded. Most rationally, a "fully-fit" preparedness plan should have considered any eventuality and provided a framework for response to each scenario. In the case of drought in Somalia, understanding is resident, the response system is robust and well exercised. This is clearly less the case with respect to floods.

### **4.2 A Humanitarian Early Warning System for Somalia**

Early warning systems and vulnerability mapping are sub-sets of disaster preparedness planning. Both functions were evident within the humanitarian system supporting Somalia at the time of the floods.

#### a) Emergency Information Gathering

In 1996, a questionnaire was designed by the UN agencies working in Somalia, with technical assistance from UNDOS, to provide a standard format for undertaking rapid humanitarian assessments and to serve as the basis of an emergency information system for the country. As conceived, the system aimed to gather, compile and analyse information obtained from completed questionnaires with a view to identifying actual and potential emergency situations and urgent humanitarian needs in specific districts of Somalia. By providing systematised and updated information on the humanitarian situation in the country, the system hoped to serve as a monitoring and decision-making tool for the United Nations Co-ordination Team (UNCT), as well as for the wider humanitarian community assisting Somalia.

Specifically, the objectives of the system were; to facilitate emergency preparedness and contingency planning; to contribute to preventative measures, and; to strengthen the capacity of the humanitarian aid community to respond to crises in a timely and co-ordinated manner. Undertaken on a regular monthly basis, and at a district level, the system hoped to identify general trends and changes in the situation with a view to extrapolating the relative levels of vulnerability prevailing in each district. The system was designed not to collect detailed or quantifiable data, nor serve to build baseline information for the purpose of programming rehabilitation or developmental interventions; rather, the system hoped to help UN agencies and their partners remain alert to potential emergency situations in specific areas of the country, which in turn would serve to facilitate decision-making and accelerate the initiation of required action, such as the fielding of more in-depth needs assessment missions to affected areas.

Although a pilot trial was run, this utilised only UN staff, and very few questionnaires were completed/returned. A lack of budget, inappropriate launch and lack of managerial follow through at a time of staff turn-over led to the abandonment of the process in early 1997.

#### b) Surveillance and Vulnerability Mapping

Much of the value of the above proposed system has been incorporated successfully in the activities of the Food Security Assessment Unit (FSAU), examined elsewhere (see Section 3, and below).

#### c) Climate Outlook

A key element of early warning in East Africa is carried by the Nairobi office and staff of the USAID-financed Famine Early Warning System (FEWS). FEWS disseminates climate outlook data, and issues warnings. It works in close collaboration with FSAU and provides them with valuable satellite data, statistical analysis and practical assistance in monitoring vulnerability in Somalia. It has ready access to remote sensing data and the indications it provides, and offers training therein. FEWS publishes the "FEWS bulletin" each month, "Special Reports" and "FEWS Watches", to communicate its findings within the wider humanitarian system.

In its August and September 1997 bulletins, FEWS provided climate outlook information for Southern Africa, giving feedback from the South Africa Climate Outlook Forum (8<sup>th</sup>-12<sup>th</sup> September) suggesting that rainfall should be above normal in Tanzania from October through December, and that in most other parts of southern Africa, it should not depart significantly from normal from October through November. Although the seasonal onset was forecast as favourable, a later downward trend was seen as likely.

The link with the El Niño phenomenon was postulated by many agency staff in their early reporting of the floods to their respective head-quarters. This is justified. Appendix B provides a description of the phenomenon. On October 27th FEWS reported,

The impact of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation pattern on rainfall in Ethiopia is less clear than it is in other parts of Africa, such as southern Africa and the Lake Victoria region. At present, many different interpretations and assumptions concerning El Niño's impact are circulating in the country.....FEWS recently performed a statistical analysis to estimate the increased chances of below- or above-average rainfall in El Niño and post-El Niño years in Ethiopia, using rainfall data since 1953 from nine stations throughout the country. The analysis showed that for most stations, the occurrences of abnormal rainfall (drier or wetter) are only slightly more frequent than normal during both El Niño and post El Niño years, indicating that El Niño may have little consistent impact on rainfall in Ethiopia. However, variability is very high in this area, even in non-El Niño years, and an El Niño might increase variability even further. Recent heavy rains are an indication of this increased variability. (FEWS Bulletin, 27th October 1997)

FEWS accessed the International Research Institute web-site in San Diego, California on or around the 13<sup>th</sup> October 1997, to view the Experimental Climate Forecast Division 90-day Rainfall Forecast for Africa for October-November-December. The document was immediately passed on to FSAU, USAID and possibly FAO (Steffen, pers.comm, 1998, July). The forecast (see Map 1, appended) indicates for much of the Horn below the Gulf of Aden; a 20% probability of below normal rainfall, a 20% probability of near normal rainfall, and a 60% probability of above-normal rainfall. While this represents the highest given probability for any region over the whole of Africa for the forecast period, no special alerts were said to accompany the map, and a 60% probability did not appear to be sufficiently conclusive to warrant issuance of a severe weather warning or flooding alert.

Other surveillance and information-gathering systems such as the monthly reporting mechanism of the SACB Health Sector Committee were clearly not in a position to have issued a flood warning. WFP started disseminating information on rising water in the first week of October, based on information received from their field monitors. (Sartori, 1998, May 23)

#### **4.3 Onset of the Floods**

On the ground, Somali's heard of the rising of upstream river levels, and given the rainfall they were experiencing locally in the South, began to take precautionary

measures. These took the form of moving valuable riverside equipment up the banks, to a level of safety judged by memory of the 1977 (or even 1961) floods.

In early to mid-October, heavy rainfall fell upon the upper Juba River basin, which includes parts of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Somalia's Gedo Region. Rain gauges in the region (Mandera, Kenya) registered as much as 400mm in 10 days. This unprecedented rainfall over both the upper and intermediate catchment areas of the main rivers flowing through Southern Somalia combined with effects of local deposition leading to a 'superflood', the highest in living memory. A huge 'inland sea' formed at the confluence of the Juba and Shabelle rivers.

On 4<sup>th</sup> November, FEWS Ethiopia reported that the rains in southern Ethiopia had subsided, and were likely to cease in the next 7-10 days, but that rainfall in Dekad 3, the last 10 day-period, of October 1997 had been unprecedented and that people living near the rivers should be alerted as soon as possible. However, no warnings were broadcast.

By the second part of October it was expected to be bad. By the end of October it was known to be beyond bad. (Sartori, 1998, May 23)

By the time FEWS issued their November 28<sup>th</sup> bulletin, a Special Report was enclosed giving details of the by-then-evident catastrophic impact of record floods upon lives and livelihoods in Southern Somalia, and the difficulties faced in relief efforts. The subsequent monthly bulletin describes how two months of relentless rains had affected Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya.

We were not expecting this. (Philip Steffen, 1998, June 4)

It later became clear from 'Rain Watch' data which compared 1997 and Normal rainfall that deviations massively exceeded the norm. For instance in Afmadow, the following percentage increases were recorded: 1-10 October, 3580%; 11-20 October, 2260%; 21-31, 1030%; Nov 1-10, 923%; 11-20, 105%; 21-30, 920%; Dec 1-10, 766%; 11-20 600%, and 2100% above average in the final dekad of 1997, after which rainfall returned to normal levels.















FEWS contributed staff and expertise to activities throughout the flood response. These included participation in aerial surveys, issuing FEWS Watches and Special Reports, helping estimate the loss of *gu* season crops in storage; revising *deyr* season harvest prospects downwards; sharing all received Meteosat, RainWatch and cloud top temperature information via the SACB web-site (once established in November 1997 by UNICEF); helping design interim market report formats; participating in rapid appraisals of vulnerability, identifying vulnerable groups and food needs by district; training FSAU Flood Monitors; and proposing a methodology for assessing the impact of Phase Two food aid on markets and local economies. FEWS own web-site received 2500 visitors over a short period during the early period of the flood response.

## **Principal Findings**

1. Humanitarian responses to natural disasters in East and Southern Africa have predominately been related to slow-onset drought events. Indeed, heavy rains at the start of a planting season are usually welcomed. Early warning systems have been developed to be sensitive at recognising light or failed rains at critical points in the agricultural calendar. Only in areas, such as Madagascar, where cyclones are a recurrent threat, have well developed early warning and rehearsed response systems been developed in concert to contend with sudden-onset disaster.
2. The El Niño phenomenon became fully re-established in 1997 and dramatic swings of global weather had been observed, particularly in the second half of the year. Much attention became focused upon the major food producing areas of the world, and the fires blazing in Indonesia and The Amazon. What little refined climate outlook data was available for East Africa did not signal the strong possibility of drought, or flood.
3. The severity and extent of the rainfall that fell over East Africa led to a crisis that was not forecast, either by local national meteorological services, or by international climate prediction centres. Impacts were exacerbated due to the deterioration of flood protection measures over the past ten years, a consequence of the insecurity and under-investment.
4. FEWS staff, although they had developed a discipline of reviewing a wide range of sources of climate prediction information, and had just attended a conference on El Niño, which brought together international experts, 'were not expecting' floods of such severity. The data that was at their disposal did not justify issuance of a 'Severe Flood Alert'.
5. Apparently, early ground reports of the severity of the event were considered exaggerated. The notion of 'Somalis crying wolf again' prevailed in the minds of some individuals in the aid sector. The accuracy of some early reports was not immediately appreciated, which may have discouraged an earlier acceptance of the scale of the problem and a swifter response. Some expatriate aid workers had only been in-country for less than one year, and assumed that the heavy rains indicated a good start to the Deyr season. Up to three weeks in October passed before the scale and implications of the flooding were realised and response planning meetings commenced.
6. Inside Somali, many riverine communities were critically aware of the unusual nature and potential impact of the rains/river crests, and with information gleaned through the Somali radio network and through traders. There is evidence that many anticipated the potential of widescale inundation, and took avoidance measures.
7. It later became clear that outbreaks of haemorrhagic fever are the normal epidemiological consequence of a flood in Africa. At an early stage FAO predicted that rains would cause Rift Valley Fever, but took no steps to issue a warning.
8. The potential of the BBC Somali Service to communicate messages to Somalis is widely recognised, but was not utilised in this instance. Broadcasts have proven effective in passing health messages, and have been given credit for changing behavioural patterns with regard to cholera and malaria prevention. It is also claimed that following warnings issued about Rift Valley Fever, slaughtering habits altered. Flood Warnings could easily have been relayed.

## **Recommendations**

- I. Specialists both from the humanitarian sector, including FEWS and FSAU, in concert with regional meteorologists should develop a sensitive and robust system of flood prediction, with an agreed national/regional alert mechanism established. There are several western systems that could be modified to the Somali context. The starting point for developing sensitive dependable systems must be on the ground in Somalia, and in the upper and intermediate catchment areas of the two principal rivers. At a minimum, a system of recording daily river stages and rainfall should be maintained in Somalia, and collated with data from Ethiopia and Kenya in order to help anticipate floods.
- II. Collaboration with the Meteorological Services of neighbouring countries would also allow access to specialists, particularly climatologists who understand the mechanisms through which ENSO tele-connections affect regional and local climates. By monitoring ENSO onsets and providing regionally or locally tailored forecasts, climatologists could provide early warning of disasters or other socio-economically important impacts. At the planning level, appropriate policies can contribute to prevention and mitigation of, or preparedness for, adverse ENSO impacts. Donors should consider supporting such developments.
- III. Warnings should be issued to alert key contacts with access to pre-identified vulnerable populations, providing the timing and scale of likely floods. A combination of broadcast and direct HF links to communities might be employed.
- IV. Flooding events in Somalia will continue. The return period of such a severe event is unknown, but even smaller floods, given both silting and the erosion of protection measures, will have serious consequences. Consideration might be given to a study of flood occurrence in Somalia, but at a minimum, early investment in rehabilitation of carefully prioritised flood protection works included as a component of future aid programming.



## **PART III: THE SOMALIA INTER-AGENCY FLOOD RESPONSE OPERATION**

### **5. DEFINING THE PROBLEM**

*There are differences between the 1992 intervention and now. These floods are an act of God. The chaos we saw in '92 was an act of man.<sup>1</sup>*

#### **5.1 Introduction**

The floods that hit Somalia at the end of 1997 were a fast onset natural disaster, albeit in the midst of an on-going complex emergency. This section documents how the problem was defined, the objectives of the Somalia Inter-Agency Flood Response operation, its targets and the assumptions behind the operation.

#### **5.2 First Reactions**

Information had been arriving in Nairobi from field monitors of rising waters in the Juba since the first week of October. The first emergency inter-agency meeting on the floods took place on 30<sup>th</sup> of October at USAID. By this time agencies in Gedo region reported widespread flooding in Luuq and Bulla Xaawa, and that Bardera town had been evacuated. In Saakow and Buaale in the Middle Jubba water was running over the bridges. In Lower Juba the river had not crested but was expected to rise (USAID, October). The meeting concluded that this was an emergency situation needing non-food assistance such as shelter items and medical supplies, but that a further situation assessment was required before a plan of action could be drawn up.

A week later a plan was presented to an Expanded meeting of the SACB Executive Committee. In the intervening week an ariel assessment was undertaken of the Middle and Lower Jubba Valley, and the broad parameters of the response operation were formulated:

- The collaborative, inter-agency nature of the operation was signalled with the formation of a 'Flood Response Coordination Committee' comprising USAID, ECHO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, FSAU and ICRC, and several 'emergency committees' including INGOs such as CARE, World Vision, InterSOS, Terra Nuova to define the elements of the response (FSAU, 1997, November 4).
- The necessity for a phased response to meet immediate and longer term needs.
- The evacuation of World Vision aid workers from Buaale on 5<sup>th</sup> November by helicopter highlighted they could play a role to overcome access constraints.
- The need for a forward storage and logistics base was identified.
- A lack of UN presence on the ground meant that any response would rely on NGOs as implementing partners, and NGOs were asked to submit information on their 'areas of operation and expertise' (Oberle, 1997 October 31).

### 5.3 Bringing in the Donors

On 7<sup>th</sup> November, the coordinating committee presented a report and plan of action to an expanded meeting of the SACB Executive Committee, which 39 representatives of agencies attended. The formal purpose of the meeting was to 'seek official endorsement from the SACB for the Somalia Inter-Agency Flood Response document' (SACB, 1997b, November 7). For the agencies it was essential to ensure that donor funding would be available for any international response. The multi-media presentation, which utilised UNDOS maps and video footage produced from the reconnaissance mission, is said to have 'left the donors with no doubt as to the severity of the problem' (Spring, 1998, June 3). The meeting endorsed the broad parameters of the operation, its objectives and the assumptions on which it was based.

### 5.4 The Plan of Action

The plan of action presented in the *Somalia Inter-Agency Coordinated Flood Response* document set out the objectives of the operation, estimated numbers of people affected, their needs, the proposed logistics operation, indicative costs and a management plan (SACB, 1997a, November 7).

#### An Inter-Agency Operation

A collaborative approach was emphasised. In line with this a coordinated response to the media was recommended through information focal points in designated agencies. All press releases were to be issued under the name of the 'Somalia Inter-Agency Coordinated Flood Response', rather than individual agencies.

The need for a clarity of responsibilities and overall leadership of the proposed operation was recognised. The SACB endorsed UNICEF 'agreement' to coordinate the overall operation, with WFP taking responsibility for logistics, and NGOs for implementation in Somalia (see table below). Following the SACB's endorsement an Inter-Agency Coordination Management Team was established, comprising the representatives of select agencies involved.

#### **Division of Responsibilities in the Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation**

<b>Agency</b>	<b>Responsibilities</b>
FSAU (with FEWS; UNDOS)	Assessments
UNICEF supported by 'Groups' for establishing priority needs; coordinating media; donors.	Coordination, analysis, planning, budgeting. Communications and security, procurement of non-food items.
WFP	Logistics and procurement of food items.
NGOs	In-Somalia logistics, delivery, monitoring and reporting.

Source: SACB 1997a November 7.

## Populations in Need

At this stage the flood was assessed to have displaced 100,000 people and affected between 400,000 and 800,000, if the Shabelle was included.

## Phased Response

In recognition of immediate and long term needs, the plan envisaged a four phased response (see table below).

Hunger, malnutrition, malaria and diarrhoeal diseases were identified as the main risks to life in the medium term. The presence or not of MCH/OPD would determine supplies the distribution of medical supplies. Water was not considered an issue that could be dealt with in the rescue and relief phase, although chlorine tablets were provided. A recommendation by SCF UK to pre-position supplies in the Shabelle in anticipation of flooding was accepted, but the primary focus of concern was the Jubba Valley.

In considering the long term implications of the floods, the FSAU made three important points (SACBb, 1997, November 7). First, they suggested that both the 1997 *dyr* and 1998 *gu* season crops could be lost if post-flood, recessional planting coincided with the 1998 *gu* rains. Second, that whilst pastoralists might benefit from improved pasture, agriculturalists would be reliant on wage labour as their means of survival. Third, that trade would be severely disrupted.

### **Assumptions of the Inter-Agency Flood Response Plan of Action**

- Flooding continues and increases in the near term (4 weeks) in the Jubba and Shabelle valleys.
- Affected populations face extreme risk unless immediate action is taken now.
- Response and decisions [to be] based on continuing assessments
- Levels of security remain acceptable for humanitarian relief efforts.
- The immediate emergency response to include shelter, ready-to-eat food and medicine.
- Near term (4-6 weeks) transportation throughout the region restricted to air and boat.
- Emergency actions require air operations.
- Airfields throughout the region open sporadically due to flooding and rain.
- Early interventions must utilize helicopter operations.
- Existing infrastructure, e.g. roads, hospitals, clinics etc. severely affected.
- Significant health problems anticipated in the near-mid term.
- Appropriate response dependent on substantial donor support.

Source: SACB, 1997a, November 7.

## Proposed Phases of Flood Response Operation

Phase	Objective	Actions
<b>Phase I Emergency Rescue and Relief</b>	Air rescue of persons stranded in areas of immediate risk to life.	Assist persons at risk of drowning or of starvation, throughout the Jubba Valley. Estimated 200,000-400,000 people. Response to be based on helicopter air operation, air-drops, limited boat operations as required. Provision of 30,000 rations or 15 mt over a minimum of 4-8 weeks (based on 10-15 flights per day, and one ration/ family / day).
<b>Phase II Relief</b>	Immediate assistance for the displaced, most vulnerable groups.	Airbridge rotations (4-8 weeks) from Garissa, to NGOs responsible for onward distribution. To include shelter items, medical items and 1 week food ration per family.
<b>Phase III From Relief to Rehabilitation</b>	Continue to provide food/ resettlement/ medical assistance to the displaced.	Land bridge operation (10-12 weeks), once roads become passable, to distribute resettlement kits, medical supplies and one month rations to previously assisted households.
<b>Phase IV Rehabilitation</b>	Support returnees in recovery of household, agriculture and livestock losses.	Rehabilitation (12 weeks) of agriculture, water sanitation and health infrastructure accompanied by seeds, tools, bulk food items, FFW. Provision of supermix (10 kg /month/child) for malnourished under 5 children, which is expected to increase from 15% norm to 25% of the population.

Source: SACB 1997a, November 7.

### Access

Access was identified as the most immediate constraint to the operation. With all but two airstrips under water, and roads impassible, helicopters, boats, tractors and donkey carts were all considered. Helicopters were proposed for rescuing trapped survivors and for dropping pre-packaged foods. Boats were determined to be essential and the use of local boat operators was considered.

WPF, proposed to provide a Joint Logistics Operation, on a 'cost recovery basis', to service UN and NGOs. This was to include:

- warehousing and handling of relief supplies in Garissa;
- air delivery of supplies to some 11 airfields in Middle and Lower Jubba and Gedo regions, with onward transport to locations;
- air transport of personnel;
- river transport of supplies, with 4 boats stationed in Bardera, Saakow, Buaale, and Jamame.

### **5.5 Objectives**

The objectives of the operation as set out in the plan of action were a mixture of priority actions and longer term aims. According to the SACB Flood Emergency Management Team

the following operational objectives were agreed for the flood emergency intervention (SACB 1998, January):<sup>2</sup>

- To facilitate timely, effective and coordinated responses by the humanitarian aid community and local authorities to humanitarian crises in the flooded areas.
- To rescue people in a life-threatening situation caused by the flooding.
- To provide immediate emergency assistance to stranded populations and to internally displaced people (IDPs) who had fled and lost their homes.
- To prevent malnutrition and outbreaks of killer diseases among the affected population, especially the most vulnerable groups (women and children under five).

## 5.6 Key Decisions

According to the SACB Flood Emergency Management Team the following decisions were agreed upon at the meeting of 7<sup>th</sup> November, and were used to guide the whole operation (ibid):<sup>3</sup>

- The Management Team mandated by the SACB was responsible for handling all issues regarding the flood emergency.
- All supplies/donation-in-kind (DIK) to be channeled through UNICEF, logistics funds through WFP, and local operational cost funds through NGOs.
- There would be no new partners on the ground unless really necessary.
- The operation would only support communities willing to collaborate. Any support to communities demonstrating hostile behaviours would be immediately stopped despite their emergency requirements.
- Somali counterparts had to be involved as much as possible in the implementation of the operation on the ground.
- The operation was to be implemented in such a manner as to avoid population displacements and keep people near their villages where relief assistance could be provided.

## 5.7 Enlarged SACB Executive Committee

On 13<sup>th</sup> November there was a further meeting of the SACB Enlarged Executive Committee with over 70 representatives of agencies present.

In the intervening week, the first base for the inter-agency operation was established in Bardera on 9<sup>th</sup> November. ICRC, UNICEF, Trocaire, SomAction, Norweigan Church Aid (NCA) had begun delivering assistance in Gedo region. A *Flash Appeal* for US\$9 million in supplies and cash was issued by the Humanitarian Coordinator on 11<sup>th</sup> November, and US\$4 million had been committed by donors. The UNICEF Representative had taken up the reins as Coordinator of the Flood Response Operation.

The SACB meeting adopted figures of 800,000 people affected and 200,000 in need of *immediate rescue* as the official number of people in need (SACB, 1997, November 13). It was further agreed that the immediate response strategies would consist of:

- serving populations around usable airstrips by boat

- sprinkling to those stranded on high ground
- rescuing those stranded by helicopter
- pre-positioning supplies in the Shabelle

Donors were requested to make unearmarked funding to enable flexibility in the operation.

As the operation got underway there was increasing concern about security. In the Middle Shabelle the security situation had been deteriorating for several months. A press release was therefore issued urging Somalis in affected areas to ensure the security and facilitation of operations. Somali leaders were urged to:

fully participate in responding to this flood crisis, particularly in ensuring the safety of all international partners involved in the flood response and furthermore to facilitate the cooperation with local governing structures to ensure a successful response. (SACB, 1997, November 14)

## **5.8 Principal Findings**

The following key issues were important in defining the Flood Response operation.

### A Natural Disaster

The flood emergency that hit Somalia in November 1997 was a fast on-set natural disaster. In the words of one aid worker:

It may be true that Somalis themselves can be blamed for most of their misfortunes, but this disaster is one which they really didn't bring on themselves (quoted in the Sunday Telegraph 1997 December 14)

As this was a natural disaster the 'Flash Appeal' for the Flood Response was channelled through the Relief Coordination Branch of DHA Geneva, the branch responsible for the coordination of responses to natural disasters and environmental emergencies.<sup>4</sup>

The Flood Response operation in essence was a 'relief' operation. The main objective was to provide material supplies to sustain populations for a brief period. Other objectives including strengthening local capacity and peace-building were added later. The emphasis placed on 'rescue', however, meant that responses to other areas in a less acute situation were delayed or given lower priority. Gedo, for example, was always told that it was not a priority (NGOs, 1998, June 4).

### Past Lessons

Despite this being a natural disaster, and thus very different to the 1991-1993 famine, there was an attempt to incorporate past 'lessons' in the design and approach of the relief operation. As the first large scale humanitarian operation since UNOSOM, there was 'an overt policy to prevent the previous poor performance [of UNOSOM]' (Berakoetxea, 1998, June 26). These included:

a) **Do no Harm**: A conscious effort to do things differently from UNOSOM, meant adopting a lower profile, making use of people who understood how to work in Somalia, and involving fewer international agencies. It also meant working with Somalis and through local structures. This approach was codified in a set of *Operational Principles and Standards of Behaviour* drawn up for the operation by the Life and Peace Institute.

b) **Security**: The security threat to the operation could be minimised by controlling the scale of the operation, and by working through local structures.

c) **Standards**: Certain technical lessons from the past were also apparent in the design of the operations. These included:

- The blanket distribution of high energy biscuits to mitigate an expected nutritional crisis.
- Beyond the immediate emergency, to prioritise measles vaccinations and vitamin distributions. In 1992/93 CDC concluded that measles related malnutrition was one of the major causes of excess death, and micro-nutrient deficiencies were identified by CDC as important factor in malnutrition (Hansch, et al. 1994 November).
- The distribution of malarial drugs in anticipation of increased incidence of malaria.

d) **Displacement**: Preventing displacement was an important element of the response. Migration induced stress has been identified as a proximate cause of death during the 1991/93 famine (Hansch et al, 1994). There was also a concern that aid might encourage population movement, and distributions strategies were designed to avoid this.

### Coverage

Ariel surveys showed that flooding along the Shabelle was minor compared to along the Juba. On 24<sup>th</sup> November the Flood Response Management Team decided that the Juba should be the highest priority for the relief operation. It recommended that resources be allocated 75% to the Juba, 20% to the Shabelle and 5% to Bay (USAID Nairobi Cables 1997 November 24). As a consequence other regions received few of the supplies and little of the logistical support provided to populations in the Juba Valley. The UNICEF Central Zone were told to utilise their own supplies.

## **5.9 The Role of ICRC**

ICRC became aware of the floods at the beginning of November when their field officer in Mareerey asked for assistance to evacuate people. ICRC has an observer status at the SACB. ICRC was not officially part of the Inter-Agency Flood Response and were initially hesitant to respond to a 'natural disaster' which is considered the responsibility of the Federation. However, they agreed to 'fill in the gaps' until the SACB response became operational. Their intervention in Lower Shabelle continued for longer than they had intended because the UN took a long time to become operational there (Cuttat, 1998, May 25).

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> MacPherson, 1997, November 16. Former US Marine and head of the Civilian Military Operations Centre in the 1992-1993 famine relief intervention

<sup>2</sup> The Evaluation Team were unable to find these objectives documented earlier than January 1998. It is therefore unclear whether these were formulated before or after the event. In the absence of any other documented objectives the Evaluation Team used these for the Evaluation.

<sup>3</sup> Again the Evaluation Team was unable to find these decisions recorded elsewhere than in the SACB report of January, although they do reflect the character of the operation.

<sup>4</sup> Now the Disaster Relief Branch (DRB) of UNOCHA.

## 6. COORDINATION

*Coordination and collaboration are key to optimising relief effectiveness. They are necessary both for improved cost-effective coverage of at-risk populations and for ensuring acceptable and sustainable working conditions for relief organisations.*  
(Sommer, 1994)

### 6.1 Introduction

Seven UN agencies, ECHO, ICRC and 19 international and Somali NGOs participated in the Flood Response operation. The operation was resourced by 17 donor governments. With its logistics base in Kenya, the operation required the consent of the Kenyan government. With several forward bases in Somalia, the collaboration of the Somali people was essential. With the experience of UNOSOM in mind donors and agencies were concerned about the impact that a large relief intervention would have in Somalia. With this number of stakeholders and these concerns, the operation required a strong coordination and management capacity, and a clear division of labour. This section assesses the coordination of the Flood Response Operation

### 6.2 A Common Humanitarian Framework

The UN's mandate gives it a central role in the coordination of international responses to a humanitarian crisis. The UN's capability for effective coordination, however, is a function of the interaction of elements within the UN system and between other international and regional political and military actors (Lautze et al., 1998). How to secure and maintain humanitarian access for effective programming is an on-going issue in Somalia. Access is about more than overcoming logistical or geographical constraints. Minear and Weiss (1993: 38-45) list geographical, social, political, security and administrative determinants of 'humanitarian space'. Achieving a common and coherent humanitarian 'framework of consent' is also critical (Lautze et al, 1998).

Coordination, therefore, is more than a technical or organisational problem. In terms of effective coordination and access, donor support and pressure can critically determine the scope for humanitarian action. In Sudan, for example, it is possible to chronicle humanitarian access with the extent of external pressure brought to bear on the warring parties (Karim et al 1996). Donor willingness to exert pressure typically reflects foreign policy interests, domestic political climate, and sometimes the media. During the floods in Somalia, the extent to which a coherent humanitarian framework was established was important in determining an effectiveness of the response.

The overall coordination of the Flood Response Operation is generally judged by most people interviewed during the Evaluation to have been effective. Most donors and implementing agencies interviewed were positive about the level of collaboration achieved. In the view of the Evaluation Team, this was achieved by successfully combining 'strategic' and 'operational' coordination. Strategic coordination, which involves balancing the interests and needs of various actors, coupled with an analysis of the operating environment, creates the 'humanitarian space' for operational activities (Lautze et al., 1997). Operational coordination - managing air services, communications, logistics, administration and so on - provides the capacity to deliver. By successfully combining these, the coordination and management of the

Flood Response, succeeded in creating a common framework of consent for the intervention among the various stakeholders. This was achieved by:

- obtaining donor and regional government support;
- establishing common and agreed objectives;
- establishing a division of responsibilities among international agencies and between international agencies and Somali 'partners';
- and, by and large, meeting its commitments.

### **6.3 Principal Findings**

#### **6.3.1 The Role of the SACB**

In Somalia it is donors to a large extent that define needs and the framework for consent. To succeed the Flood Response operation needed their support. This was no small task. After eight years of civil war in Somalia, and no durable resolution to the conflict, 'fatigue' among donors was apparent (Bierke, 1998 May 21). The Flood Response Operation, however, succeeded in securing the support of donors, who responded rapidly in cash and kind to the Flash Appeal of 11<sup>th</sup> November. The reasons for this were several.

Importantly, some of the major donors were involved from the start in defining the response, in particular USAID and ECHO. As funders of FEWS, one of the few donors with an annual emergency budget for Somalia, and with a particular interest in 'Jubbaland', USAID demonstrated an immediate concern by hosting the first emergency meeting. They were the largest single donor.

In garnering the support of donors and ensuring the 'inter-agency' character of the operation the SACB fulfilled a crucial role. The multi-media presentation of the crisis and plan of action to the SACB on 7<sup>th</sup> November assisted in lifting the donors from their 'fatigue' (Spring, 1998, June 3) The Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation was endorsed by, and identified as a response of the SACB.<sup>1</sup> The main partners in the operation concluded that:

The SACB represented a unique institution for mobilizing resources, funds, leadership and coordination for this operation. (SACB, 1998 January)

Since 1994, the SACB has sought to provide strategic and operational coordination in Somalia by bringing donors and agencies together under one roof. To its supporters it has succeeded brilliantly in this. The SACB clearly is important as a forum for promoting a unified aid policy and for providing a venue for aid agencies to influence this. However, this has not prevented a decline in aid resources to Somalia, and critics of the SACB point to a continued lack of coherence amongst donors involved in Somalia.

The reasons why donor coherence was achieved in the case of the flood emergency may be explained by a common interest to avert the long term costs of a major disaster in Somalia, and to contain the problem. There was, for example, a concern that the floods would lead to widespread internal displacement and a new refugee exodus. As noted, a key decision was that the operation should be implemented in such a way as to avoid population displacements. In the view of the Evaluation Team, a further reason why donors were prepared to respond generously to this emergency is best explained by the words of one UN official:

The [donor] response to the floods was swift and generous, because it was a classic, visible, natural emergency. It made sense. It was worth spending money. It was not the fault of the poor farmers who were affected. You could have an impact. Prior to this we had not been dealing with a classic emergency, but something man-made. A natural disaster was more palatable for our mandates.<sup>2</sup>

There were of course limitations to the kind of support donors were prepared to provide. Their failure to respond to request for helicopters was a case in point.

### **6.3.2 The Role of the UN**

The floods were the first time for the SACB and UN to respond together to a major disaster.<sup>3</sup> Although the operation ran under the name of the SACB, an important feature of the Flood Response Operation is that it was UN-led and run. The SACB has no operational capacity. The EC has no emergency mandate, and ECHO has no operational capacity in Somalia. With the exception of ICRC, the UN is the only institution with the mandate and capability to respond to humanitarian emergencies on a large scale. Changes within the leadership of the SACB have given the UN an opportunity to assert a greater leadership role in Somalia.<sup>4</sup>

During the emergency the UN was supported in this role by a strategic decision of donors to regulate the number of aid agencies participating in the operation. The intention was to control the entry of new and inexperienced NGOs and to mitigate the potentially damaging impact, and security implications of an uncoordinated response. As described by international NGOs:

The SACB and donors were clear that they did not want new agencies flocking in because of the potential for 'doing more harm than good'. (NGOs, 1998, June 4).

For this policy there was apparent consensus among those international NGOs already operational in Somalia. The policy was implemented by donors creating a restrictive funding environment for NGOs and channelling funds through the UN. NGO logistic costs, for example, were paid for by donors through the joint logistics operation run by WFP. Only a few donors provided direct funding to select NGOs with whom they had established partnerships. Over 65% of donor contributions went through UNICEF and WFP.

### **6.3.3 The Appointment of 'Lead Agency'**

A weakness of the coordination arrangements was a lack of clarity over agency mandates and responsibilities. This caused confusion among both donors and implementing agencies. At least two weeks were taken up in the critical early stages of the floods before these were established (SACB, January). Although the respective roles of agencies were endorsed by the SACB on 7<sup>th</sup> November, it was not until 22<sup>nd</sup> November that a management structure acceptable to the agencies- the 'Structure for Accountability for Somalia Inter-Agency Flood Response Operations' - was put in place.

A key issue was the respective roles of UNDP, UNICEF and WFP. The designation of UNICEF as lead agency for overall coordination was an obvious choice. In Somalia it is one of the few UN agencies with a clear emergency mandate. At the time it had the largest

presence of all UN agencies in the southern and central zones of Somalia, in terms of personnel, infrastructure and implementing partners. It was the only UN agency with a base in Kismayo. Although its emergency capacity had been downgraded when USERT (UNICEF Somalia Emergency Response Team) was dismantled, it did mean that UNICEF had emergency stocks of non-food items, and staff with operational experience. Its particular funding arrangements also provide it some flexibility. In the first 10 days of the response, for example, they were able to secure a loan from headquarters which allowed them to charter the first UN relief flights. Within the UNCT for Somalia, UNICEF had been designated as focal point for non-food emergencies in 1996. Their role as chair of the Executive Committee for joint programmes on emergencies and as the Fund Recipient Manager (FRM) is clear in the 1996/7 Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia (UNDHA, 1996). During the 1997 drought in the north east UNICEF had taken the role of FRM. Within the UN in Somalia, therefore, there was an understanding that UNICEF was the 'de facto coordinator for emergencies' (Oberle, 1998, May 25). Similarly, WFP, with its superior capacity for logistics was the obvious choice for the coordination of logistics.

Some donors have questioned the mandate of the SACB to 'endorse' the role of lead agency (Mansfield, 1998, July 31). In a complex emergency it is normally the responsibility of the IASC to appoint the lead agency. In OCHA's view, however, the floods were a 'natural disaster', and thus came under the Disaster Response Branch of OCHA, rather than the complex emergency division (Beigbeder, 1998 August 13; Boutroue, 1998, August 13). Furthermore, they supported the Humanitarian Coordinator who was responsible for the appointment of lead agency.

It is less clear why UNCU played only a minor role in Phase I of the response to the flood emergency, but took a lead in Phase II.<sup>5</sup> Within the office of the Humanitarian Coordinator in Somalia, the UNCU has overall responsibility for emergencies and report directly to OCHA. In previous emergencies, (in Mogadishu in 1996, and Jubbaland in 1996) the UNCU had coordinated the creation of plans of action. Some argue that if the UNCU had been more active, some problems which arose, for example between the Flood Response operation and ICRC, might have been avoided (Gourdin, 1998, May 30).<sup>6</sup> The strategic weight given to development over humanitarian concerns within UNDP, however, means that the capacity of UNCU is limited. The option of strengthening the UNCU with support from DRB (OCHA) was not taken up. In consultation with the Representatives of other UN agencies, the Humanitarian Coordinator concluded that sufficient capacity existed within the technical agencies of the UN in Somalia to cope with the emergency (Langenbacher, 1998, June 9).

If the arrangements for the coordination of an emergency response was clear to the UN in Somalia, they were not clear to the donors and partners. Outside of the UN, UNICEF's position as lead agency and FRM for non-food emergencies appears not to have been known. While this does suggest that the 1996/97 CAP had not been widely read by donors, it also points to the fact that there had been no pre-planning for emergencies in which the particular responsibilities of the UN agencies were clearly defined.

#### **6.3.4 Relations Between UNICEF and WFP**

The lack of clarity in coordination arrangements was in part responsible for the fraught relations between UNICEF and WFP in Somalia, which were apparent during Phase I. At times this threatened inter-agency collaboration. At the IASC-WG meeting in late November

questions were raised over decision-making processes and 'strange' financing arrangements in the Flood Response Operation, suggesting that these were creating obstacles to cooperation.<sup>7</sup>

The UN in Somalia made no secret of the fact that it was in financial straits at the end of 1997. This fact was not lost on agencies participating in the Flood Response Operation. Some saw the problems between WFP and UNICEF as a case of 'muscle flexing' in an effort to gain visibility. Visibility in emergencies had been identified by UNICEF as a means for improving their financial position (Paganini, 1998, May 20). For WFP, whose future in Somalia at the time was uncertain, a visible leadership role would strengthen the argument to stay.

It has been noted elsewhere that, 'Coordination arrangements are not necessarily negotiated within the UN to maximise the quality of responses to emergencies, but rather are the compromise of inter-agency competition. (Lautze et al, 1998). However, the 'epidemic of destructive rivalry' reported among the UN in the Great Lakes appears to have been avoided in Somalia (ibid). Funding constraints are an important influence on agency mandates, and behaviour. In the view of the Evaluation Team the tense relations apparent between UNICEF and WFP during the floods was as much a product of donor politics and funding pressures as inherent UN rivalry.

### **6.3.5 Personalities**

The Coordinator was unanimously acknowledged by everyone interviewed to have been central to the operations' achievements. Skills in strategic coordination were required in relations with donors, in negotiations with Somalis, and in relations with headquarters. The Coordinator's influence was apparent in all these areas. However, while some participating agencies believed it was critical the operation had a strong leader, others argued that the often command-style approach of the Coordinator led to inefficiencies and threatened relations between agencies.

The Evaluation team were surprised at the emphasis assigned to the influence of one personality in the operation. This may reflect a particular management style that did not display sufficient confidence in other partners in the operation. However, striking the balance between a command style and consensual style leadership is difficult. One can marginalise people, the other can gridlock decision-making. In emergencies the need for quick decision-making seems to warrant a more command style leadership and structure. Certainly this was the opinion of most people interviewed during the Evaluation. In the view of the Evaluation Team, a personality-dependent system of coordination is also a reflection of a weakness inherent in coordination mechanisms in the wider aid system in Somalia

### **6.3.6 Flood Response Management Team**

The UN's leadership role was enhanced with the formation of the Flood Response Management Team, which became the centre of coordination following the 7<sup>th</sup> November SACB meeting. When large daily gatherings proved unproductive, the management of the operation was assigned to a core group, in which UNICEF took responsibility for overall Coordination, supplies, security, and the media, and WFP took responsibility for the logistics.

ECHO seconded personnel for field communications, and two NGOs (representing the Juba and Shabelle valleys) participated on a rotating basis.

Creating a Management Team outside of the normal SACB forums proved more efficient, and saved the operation from becoming mired in donor and agency politics and preferences. The mix of people on the Management Team, comprising operational agencies and donors, helped maintain the collaborative ethos of the operation.

Some INGOs, however, criticised the meetings for being too exclusive. Being outside the SACB structure, this reinforced the impression that this was a UN rather than the SACB-led operation (INGOs, 1998 June 4). INGOs did appreciate the presence of experienced ex-NGO personnel among some donors representatives, although some felt that it did not make the best use of experience available in SACB sectoral committees, such as the health committee. The links between the Management Team and the field teams were felt by some agencies to be weak, and some members of the Management Team did not participate as they were supposed to. A particular criticism levelled at the Management Team structure was the lack of consideration given to transferring management responsibility from UNICEF to UNCU, when Phase I of the operation was declared to have ended and Phase II commenced.

In the view of the Evaluation Team, the existence of pre-agreed coordination arrangements for emergencies would have helped solve some of these problems. Pre-agreed terms of reference for an emergency management team, in which the respective roles and responsibilities of agencies were clearly delineated, would have helped ease inter-agency relations, and ensured the accountability of the system. In this respect, OCHA, with its responsibilities for the coordination of humanitarian operations, should have played a more active role in developing of such a mechanism, and in monitoring its performance.

### **6.3.7 The Decentralisation of Decision-Making**

For the first two to three weeks of the operation priorities were set in Nairobi, based on information received from Somalia. The setting of priorities in Nairobi, however, clashed with the situation as seen by those agencies in Somalia. In the Shabelle valley, for example, agencies complained that they were constantly frustrated, because those in Nairobi did not believe the scale of the problem there (Higgins, 1998, May 5). On 28th November following complaints from Somalia-based teams, a new strategy which allowed priorities to be set by the field was agreed. The meeting to review Phase I of the Flood Response, and the subsequent report, made much of the decision to transfer decision-making to agencies in Somalia who had good knowledge, experience and understanding of their respective areas of operation (SACB, January 1998).

In the opinion of the Evaluation Team too much is made by those in Nairobi of this delegation of decision-making. The idea that decision-making based on locally assessed needs should be anything but field-led, can only come from an institution based outside of Somalia. ICRC, for example, were able to respond rapidly because of the 'absolutely essential role of field officers' (Langenkamp, 1998, June 2). Furthermore, without military or security infrastructure to protect the operation, it was locally negotiated consent to operate in an area that ultimately determined the level at which decision-making had to happen.

In the view of the Evaluation Team, it is important to balance the need for flexible coordination mechanisms that enable day to day decision-making to be made at the most appropriate operational level, and the need for regulation to ensure adherence to common policies and professional standards. During the operation, delegation of decision making allowed for the former. Mechanisms to ensure and monitor the latter were limited.

### **6.3.8 The Role of NGOs**

Field level capacity was crucial in determining the success of the operation. Following the withdrawal of UNOSOM troops and the security infrastructure in 1995, the international presence in much of southern Somalia contracted. At the time of the floods UNICEF's retained an office for the southern zone in Kismayo. However, in the words of one UN official:

The floods highlighted the fact that most staff in Somalia had left. Most were off shore. There was little familiarity with the Juba. It was uncharted waters for the UN in general, due to the UN security rules.<sup>8</sup>

The presence of NGOs, both international and Somali, was therefore vital in the implementation of the response. In the main operational hubs, such as Bardera, Kismayo, Jamame, or Jowhar, the UN provided field level coordination. Elsewhere NGOs fulfilled this role. Much of the on ground assessments were undertaken by NGOs, and they delivered much of assistance provided by through the UN. The involvement of NGOs, however, was not without problems.

International NGOs acknowledge that coordination amongst themselves was less successful than the UN (NGOs, 1998, June 4). Some did not want to cooperate with the UN, and during the floods the INGO Consortium never became a viable response mechanism. INGOs did not utilise those INGOs representing them on the Flood Response Management Team for accessing information and support.

In some quarters there was criticism that a reliance on NGOs meant that programming was based on NGOs' definitions of need, based on their normal areas of operations. It was only when the helicopters and boats arrived that the operation expanded outside their areas.

Finally, the presence and capacity of NGOs varied between regions - a legacy of the prevailing security situation and donor policy in Somalia. In Lower Juba, Middle Juba and Gedo regions, there was at least one INGO or SNGO in each district. The situation was similar in Hiraan. Insecurity in Mogadishu and Middle Shabelle meant that NGO and UN presence during the floods was limited. The virtual absence of NGOs in Bay and their limited presence in Lower Shabelle, meant that these regions were less well served, as there was no one to lobby for these regions in the SACB meetings (Kloppenburger, 1998, June 30).

International NGOs recognise their limited capacity in southern Somalia, noting that their coverage is weak, that they are under-staffed, and with a limited expatriate presence on the ground information can be flawed (NGOs, 1998 June 4). In addition, only a few of the NGOs had relevant emergency experience, and only two had emergency provisions that they were able to utilise. Consequently, some NGOs were called on to take on responsibilities that they were not equipped handle with. Most appear to have coped well.

Like the UN, the presence and capacity of NGOs in southern Somalia has contracted since 1995. Continuing insecurity and decline in donor funding have all contributed to this. As noted, during the floods the policy of donors was to restrict the entry of new NGOs. In the absence of military or security infrastructure, local knowledge and established working relationships were important in obtaining local consent to operate in an area. There is much evidence to show that an uncoordinated and unregulated inflow of aid agencies into a complex politically contested environment can have a negative consequences. Somalia and Rwanda are prime examples where this has led to aid diversion, local knowledge and capability being ignored and standards of service provision being eroded (Eriksson et al, 1996). However, the UN and donors are not blameless in these cases. During the floods, the Evaluation Team in fact found little evidence that Somalia was threatened with a massive influx of NGOs. In the view of the Evaluation Team, the policy to limit a response by humanitarian agencies should be based on a rigorous assessment of needs, rather than assumptions.

### **6.3.9 The Role of ICRC**

ICRC played an crucial role in the flood response operation, responding rapidly and delivering assistance while the UN was establishing its operations. ICRC's adherence to strictures of neutrality, and its reluctance to provide information, did lead to a lack of coordination on the ground in Somalia. However, some participating agencies expressed the view that ICRC were 'uncommonly forthcoming' with information at the Nairobi level. Indeed a concern was expressed that this was not reciprocated by the UN, which may mean that ICRC will be less willing to reciprocate in the future.

The ICRC has played a unique role during the Somali conflict, and they remain a critical element in the international humanitarian systems' response capacity in Somalia. It is therefore essential that good relations are maintained between ICRC and the rest of the system.<sup>9</sup>

## **NOTES**

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<sup>1</sup> In the Flood Website hosted by UNICEF the Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation was identified as the 'operational arm of the SACB'.

<sup>2</sup> Interviewed in Nairobi, 1998, June 30.

<sup>3</sup> Prior to the floods the first inter-agency relief operation since UNOSOM had been in response to the drought in 1997. That was a limited operation for which external resources were not sought.

<sup>4</sup> In particular the change of chairmanship following the departure of the former EC Special Envoy to Somalia.

<sup>5</sup> The Evaluation Team understand that key individuals were absent on official visits.

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<sup>6</sup>These include UNICEF out-bidding ICRC for the lease of a plane, and WFP sending food to Jilib having agreed that ICRC would do so.

<sup>7</sup> The issue was raised by Manuel Da Silva on 28 November 1997.

<sup>8</sup> Interviewed in Nairobi, 1998, May 2.

<sup>9</sup>At the time of this Evaluation, ICRC's operation in Somalia was on hold, following the taking of several ICRC delegates as hostage.

## **7. ASSESSMENT**

### **7.1 Introduction**

In October 1997, the unprecedented extent and severity of rainfall over both the affected areas and the upper catchment areas to the west in Kenya and Ethiopia, led to flash floods in seasonal tributary's and main river levels rose to exceed riverbank capacities. This together with a combination of consequent over-bank spillage and overland rainfall run-off led to the overwhelming of natural and man-made storage capacities, rapidly leading to severe flooding. The disruption outstripped the population's coping capacities and the disaster unfolded. No formal early warnings systems were broadcast to alert people to the possible consequences.

Over the first three weeks of October, localised flooding was soon followed by severe flooding in the Upper and Middle Juba River. Heavy rains in the first dekad (10-day recording period) of October saturated generally dry land, and was therefore easily absorbed. The situation soon worsened. The rains increased in severity in Somalia, and did not abate in Ethiopia and Kenya. FEWS RainWatch data collated later (February 9<sup>th</sup> 1998) shows dekad 2 rainfall in Kismayo (Oct 11-20) to be 60 times the normal, in Afmadow 36 times normal for the same period.

In Nairobi, the magnitude of the event took some time to be fully recognised. Realisation dawned in the third dekad of October. On 27<sup>th</sup> October, USAID recorded,

Terra Nova report flooding of the bridge in Bardera, the river 40ft higher than normal. The lower part of Bardera town has been completely evacuated. Bardera will likely be cut off for at least 3 weeks. One bag of sugar currently 4 times normal price. Much maize and sorghum destroyed. Some houses washed away in Buaale. In Bordubu, north of Bardera, 5000 families were washed away yesterday and looks worse today. 120 houses washed away; the river is running 11km wide. Overflights planned. (Barry, in E-Mail to OFDA)

On 30<sup>th</sup> October, a co-ordination meeting (50 aid and donor community personnel) was convened at USAID, to discuss the co-ordination of assessment and information-gathering efforts between those organisations present in the flood-affected areas of Gedo, Middle and Lower Juba, and others keen to assist. Response planning also commenced that day.

### **7.2 Emerging Needs**

By the first week of November the river was cresting in the lower reaches of the Juba River. On the 3<sup>rd</sup> November an assessment over-flight took place, carrying staff from UNDOS (cartographer), ECHO, ICRC, FSAU and USAID. They flew over Mugambo (S.Juba) up to just north of Buaale, and reported that all areas north of Jilib, especially Fanoli up to Sakow was worst affected. A number of settlements were completely submerged or surrounded by water.

On the 4<sup>th</sup> November a strategic co-ordination meeting was held to discuss the overall situation and a Flood Relief Inter-agency Co-ordination Committee was formed under the aegis of the SACB, initially co-chaired by UNICEF and WFP. The task of Flood

Assessment was given to FEWS, FSAU and UNDOS, forming one of the six working groups. Daily meetings commenced to which all working groups reported.

Severe flood conditions were naturally expected to lead to problems of access and difficulties in undertaking on-the-ground assessment. Simultaneous efforts were made in collation of remote sensing materials, while preparing for and undertaking systematic aerial surveys. These were followed by field assessments and planning for a continuing process of monitoring and re-evaluating the flood impact, emerging unmet needs and monitoring of the appropriateness of the response.

### **7.3 Aerial Surveys**

Although there were several over-flights in late October/early November, there were only four formal aerial surveys conducted, two over the Juba River (3<sup>rd</sup> and 12<sup>th</sup> November 1997) and two over the Middle Shabelle (19<sup>th</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup> November 1997). The GIS (Geographic Information System) Unit of UNDOS conducted the surveys and produced flood boundary maps. Geo-referenced maps were obtained by scanning 1:100 000 charts and made readable by ARCVIEW GIS 3.0 (ESRI) software. Combining the digitised map with a database of population provided an estimation of the size of the affected population (See Map Nos. 9-14). Figures in the database were estimates from corrected pre-war data. The Somalia government with the assistance of the former USSR had computed these between 1980 and 1986, using the number of buildings and structures on the ground as a proxy for families (1:1). Each family is assumed to have six members. UNDOS chose to “correct” the pre-war figures by a factor of 25% to take into account estimated population increases over the intervening years. (Sartori G. and Nembrini P.G, 1998)

UNDOS estimated the directly flood-affected population of the Juba valley at 60,850 as of the 12<sup>th</sup> November. This analysis was deemed too low by some, and proved controversial when their estimates seemed to indicate that only 10% of the people had been affected. UNDOS was forced to defend the limits of their methodology, explaining at more than one Flood Response Committee meeting that the estimate was of people whose village houses were likely to have been flooded to an extent to force their displacement. Populations such as Afmadow and those affected but less visible by aerial survey were not included. Also, no assessment took place in Bay and Bakool regions. The official figure that emerged in the flood emergency was 300,000 (60,000 families) to include the indirectly affected families, which soon became the working figure for planning purposes.

### **7.4 Remote Sensing**

UNDOS also obtained a range of remote sensing imagery (see Map Nos. 2 to 4). The radar satellite image of 12th November, looking down through the thick cloud, shows flooding of the Juba River especially south of Buaale. The images of the 26<sup>th</sup> and 29<sup>th</sup> indicate clearly and graphically the convergence of three huge streams of water. The Juba River from the north, the Shabelle from the north-east and the Lach Dera, fed from Kenya and north-west of Afmadow, all merge into an ‘inland sea’ 30km wide, close to the Somali coast-line. While the Canadian Space Agency services were expensive, and it took 10 days to move the satellite, imagery provided was well

enhanced and interpreted, and provided a useful contribution to realising the actual extent of the flood emergency. Unprecedented levels of inundation were evident, the worst for 50 years. Other lower grade, and free imagery, was obtained from the University of California web-site. (Sartori, May 1998)

UNDOS equipped the agencies with over 3,000 maps, full sets being given to agency heads and “focal-point” NGOs. In addition, much of the early assessment information was released on the SACB Web-site.

## **7.5 Field Assessment**

The Food Security Assessment Unit contributed to the assessment process. Operational since 1994, FSAU was at the time of the floods rebuilding its capacities, having experience a funding gap of 15 months from December 1995 to June 1997. In October they had no permanent paid team of monitors due to a delay in recruitment. On 31<sup>st</sup> October FSAU helped WFP develop “Flood Areas Data Collection Guidelines”, which WFP asked all agencies in the field to contribute to.

In November, FSAU had five “Food Economy” Monitors on their staff. The reorganisation already underway was accelerated and further recruitment swiftly concluded. Thirteen Flood Enumerators were stationed in the field and asked to provide reports. Some of them could not travel far due to the conditions. The reports, hand-written, and a blend of quantitative and qualitative information proved useful. This style of reporting bore little resemblance to previous formats, and to a large extent offered little cross-district consistency. However, their findings, combined with a wider set of data/knowledge held, resulted in an FSAU submission to both the Food Security Sectoral Committee of the SACB and WFP Country and Regional Offices, indicating estimated total food needs in the flood affected areas of Southern Somalia.

In December, FSAU developed and issued a weekly reporting format under the title of ‘Rapid Assessment Survey of Flood Affected Populations’. This looked at a broad range of emergency indicators: logistical access, population estimates, assets carried, water sources, sanitation, food availability, market prices/purchasing power, cultivation plans, crops and pests, job opportunities, human and livestock health and gave space for additional comments and insights. It provided useful data.

The assessment process took UNDOS population figures as a starting point. Then with their understanding of Food Economy Groups (FEG) of particular concern, whether agricultural, pastoral, agro-pastoral or urban, FSAU determined the percentage of the population in each FEG, then estimated the percentage of that FEG deemed vulnerable, giving an overall target vulnerable population figure by district for food programme planning purposes.

Other contributing information included: existing base-line FEG reports, market data, coping strategies (seasonality of food sources and access to them), nutritional reports, satellite and remote-sensed rainfall prediction information, the findings of aerial overflights, flood mapping by UNDOS, and conclusions of meetings with NGOs (in Nairobi) where their respective ground reports/insights were collated. These

complemented the Flood Monitors information, which included district authority data and recommendations. (Sacco, 1998, May 29)

## 7.6 Determining Food Needs

The continuing assessment combined the above analyses, identified the geographic and socio-economic localisation of actual vulnerability and determined the net food needs in terms of the percentage of the relief ration required by assuming that food aid would complement the available food sources. By integrating supply-side and food economy assessment approaches, FSAU generated information which helped limit the magnitude of the aid resource called forward. A range of percentages of a full ration (16.2kg/person/month) were recommended, by district and vulnerable population. The range varied between 35% and 100% of the full ration for 3 months January to March 1998 to supplement recovering livelihoods for the most flood-event affected and 'pre-vulnerable' populations. FSAU recommended 18,522Mt. or 6,174Mt./month. WFP, reduced this figure to around 4000Mt./month within its operational plan, to be delivered through a range of logistic channels. (Calvert, 1998, May 29).

Later, in Phase II, monthly food security/economy trend-based data collections were commenced, giving more useful, qualitative information with supporting narrative.

On 4<sup>th</sup> December 1997, WFP presented to donors 'A Food Security Strategy and Food Supplies for Flood Affected Populations in Southern Somalia during Phase I'.

### Foods Needs Estimates November/December 1997

Area	No of population in absolute need *	MT's required per month (standard relief ration for area 1; half rations for areas 2-4)**
1 Middle & Lower Juba	70,000	1,415
2 Upper Juba (Buaale to Luuq)	10,000	82
3 Bay and Bakool	10,000	82
4 Shabelle riverine (Border to coast)	20,000	164
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>110,000</b>	<b>1,473</b>

\*absolute need: meaning no or limited calorific food availability (initial estimates)

\*\* Standard WFP relief ration per day per person. Half rations used as it is assumed that affected populations have been able to carry a small amount of food with them.

FSAU estimated that the actual number of affected population in the Bay, Bakool and Hiran regions is larger than that stated in this table. However, WFP continued to supply these areas with relief food originally intended for drought affected populations (targeted at 170,000). These staple foods, cereals, pulses, vegetable oil and CSB complemented the processed foods, BP5, Supermix, HDRs and High Protein biscuits, which were already being distributed.

## **Principal Findings**

1. The magnitude of the flooding event took some time to be recognised.
2. It is easier to respond to drought-induced crises. Floods of this scale, by their very nature, frustrated access for assessment and limited options for responding.
3. The use of aerial surveys, while indispensable, was characterised by poor standardisation of assessment methodologies and team composition, leading to contradictions and some controversy.
4. With no hydrographer consulted in the assessment phase, or onboard during the aerial surveys, important insights were missed. Some reported large areas of standing rain water. What was not recognised from the air was that this water was in fact moving. This was important for predicting later impacts, and should have again triggered the issuance of warnings.
5. The districts of Bay and Bakool were deemed less flood affected by the aerial assessment teams. Little information of a verifiable nature emerged from these areas, due to prevailing security concerns. Although flooding levels were not high, what was overlooked, and this became evident later, was that even shallow standing water will kill crops, and deny inhabitants the livelihood support that trading access represents. The floods led to transport routes being cut for weeks.
6. Again, largely under-assessed was the Shabelle flooding. While not nearly so dramatic, the floods still had serious impact on a much more densely populated area than the Juba valley. Agency staff evacuations following the CINS killings/kidnapping led to key staff being absent over an important period which should have seen the peak response period in this area.
7. Little on the ground assessment took place, and early reporting opportunities were lost. UN security restrictions in the Juba valley were soon lifted, but were an additional frustrating factor in the early days. Nevertheless, INGOs maintained a most valuable presence in the affected areas and contributed much to the wider assessment process.
8. With no pre-agreed understanding as to who would be responsible for undertaking the assessment, much time was lost. While the use of remote-sensing imagery provided a useful overview of the situation, more effort could have been made to undertake visual assessment. Use of a helicopter at this stage would have been ideal.
9. The understanding gleaned from household food economy analysis allowed appropriate refinements to be made to early assessments of needs, not only saving considerable resources, but also averting the potential that those resources would undermine local capacities and coping systems.
10. In spite of the rising waters, some communities decided to stay until the very last moment, citing the fear of looting as one important consideration. In Bay certainly, but elsewhere too, flash flooding over land caught people by surprise and led to loss of life. River levels, on occasions apparently peaked, and sometimes dropped, but later rose again to greater heights, on at least three occasions as successive flood crests passed downstream.

## **Recommendations**

- I. For improvement of disaster assessment readiness, prior agreement should be reached on team composition and respective responsibilities, methodology, reporting elements, format design and presentation of findings. A responsible entity should be assigned responsibility to co-ordinate such actions and arrange training and rehearsals.
- II. Closer links with those carrying the Early Warning function would permit pre-disaster assessment opportunities.

## **8. RESPONSE IMPLEMENTATION**

### **Introduction**

The implementation of the Somalia Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation began in early November 1997. The Evaluation Team focused on efforts made by members of the SACB but recognises other organised responses were undertaken by a wider range of actors, including many local Somali initiatives with some direct support evident from neighbouring Arab States.

Following the decision of the SACB on 7<sup>th</sup> November, an Inter-Agency co-ordination Management Team was established, comprised of the managers from the involved agencies, meeting initially on a daily basis to plan, organise and execute implementation of the operation. The assumptions guiding the planning process, the priorities, objectives, key decisions, proposed phases of the operation, and assignment of responsibilities are given in Section 5.

### **8.1 THE JOINT LOGISTICS OPERATION**

The principle obstacle to rescue and relief response efforts was the lack of access. Within the spirit of a collaborative, inter-agency response, the joint logistics operation was quickly conceived. With roads and air-strips in many places submerged, the logistical planners looked to air-drops, helicopters, boats and some fixed-wing aircraft landings as the remaining options. The river valleys were the focus of needs, and inaccessible from the coast. Considerations of ocean access and supply were judged impractical, at least at the onset.

#### **8.1.1 Air Logistics and Operations**

The operation benefited greatly from the considerable capacities retained in the region, not least regional offices and assets held by the main humanitarian agencies, and staff with enormous relevant expertise in air logistics.

The WFP Regional Manager dedicated his Deputy to support the Somalia country office, along with a wider number of people attached, assisting with communications, human resources, procurement, flight co-ordination and information. Contacts with their HQ in Rome were critical, especially the bureau desk officer, the ALITE Team, OTL and Emergency Sections. Professional strengths of key individuals in Nairobi were recognised and they were seconded to the team from different agencies. (Russell L. Ulrey, 1998, May 27)

Following the discussions held on 7th November, an UNCTAD staff member was seconded to the operation to assist WFP with airhead/airbridge logistics. By early December a UNICEF programme officer and a radio operator joined the Garissa team. While some pre-positioned emergency goods, especially food, was held in Mombassa, with other materials stored in Nairobi, both locations were a long distance from the affected region, and it was decided that establishment of an intermediate logistics base would be necessary. By the 16th a clear concept of the operation had been established, and Garissa in Northern Kenya chosen, assessed and judged suitable as an

intermediate forward logistics base. Mandera, Da'Dab and Wajir were also considered but ruled out.

Garissa offered a paved airstrip, 850m above sea level with an available runway length of 1,000 metres; an adjoining military base; covered, clean and secure warehousing adequate for up to 2000 mt of cargo and in good proximity to the airstrip; a good road infrastructure and land-lines of communication with Nairobi and Mombassa; readily available structures for use as a Log-Base HQ/Operations centre with other possibilities for staff accommodation. At one point there were 92 people in Garissa on the WFP payroll (60 of these loaders). The road to Nairobi, suffered from flood damage during the early part of the operation, and was closed for some days.

Permissions and understandings were secured with all appropriate authorities in Garissa, in Nairobi with the Kenyan Government, with the Donors and heads of Agencies. Operational equipment's were secured, including, HF/VHF radios, furniture's and materials, maps, vehicles and ground support. Standard Operating Procedures for the Log-Base, Air-Operations and Reporting/Information Control were introduced with a clear single "chain of command". The team could have benefited from a "base opening" module.

CALTEX installed a 40,000 litre ground storage tank at Garissa for JET A1 fuel, and ran regular tankers to replenish. Mobile bowsers fed the aircraft. From a "cold start" in Garissa on the 22nd November, the first cargo was received on the 29<sup>th</sup>. Although sharing the airstrip with Kenyan military and commercial traffic, congestion was minimised. All the relief aircraft were turbine-engined, the flight-line including 2 Buffalo's, 2 DC3's, a Twin Otter, 1 Caravan, and later 2 Mi-8 helicopters.

Although there was no Instrument Landing System at Garissa, pilots encountered no weather problems to force a diversion, and only a few "go-arounds" were forced due to livestock entering onto the landing runway.

### **8.1.2 Tasking and prioritisation of cargo/destinations:**

At first, needs and priorities were received by radio from NGOs reporting directly from the affected areas. These reports and requests were presented to a "panel discussion" in Nairobi. UNICEF Nairobi would then communicate "mission orders" back through WFP, and to Garissa. Much debated, but nevertheless at a relatively early point, a rational devolution of responsibility was released to Garissa, and the Nairobi loop cut out. The "field" then communicated their needs directly to Garissa.

Garissa issued a daily stock report, detailing what had been expended and what was planned for the next day.

Nairobi's job was to keep the pipeline filled... Garissa never had a demand that could not be satisfied. (Larsen, 1998, July 1)

On the 12th November, UNICEF issued a WFP-prepared document describing, 'Procedures with respect to the Joint Logistics Operation for Flood-Response'. In it they described the provision of air-transport services free of charge, as agreed and

presented in the Joint-Appeal, and contingent upon the donor-response to that Appeal. WFP accepted the role of forwarding cargo by road to Garissa, but only on a cost-recovery basis:

In principle, WFP will make a base in Garissa where goods can be stored and will be forwarded by air to the Final Destination. NGOs and UN-agencies can take their cargo to Garissa after approval from UNICEF. WFP can provide road transport as per request and on a cost-recovery basis (about \$50/mt), including storage and handling at Transami warehouses (a commercial provider) in Nairobi. (WFP, 1997, 12<sup>th</sup> November)

After the operation, some agencies who had misunderstood this, refused to pay.

Cargo booking Requests were handled by UNICEF, who took responsibility for the prioritisation of cargo forwarded, both Nairobi-Garissa and Garissa-forward. Agencies were provided with separate standard booking request forms for both legs. UNICEF held the responsibility to provide cargo status details on demand, and as agreed, UNICEF forwarded approved cargo booking requests to WFP, the JLO service agency, who forwarded the cargo as per the request.

A number of NGOs experienced problems with the service, with goods being held in the system longer than anticipated, and concerns were voiced that UN cargo was at times being prioritised over others. Certainly some delays were experienced, but this can largely be explained by the need to give waterlogged airstrips 48 hours to dry out prior to attempting a landing. At times rain resumed at the last moment. WVI cargo for Buale was postponed for this reason. The devolution of authority to the field managers to determine logistical and needs priorities, combined with the support and responsiveness of Garissa were stressed as the key to the success of the operation, soon overcoming the initial problems.

### 8.1.3 Clearance of Goods

A crucial element in the establishment of the air operations was the early consultation made with The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO), and a request was made by UNCT to release their Legal Advisor to assist the Flood Emergency Team

#### **International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO)**

Following the breakdown of Air Traffic Services in 1991, ICAO's re-engagement with Somalia commenced in 1993, offering advice/support to UNOSOM. An operational project started in 1996: Its aims are:

- (i) to assist in providing safety to International Air Traffic transiting Somali Airspace.
- (ii) to set up/maintain at least a nucleus of Civil Aviation administration skills, comprised of Somali nationals.
- (iii) As far as possible, where security allows, to support the humanitarian community through low-profile infrastructure repair/rebuilding.

At some future juncture - capacities and resources retained and rehabilitated will be handed back to the Somali Government.

with the entry of emergency goods into Kenya, and to facilitate onward transit. This resulted in the Office of the President being approached through the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, and a special exemption granted. On 19th November Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation granted: (1) Clearance for 2 cargo aircraft to operate from Kenya to Somalia, for multiple flights, a C-130 and a Twin Otter (2) Clearance for several large commercial helicopters (3) To operate out of Garissa air base (4) Work Permits for all air-crew members associated with the emergency aircraft. This step facilitated subsequent discussions with Customs, and the Department of Civil Aviation. The good will and assistance afforded to the operation by the Government of Kenya was notable. An understanding reached allowed goods to be left on the tarmac at Jomo Kenyatta Airport in Nairobi, overcoming the normal requirement for them to enter a transit warehouse. They were then moved swiftly to Garissa, which then became treated as the official duty-waived transit point. This measure greatly accelerated the flow of imported relief goods. (Wanyama and Mensah, 1998, June 9)

#### **8.1.4 Air-Lift/Deliveries**

Before the intermediate base at Garissa was established during the week of the 27<sup>th</sup> November, fixed wing operations had commenced directly to the flood affected areas of Somalia from Nairobi. While UNCAS aircraft were utilised for some of the early aerial survey work and to make landings at Kismayo and Bardera, a number of other aircraft were chartered ex-Nairobi. WFP contracted a Cessna Caravan (5Y-NOM) on 3<sup>rd</sup> November to facilitate survey activities and begin the first air deliveries of relief materials (capacity 1.5mt, block time devoted to Phase I operations being 130hrs). This was replaced on 5<sup>th</sup> December by Caravan 5Y-NIZ (block time 51hrs). On the 11<sup>th</sup> November, a Hawker Andover was hired directly by UNICEF (capacity 5mt). WFP contracted a Buffalo 5Y-GBA from 13<sup>th</sup> November to the 16<sup>th</sup> December (capacity 7.0mt, block time 140hrs). From November 18<sup>th</sup> to Dec 26<sup>th</sup> a Twin Otter ZS-NJK (capacity 1.5mt, block time 89hrs) was joined by, Buffalo (5Y-GAA) 22nd Nov-7<sup>th</sup> Dec (replacing the Andover) and which operated for 98 hours. A C-130 Hercules (59-CAI) with a 16mt capacity operated 20hrs from Nairobi between 27-30<sup>th</sup> November. As further aircraft came on-line, deliveries increased especially with the addition of a Hercules C-130 on 27<sup>th</sup> November, increasing the daily airlift capacity by almost 36mt.

Early Caravan block-time was consumed with survey activities and the movement of people. The Buffalo lifted items to Bardera, Beletweyn, Kismayo and Jowhar, and to a lesser extent, Buaale and Jamaame. Relief supplies included plastic sheeting, tarpaulins, blankets, high protein biscuits, medicines, mosquito netting and jerrycans, as well as materials to build the logistics support network including boats, petrol, Jet A1 fuel for fixed and rotary-wing aircraft, and all support items required for the boat operations. On the 25<sup>th</sup> November a Caravan, and Twin Otter began movements forward from Garissa, joined by a Buffalo on the 29<sup>th</sup>. As the Joint Logistics Operation evolved, Garissa became the focal point of despatch to Somalia, and stock consolidation by air and road rapidly grew, supporting a total of 221 aircraft movements forward into Somalia before the end of December (including the Helicopters).

Phase	Supplies	MT	Consignee
Phase I	Processed Food	551.60	UNICEF/WFP
	Non-food items	366.45	UNICEF/NGO
	Operational equipment and JET A1	204.35	WFP
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>1,122.4MT</b>	(WFP, 1998, January 7)

### 8.1.5 Air "Sprinkle"

Between the 25th-30<sup>th</sup> November the Twin Otter aircraft, from a base in Garissa, was utilised to hand-sprinkle a total of just over 3mt of supplies from low height and in slow flight, including biscuits, HDR's, Supermix, ORS and blankets within access of isolated pockets of people in Afmadu, Hagar and Jamame. Although the technique does not involve such a formalised preparation as for a heavy air-drop, ground areas were first demarcated by local actors. The operation was undertaken without injury to recipients on the ground. These flights represented the first of the planned SACB Flood Response airdrops into Somalia, and were the first relief airdrops into Somalia for several years (Baggerley, 1998, May 27).

### 8.1.6 Air-Drops

Airdrops formed a key part in the delivery matrix, serving Lower, Middle Juba and Gedo. Following the agreement of the Management Team on 9th December, where WFP presented its initial food distribution schedule, airdrops started on the 10th December ex-Mombassa to Garbarharay, Gedo. Locations were decided upon following consultations with field staff. Although aircraft took off from Mombassa, the operation was co-ordinated from Garissa. In Mombassa, three WFP-staff supervisors were responsible for the management of the loaders, bag packers/stitchers and palletisers (50 staff in total). Each of the 32 flights undertaken in Phase I carried 16mt, primarily maize and lentils. While the operation continued until April 1998, materials air-dropped within Phase I (10<sup>th</sup> - 30<sup>th</sup> December) totalled 517.6mt.

Drop zones were prepared by teams hired by WFP. By that stage, the availability of the helicopters made it possible to conveniently pre-position the teams 2-3 days in advance, to ensure that site preparation was completed with the full understanding of the local communities. Preparation involved bush clearance and the arranging of security to exclude people from the drop-zone. All drops were undertaken in the bush to avoid damage to houses, roads or airstrips. A drop-zone, 600m by 90m was cleared of trees and bushes, further surrounded by a 200m security zone. White food bags were used as markers around the perimeter, and a big cross marked the centre. Local security guards were placed around the zone to prevent anyone from wandering into the zone during the drops. In each of two rotations, eight pallets of one tonne each were dropped from a height of 700ft. NGOs and local authorities assisted with the preparations and to ensure safe storage of the dropped supplies and equitable distribution thereafter. Helicopters were deemed essential, both to allow the pre-positioning of ADZ staff in areas otherwise inaccessible, and to later lift teams out.

Airport Summary	Supplies	MT	Consignee(s)
<b>PHASE I</b>	Maize	442	GEDG: Memisa <sup>2</sup> ARC, SomAction
	Lentils	75.6	L/Juba: ARC
			M/Juba: WVI
			Hiraan: SCK (UK)
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>517.6 MT</b>	

[Source: WFP Somalia]

### 8.1.7 Helicopters

The operational concept of “emergency rescue” of flood victims stranded in areas of immediate risk to life, led to the identification of helicopters as the most suitable means of access (see Section 5.1).

A local search in East Africa came up with only one private helicopter, a Bell JetRanger, with a limited payload and range.

On 11th November a request was made by UNICEF, WFP and UNDOS to the Military and Civil Defence Unit in the (then) Relief Co-ordination Branch (now Disaster Response Branch) of the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (now OCHA) to mobilise 4 Helicopters (no less than 1.5mt payload), 8 hard-hulled boats (up to 6m, 50 HP outboard engines, each unit with 1 crew having river handling/flood experience). Also requested was air transport for these assets and other non-food items sourced from the UNICEF warehouse in Copenhagen, and the DHA warehouse in Pisa, to Garissa, Kenya. On 12<sup>th</sup> November, MCDU forwarded the request to all appropriate Focal Points in all Diplomatic Permanent Missions in Geneva.

MCDU received no answer at all to their appeal for helicopters. The French Ambassador to Kenya did make efforts to release French military assets. A small assessment team from the Cellule D’Urgence in Paris visited Kenya, conducted a field assessment with ICRC and discussed the needs with UNICEF. Their report to the French MFA recommended the release of military helicopter assets. Eventually following a long passage through the Ministries of Cooperation, Defence, Humanitarian Affairs and the First Ministry, the action was not approved. The French Government soon after donated \$250,000 to the flood relief operation. French military helicopters did, however, assist in the Kenyan flood emergency. (Guillaume de Montravel, 1998, August 13)

In response to needs, other than helicopters, the response was more forthcoming. On 14<sup>th</sup> November the Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs responded favourably with respect to the boats. UNICEF airlifted the boats to Nairobi on the 19<sup>th</sup>. The Netherlands Government made a DC-10 available on the 2<sup>nd</sup> December carrying health kits and ORS from Eindhoven to Nairobi. (Beigbeder, 1998, August 12)

In pursuit of helicopters, direct approaches made by UNICEF-EMOPS Geneva to local Diplomatic Missions and Donor country Emergency Aid Departments around the 10<sup>th</sup> of November had initially proven un-fruitful. However, on the 14<sup>th</sup>, the South African Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva responded, and gave the information

that the Department of Foreign Affairs in Pretoria had been able to establish that a specific private South African company<sup>1</sup> might be able to assist.

In light of this recommendation and the short time assumed it would take to ship helicopters to Nairobi to begin operations in Somalia, contact was made. A proposal was received from the company through UNICEF Geneva. Subsequently, UNICEF Somalia entered into a contract with the company on the 19<sup>th</sup> to provide 4 helicopters, the first to be operational within 4 days of receipt of pre-positioning funds, the 25<sup>th</sup> November, with the other three within 7 days of receipt of further funds. On 20<sup>th</sup> November, the SA company confirmed receipt of \$240,000, and informed UNICEF of the date of the arrival of the helicopters. In that letter they stated that the helicopters would be despatched, not from South Africa, but the USA, flying via Amsterdam. It later transpired that the company had failed to meet certain requirements of US law before shipment was permitted. One of the aircraft turned out not to be registered in the US, so the FAA impounded all four.

Despite numerous interventions on UNICEF's part with the Governments of both South Africa and the US, the helicopters were not released. The US Embassy in Nairobi were very helpful in its assistance in clarifying the reasons for the hold up of the helicopters. Subsequently, UNICEF received a letter from the US Department of State that due to errors made by the SA company, the delay in releasing the aircraft would be long enough to prevent the helicopters arriving in Somalia in time to be of use in the flood relief operations. The company then made alternative offers to replace these with aircraft from the Ukraine. UNICEF agreed, without waiving their rights under the contract, but by the 2<sup>nd</sup> December it was clear that those offers would never materialise. Civil Aviation Laws of Kenya stipulate that all aircraft operating in Kenya have to be certified either under European Joint Aviation Regulations or US Federal Aviation Regulations. The aircraft offered for replacement were not certified by either of the above. As it turned out, the helicopters did not arrive on the date stipulated in the contract, nor on any other day.

UNICEF sent the SA company a demand letter on 6<sup>th</sup> December for the return of \$240,000 by the 10<sup>th</sup>. The company responded on the 8<sup>th</sup> Dec, promising the full amount. By letter 10<sup>th</sup> Dec (enclosing bank transfer requests) they informed UNICEF of the transfer of \$154,989.82. Upon verification with the bank, UNICEF were informed that only \$54,972.32 was actually received. The company promised \$80,000, UNICEF were presented with a copy of a bank transfer, but this never materialised in cash. On 15<sup>th</sup> UNICEF informed the company that the money promised had not been received. The matter was handed to legal counsel to pursue. In January 1998, the recommendation was made to the UN, New York that the South African Government be requested to purchase from UNICEF the SA company's indebtedness to it in the amount of \$185,027.68.

In a letter to UNICEF around that time, the Commercial Aviation Association of Southern Africa presented:

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<sup>1</sup> Name reserved by Evaluation Team.

We are extremely surprised to note the poor information supplied by our Department of Foreign Affairs on the availability of aircraft in South Africa, and question the fact that a singular aviation company... was required to respond. They had submitted a rather questionable tender agreement to UNICEF and it is quite clear that the person evaluating the tender at the offices of UNICEF, has limited or no experience in evaluating aviation tender requirements. (Pierre F. de Bruyn, 1998, December 8)

On the 19<sup>th</sup> November, a Flash Appeal for Helicopters was launched by the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator for Somalia, co-ordinated with DHA, urgently appealing for funding of a 8-helicopter operation, costing \$3.4 million for one month. Around this time, the charity Band Aid Trust offered up to \$800,000 towards helicopter rental costs incurred by the Flood Response Team. Without this grant, helicopters may not have played any role in the emergency response.

As soon as it was clear that problems with the SA contract were insuperable, the search was widened with help from WFP/UNCAS.

An alternative supplier, Skylink Aeromanagement (K) Limited, was approached and a contract for two helicopters was secured swiftly, with the first becoming operational on 6<sup>th</sup> December. Records show that between the 5<sup>th</sup>-31<sup>st</sup> December aircraft ZS-RIR flew 61hrs 54min, this soon being replaced by RA22891 which flew 124hrs. A second MI-8T Helicopter LZ-CAR flew 134 hours over this period. Approximate running costs were \$1500/hr plus 800litres of JET A1 fuel each hour. Positioning/de-positioning costs were \$40,000/aircraft.

The first of two MI-8 (former Soviet military) helicopters came into operation on 6<sup>th</sup> December. Due to insurance arrangements, throughout the operations, the helicopters had to return to Garissa each evening. The first helicopter had a more powerful engine than the two that followed within the contract. It was capable of carrying 3.8mt. Skylink changed this for a conventional lower-powered MI-8 about a week later which carried 2.3mt in addition to the 5 crew. The second helicopter arrived on the 13<sup>th</sup>. Neither of the helicopters had HF radios. They would fly at between 1000-2000ft agl, and were soon outside the line-of-sight range of VHF communications. A UN security officer would fly onboard each helicopter. Four Russian crews were rotated through during the contract and one Bulgarian crew. The latter were regarded as the best, in that the captain spoke fluent English. Leaving Garissa fully loaded each morning, they took two hours to reach the affected areas of southern Somalia, whereupon they would always land to make a delivery en-route to the forward bases. Having arrived, they would refuel and continue with deliveries of relief supplies to otherwise inaccessible locations. These supplies had been pre-positioned by fixed wing aircraft. Rotations out of Bardera or Kismayo would continue until the helicopters returned to Garissa within available daylight hours early each evening. Occasionally up to 8 forward rotations were achieved in one day. It is estimated that 90-95% of their activity once they reached Somalia each day was spent on delivery tasks. Very little if any time was spent on the direct rescue of people. It can be seen that around 4 hours of flight time each day was consumed in transit between Garissa and the affected area.

The air operation consumed a very large quantity of Jet A1 fuel, which was brought into Kismayo from Garissa by air and from Mombasa by ship. A total of 592 drums of 200 liters each were up-lifted in Somalia, with the following breakdown: UNC18 Caravan - 74; UNCAS - 12; UNT1 Twin Otter - 99; UN Helicopter III - 407.

### **8.1.8 Boat Operations**

There are many small boats owned and operated by Somali's riverine communities, used for ferrying goods, people and livestock along and across the rivers. Typically, they are narrow, and poorly equipped to contend with extreme conditions. Some local boat owner-operators were charging \$100/day and offering to hire their craft out to humanitarian agencies. Initially, some local boat capacities were utilised. ICRC hired local boats from Brava to travel assist in Kamsuma and Jamame. By hiring local boat operators in Jamame, WFP rescued over 900 persons. It was decided by the assisting agencies that additional boats were required to rescue people, deliver relief supplies and assistance to the flood-isolated populations, and facilitate the movement of people until the floodwaters receded.

The UN Security and Logistics Team flew into Bardera on 8<sup>th</sup> November with inflatable boats to facilitate the ferrying of materials from the airport to the location of the marooned population.

On 26<sup>th</sup> November WFP reported:

So far, there are six boats operational; 2 boats in Bardera, 2 in Bualle, and 2 in Jamame. Also in Kismayo two boats are being deployed and will be operational in the coming days. From Kenya's Jomo Kenyatta Airport, 12 more boats will be deployed into southern Somalia within 7 days, once Customs-cleared. These will be allocated in Bardera, Sakow, Bualle, Jamina, Jamame and Kismayo. To-date, seven boat operators have been recruited by WFP and 8 more will be recruited. The Swedish Government has allocated 5 more operators who will commence on the 27<sup>th</sup> November. The WFP Boat Operation in Bualle and Bardera are facilitating the efforts of Terra Nuova and World Vision respectively in delivering blankets, plastic sheeting, medicines and food to villages up to 60 kms away from the towns. Each boat has made an average of 3 trips a day since 15<sup>th</sup> November. In Jamame, in addition to providing relief materials, rescues are being undertaken. On 20-21 November, two boats were delivered from Bardera to Bualle via Sakow, 300kms on the river, undertaking preliminary assessments of the villages along the way. This is the first contact the people of these villages have had with the humanitarian community since the flood stranded them. So far, the boat operation has been the only logistical way to access stranded people. This first contact brings some confidence to the population left in this area - and limits further population movements towards near-by towns

(Fraisie, S.,1997, Nov26)

Under the overall guidance of WFP, some 20 boats were allocated to a further six different bases in South Somalia (Garba Harrey, Hagar, Bilis Qoqani, Bur Dubu, Badaadhe, Belet Weyn and El Wak. Ten boats were supplied by WFP, ten donated by Norway through UNICEF. WFP reported,

during the first month, the boats ferried some several thousand people from flooded lands to higher ground and facilitated their movement across the rivers to reach supplies. The boats transported 520mt of UNICEF/NGO emergency food and 360mt of non-food items wherever needy and stranded populations were identified.

(WFP Somalia Weekly Flood Response Update 12-18 January 1998)

On 23<sup>rd</sup> November, World Vision commenced their boat operation around Buaale, which continued on a near-daily basis until February 1998.

On 20<sup>th</sup> November an appeal was made to the Swedish Government for boat operators. By the 30<sup>th</sup>, a Swedish Rescue Services Team were in Bardera with 4 boats, having passed through Nairobi for briefings and equipment assembly. On 1<sup>st</sup> December the team was on the river serving 19 settlements between Bula Batula and Kurusow from the Swedish Church Relief base at Sakow. A second boat team replaced the first in Sakow on 22<sup>nd</sup> December. They continued until 7<sup>th</sup> January when a gun-fight between guards at their compound and armed men outside precipitated the boat teams evacuation by helicopter. Team comments and recommendations on equipment are reflected within the Supplies section of this report. (Swedish Rescue Services Agency, 1997, December)

UNOPS and Diakonia (German NGO) procured four inflatables and eight aluminium boats for their operation on the Shabelle River at Belet Weyn.

### **8.1.9 Road and Sea Operations**

The conditions frustrated emergency access by road for many weeks. Even in areas that were not under water, torrential rain made most un-paved roads impassable, especially on "black-cotton" soils. Some trucks were bogged down for months.

However, to reach populations in need and reduce delivery costs, both WFP and ICRC attempted long-haul truck movements. Other agencies used light vehicles for local distribution and relief activities, especially as conditions began to improve. Tractors and donkey carts were used by local actors with great success at a local level, throughout the emergency period.

Ironically, some "drought-response" food commodities had been distributed in the affected areas in the month prior to the floods. Any remaining in storage was released for local distribution before being spoiled by the flooding. Around 1500mt of food had been distributed in September 1997 in the areas of Galgadud, Gedo, Hiraan, Middle & Lower Shabelle, and the Middle Juba.

Using local transport, WFP consigned 374mt by convoy to Dinsoor, in Bay. The consignment left Mogadishu on 1<sup>st</sup> December, but by the 15<sup>th</sup> had only reached Qansadere after a very difficult journey, from where the commodities were collected by people on foot. Another destined for Jamame in the Lower Shabelle at the end of November could only reach Sablaale, where ACORD ensured distribution. A later consignment in December of 486mt was directed to flood-displaced populations in

and around Brava, Qorioley and Sablaale, and was distributed by ACORD and the local NGO AgroAction. Further efforts in December brought 310mt to Jowhar, distributed by ADRA/SAACID and a larger consignment of 938mt was distributed by WFP in Burakaba, Bay Region.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) sent a 22 truck convoy to Marere/Jilib, which, after being blocked twice on the flooded road finally reached its destination at the end of November.

UNICEF sent two ships from Mombassa to Kismayo in December 1997 (12<sup>th</sup> and 23<sup>rd</sup>) carrying JET A1 fuel and food cargo. A further vessel carrying a large consignment of blankets, medical supplies, BP5 and Supermix was sent to Mogadishu before the end of December.

## WFP Food Distributions September-December 1997

NOTE: Bold entries indicate flood-affected areas/populations

MONTH	REGION	TOTAL MTN	IMPLEMENTING AGENCY	ROAD	AIRDROP	AIRLIFT
September-97	<b>BENADIR</b>	<b>354.05</b>	ADRA LNGO WFL	210 20.25 123.8		
	GALGADUD	89.992	CARE	89.992		
	<b>GEDO</b>	<b>255.88</b>	CARE	<b>255.88</b>		
	<b>HIRAAN</b>	<b>74.994</b>	CARE	<b>74.994</b>		
	<b>L. SHEBELLE</b>	<b>258.05</b>	CARE COSV LNGO	225 32 1.05		
	<b>M. JUBA</b>	<b>443.002</b>	WVI	<b>443.002</b>		
	<b>M. SHEBELLE</b>	<b>376.777</b>	ADRA	<b>376.777</b>		
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>1,852.745</b>				
October-97	<b>BENADIR</b>	<b>29.348</b>	ADRA	<b>29.348</b>		
November-97	<b>BAY</b>	<b>374.304</b>	WFP	<b>374.304</b>		
	<b>BENADIR</b>	<b>7.30</b>	ADRA	<b>7.3</b>		
	<b>L. SHEBELLE</b>	<b>59.844</b>	ACORD	<b>59.844</b>		
	<b>M. SHEBELLE</b>	<b>10.410</b>	ADRA	<b>10.41</b>		
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>451.858</b>				
December-97	<b>BAY</b>	<b>1008.132</b>	LNGO WFP	70 938.132		
	<b>BENADIR</b>	<b>292.846</b>	ACF ADRA	37.004 255.842		
	<b>GALGADUD</b>	<b>62.984</b>	CARE	<b>62.984</b>		
	<b>GEDO</b>	<b>197.01</b>	MEMISA LNGO		129.6 64	3.41
	<b>HIRAAN</b>	<b>97.2</b>	SCF		<b>97.2</b>	
	<b>L. JUBA</b>	<b>194.4</b>	ARC		<b>194.4</b>	
	<b>L. SHEBELLE</b>	<b>486.8</b>	ACORD CARE	318.168 168.632		
	<b>M. JUBA</b>	<b>32.4</b>	WVI		<b>32.4</b>	
	<b>M. SHEBELLE</b>	<b>310.595</b>	ADRA	<b>310.595</b>		
	<b>TOTAL:</b>	<b>2,682.367</b>		<b>2161.357</b>	<b>517.6</b>	<b>3.41</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL:</b>	<b>5,016.32</b>					

## 8.2 JOINT FLOOD RESPONSE ACTIVITIES

Over twenty organisations contributed to the flood relief operations during Phase I, operating from bases the length of the Juba and Shabelle Rivers. Many of the agencies have had long-standing programmes and good relations with local authorities and populations.

The UNICEF operation in Bardera began on 10 November 1997, initially from the office of Terra Nuova, an Italian NGO. From 18 November, the operational base was then moved to a hotel where radio communication was established and daily coordination meetings held with all partners.

In common with almost all of the flood affected areas, by the time the agencies arrived with any significant capacity to assist, Somalia was already 3 weeks into the crisis. It was during this initial period that many people had been swept away by floodwaters to their deaths. The operation in Bardera did not embark upon rescue operations. Survivors had rescued themselves.

Again in common with elsewhere, the flood and heavy rains damaged much of the farmland, and spoiled much of the under-ground and household crop storage. Most of the relief supplies moved to Bardera by aircraft were distributed to inhabitants of the town, to the IDPs camps recently established around Bardera and to the outlying affected villages in the district which were inaccessible due to impassable roads. Initially, supplies were stored in the open air at the airport, with security provided by the local authorities. As road conditions improved, the Bardera administration provided a warehouse in Bardera town. A total of 314 Mts. of relief supplies was received and distributed.

All road distributions were carried out by the Bardera Relief Committee and InterSOS. Life and Peace Institute initially facilitated the coordination with the local authorities. Boat operations were managed by Terra Nova, up to 100 km north and south of Bardera town. The Bardera Relief Committee and local authorities planned and assisted the distributions in Bardera District (some by helicopter) as well as in Quansadhere and Dinsor districts in Bay Region. ACF France provided a logistician to support all distribution and logistics activities.

### Distribution of relief supplies from Bardera

Quantity distributed (Mts.)	Distribution means	Number of families assisted
87 Mts. *	Helicopters	4,500
24 Mts.	Boats	2,000
203 Mts.	Road	18,000
<b>314 Mts.</b>	<b>Total</b>	<b>24,500</b>

\* This includes relief commodities dispatched to World Vision in Buale and Salagle by helicopters, totaling 13 Mts., and to Swedish Church relief in Sakow, totaling 27 Mts.

Bardera Hospital and Health committees distributed medicines during all food distributions and carried out a measles campaign in Bardera town and IDP camps.

MSF International rehabilitated three water tanks in Bardera town to supply clean water to the east bank of the river.

The main operation in Kismayo was carried out from Kismayo Airport between 18<sup>th</sup> November and 31<sup>st</sup> December 1997. The Inter-Agency team, with the support of the Life and Peace Institute, negotiated with the local authorities and the militia commander in charge of the airport for an arrangement that would permit the operation to safely utilize Kismayo Airport. Distributions were made to areas in and around Kismayo district that were accessible by road. Eight districts were served from Kismayo, including: Afmadow, Sakow, Buale, Hagar, Jilib, Jamame, Badhade, and Kismayo. A variety of means of transport were utilised during the operation, including boats and dhows along the coast, trucks, tractors, donkey carts, fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters. The operation was based on the airstrip, where a warehouse was provided by the local authorities. A Disaster Committee was also created, primarily for the purpose of assessing the needs of the large number of displaced families that moved to Kismayo town as a result of the flooding in the Valley. Some 6,000 families in three camps received food, shelter and cooking pots, and a local immunisation campaign was conducted through the Regional Health Board.

#### Distribution of relief supplies from Kismayo

Distribution means	Quantity distributed (Mts.)	Number of families assisted
Helicopters *	220 Mts.	15,000
Road	82 Mts.	6,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>302 Mts.</b>	<b>21,000</b>

\* Parts of the items were airlifted initially by helicopter in to villages from where they were later distributed by boat.

Two WHO-supported medical teams operating in the Kismayo area helped to reduce the burden on the MSF/Belgium-operated hospital.

A total of more than 65 villages received essential survival items during the period in the Juba valley, providing direct assistance to more than 15,000 families. These items were received and distributed by a number of partners in the zone: ARC (Afmadow, Hagar, Badhade); Swedish Church Relief (Sakow); World Vision (Buale); Mercy International/Care (Jilib); SCS (Marere). (SACB, 1998, January)

The two helicopters operating on daily basis for the flood operation left Garissa, carrying emergency supplies for 100 families including emergency food as BP5 or House of Manji biscuits, as well as medical supplies, fuel, and miscellaneous field requirements (spare parts, food for field staff, etc.). Fifteen thousand family kits procured by World Vision were airlifted from Garissa to Buale and Saglale to be distributed to affected families in Middle Juba.

### Distribution of relief supplies directly from Garissa

Description of supplies	Quantity distributed (Mts.)	Number of families assisted
Buffalo aircraft	120 Mts.	15,000
Helicopters *	120 Mts.	5,500
<b>Total</b>	<b>240 Mts.</b>	<b>20,500</b>

In the Shabelle, at least 92 villages and towns received essential survival supplies directed at pregnant and lactating women, providing more than 82 Mts. of emergency assistance to 5,500 families. Mostly UNICEF staff distributed these items through COSV, ACORD, DBG, CEFA, SCF-UK, IMC and UNOPS.

### Quantities of supplies issued by UNICEF during the operation

Description of supplies	Quantities distributed
House of Manji High Protein biscuits	12,000 cartons
BP 5 Compact food	15,952 cartons
Sand Bags	147,000 bags
Blankets	115,370 units
Tarpaulins	62,045 pieces
Cooking pots	30,000 units
Chlorine	396 drums
Resettlement kits	1,886 kits
Collapsible jerrycans	59,500 units
Humanitarians daily rations	10,000 cartons
Supermix	30,902 bags
Boats	30 units
Emergency health kits	10 units
Mosquito nets	800 pieces
ORS	727 cartons

\* Note that blankets, plastic sheeting, jerrycans and cooking pots were also provided by World Vision, as part of their emergency packages.

Substantial quantities of essential drugs, especially anti-malarial drugs were provided by WHO from its reserve stocks in Nairobi or stocks already pre-positioned prior to the flood in Luuq and Kismayo (in anticipation of an exceptionally high malaria morbidity season) to the various NGOs operating in the flood-affected areas.

## Summary of the beneficiaries of UNICEF activities

Location	Estimated number of beneficiaries families	Quantities of supplies issued
Garissa *	20,500	240 Mts.
Bardera	24,500	314 Mts.
Kismayo	21,000	302 Mts.
Shabelle Valley	5,500	82 Mts.
<b>Total</b>	<b>71,500</b>	<b>938 Mts.</b>

*\* 120 Mts. of World Vision supplies were issued from Garissa and airlifted to Buale/Sakow for 15,000 families. 120 Mts. of various relief and operational supplies were lifted by helicopters from Garissa to 5,500 families in various location in the Juba valley.*

The **International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)**<sup>2</sup>, were prompt in addressing the immediate needs of affected populations, assisted by a network of Somalia Red Crescent Society volunteers and local consultants, while simultaneously planning and initiating measures to tackle the medium-term consequences of the floods. Deliveries commenced in November of basic shelter items and emergency food supplies. ICRC reported that by the end of November, 97,950 beneficiaries had been targeted, rising to 228,000 by the end of December, in the areas of Gedo, Juba, Hiran, and the Middle and Lower Shabelle (ICRC, 1998, February). Health assistance measures included temporary health posts (10,622 consultancies were undertaken up to 8<sup>th</sup> January in Belet Weyn). Two floating clinics were launched to serve the worst-affected areas of the Lower Juba around Marere and Jamame, to reduce outbreaks of respiratory infections and to monitor the haemorrhagic epidemics, one of which is known as "Rift Valley Fever". Water and sanitation activities included the establishment of treated water points in Jilib, Marere and Jamame, 51 wells were cleaned and disinfected. Several wells that had been destroyed by the floods were reconstructed and ten tonnes of soap was distributed. In December 1997 a large seeds distribution to 258,500 people (51,700 families) commenced. By giving farmers 12kg of locally appropriate seeds to replace those they had lost in underground storage, flood recession planting and re-planting was made possible, giving the prospect of a harvest the following March/April. Each farming family also received 45kg of food (30kg maize, 10kg beans and 5 litres of oil) to discourage the immediate consumption of the seeds as food. (Langenkamp and Charters, 1998, June 2)

By November 7<sup>th</sup> in Belet Weyn District the Shabelle River burst its banks and submerged vast areas of land to an extent not seen in decades. 70% of the town's population relocated to Km.115, a point east of Belet Weyne on the main tarmac road from Mogadishu to Bosasso. With Support from Dfid, **Save the Children Fund (SCF (UK))** responded to needs at Km.115 and surrounding villages with provision of plastic sheeting, blankets and Jerry cans through long pre-established mechanisms developed in the SCF agricultural programme. Allocations to families were organised

<sup>2</sup> The Evaluation Team did not have access to the operational files of ICRC, and had to rely for source material upon interview accounts and summary updates.

by community leaders. Activities were co-ordinated with ICRC and IMC. 9,810 families were assisted in November and December 1997. In Belet Weyn town, public wells were chlorinated and the hospital was sprayed with insecticide on a daily basis. A distribution of 1500 mosquito nets combined with a health education programme to reinforce health messages, complemented a joint SCF-OXFAM initiative to tackle problems in water and sanitation. Agricultural rehabilitation and support activities, including seed distributions and repair of canals and irrigation ditches resumed in January as the rains abated and displaced people returned to their homes. (Boyle, 1998)

In northern Gedo, close to the Kenyan border, the operational area of the INGO **Trocaire**, continuous rains and breaching of the river banks resulted in extensive flooding in and around Bulla Xawa (where 7 people died in the floods), Dolo (where a further 22 died) and surrounding villages. The first to be affected were already displaced Rahanwein families living on the outskirts of Bulla Xawa. Other 1000 families in Belet Amin, displaced since 1991, and without resources, were severely affected. The population of Dolo had only just returned to their homes after being displaced at the time of the Ethiopian attacks of August 1996. Around 1000 families lost their homes as the waters rose, all newly planted crops were washed away in both rain-fed and irrigated areas, irrigation pumps damaged, canal banks collapsed along with the majority of the shallow wells and public latrines, and market prices soared 400% due to destruction of road infrastructure. As the region is a food deficit area and transport access was cut, Trocaire responded with 384mt of food for 24,000 people (soft wheat/lentils, Unimix and BP5 biscuits) for both FFW and free distribution. Nutritional levels declined severely. Trocaire distributed UNICEF plastic sheeting and blankets to over 1500 families (flown to Mandera by WFP), and supervised use of chlorine for well cleansing and water treatment. Further environmental sanitation activities included the spraying of all houses in the town, and was combined with a health information campaign. FFW requested from CARE/WFP for drought response, arrived in time to assist with the implementation of a drainage programme protecting sections of Bulla Xaawa vulnerable to run-off from nearby hills, and re-opening of the Bananey road to allow resumption of water supplies to the town. This work was undertaken jointly with the District Council office. Subsequently, seeds were distributed to benefit 12,716 families in surrounding villages. Ongoing rehabilitation and development work resumed in early 1998.

The INGO **ACORD** works in Sablale district, a mainly agricultural area. In the floods the whole of the town and 14 surrounding villages were displaced as the Shabelle River, which normally ends in the swamps of Haway without reaching the sea, formed an "inland sea" in a massive confluence with the Juba River. More distant villages became surrounded and inaccessible. The displaced populations of Brava, Sablale and Kurtunwarey exceeded 147,000. ACORD responded with evacuation of weak people to high ground. 10,000 were accommodated on the sand-dunes at Mudun, and benefited from a distribution of non-food items, consigned by UNICEF. In two December distributions, blankets, Jerry Cans, tarpaulins/plastic sheets and Unimix reached around 56,000 people. 318mt of WFP food was distributed in January 1998. Flood protection schemes were initiated using 19,500 sand-bags from UNICEF and 10,800 from ICRC, which helped save the land of 2,500 families near Kurtun Warey.

In late November, WFP collaborated with the NGOs Jubashine and CINS to help rehabilitate a sand-dune road (120km) to overcome the problem of road access to the lower Juba valley, given that the main tarmac road from Mogadishu to Kismayo via Jelib had been severed due to the flooding.

**CARE International**, at the time of the floods was implementing an OFDA-funded Emergency Drought Relief Project, and was forced to suspend many of its programs. Of the twelve NGO projects funded under the CARE Umbrella Grant Partnership Project, six were forced to suspend their activities. With \$45,000 support from UNICEF, CARE co-ordinated the response activities of a number of Somali NGOs. With Somalia Community Services and Mercy International (Middle Juba), SomAction and Small Enterprise Development Agency (Gedo) relief items were distributed to 60 villages, serving a total of 12,683 families. (Ahmed, 1998, May 26).

In the Balad, Afgoye and Jowhar/Mahaddey districts of the Shabelle, the NGO Diakonie/ Bread for the World-Germany (DBG) effected a response involving flood prevention measures (sand-bags), plastic shelter materials for 2000 affected families, and provided a further 18,500 flood victims with basic and supplementary food. Part of the supplies were provided from the UNICEF stocks in Mogadishu.

With support from OFDA and DfID, **World Vision** in the districts of Bu'aale, Sakkow and Salagle distributed 15,000 family survival kits, to meet the basic non-food needs of families affected by the flooding. The UN Joint Logistics Operation airlifted WV supplies. Four motorised inflatable boats were used to access otherwise isolated villages. 18,000 mosquito nets were distributed. To reduce the incidence of water-borne disease, water purification (by sand filtration), and chlorination of existing sources was undertaken. 18 pit latrines were constructed. 45 villages received basic medical care (3,982 families). In December, with financial support from UNHCR, WV distributed seeds and tools in 60 villages, reaching 4,149 farming families, helping communities take advantage of flood recession planting opportunities.

At the onset of the operation, Swedish Church Relief (SCR) received supplies in Sakow by air-drop, the airstrip being under water. Later the strip dried out. Donkey carts and carriage by hand were the main options for local over-land transport. During the first half of December, tarpaulins, mosquito nets and small quantities of food were distributed to villages along the river. During the second half of December, villages further away from the rivers were served with increased food quantities, since the needs in these centres was higher. The helicopter operation at this time was directed to three of the main villages in the area. SCR distributed 5,390 mosquito nets, 920 tarpaulins and medicines, through a pre-established outreach system of Community Health Workers, to combat malaria and dysentery. Co-ordination and relief prioritisation was undertaken in concert with the local authorities, who travelled with the boat crews. SCR supported the rehabilitation of airstrips and small sections of road, the construction of a raft in Bu'ale town for the evacuation of people and their belongings. (Nygren et al, 1998)

Norwegian Church Aid (NCA) completed an airlift of 34 Mt. of food to Burdhubo and Garbarharey on the 10<sup>th</sup> November, to benefit 3,000 families in the town.

American Relief Committee (ARC) operated in some of the worst affected areas of Somalia, including Afmadow, Hagar and Bilis Qoqani, undertaking air-sprinkle operations in co-ordination with the Garissa team, and organising zones for WFP airdrops.

COSV in Merka ran the hospital 9 MCH centres, 10 health posts and a therapeutic feeding centre.

### **8.3 Supervision and Monitoring**

Many agencies participated in the implementation of this joint operation. Levels and methods of supervision of distribution varied by location. When helicopters delivered supplies to marooned communities, medicines were handed to trained health personnel wherever possible, similarly with the boat distributions. Such direct distributions reduced the risk of diversion or loss. In Baidoa, inaccessible to international staff due to insecurity, the Somali Red Crescent Society took the lead. It was evident at each major location that issuance monitoring was undertaken by a combination of operational agencies, visiting donor missions, the local authorities and local flood relief committees.

At the onset of the operation, UNDOS started to collate the detail of implementation of each of the participating agencies, but the task proved very complicated and they stopped soon after. Regular reports to the SACB and donors provide a somewhat disparate but fairly comprehensive record of what goods were distributed, but there is little evidence of thorough and on-going monitoring of the impact the materials provided. While adequate attention was given to ensuring the hand-over, or release of relief items, little systematic effort was made to monitor the equitable end-use of distributions.

### **Principal Findings**

1. The fast onset of the flooding event, the lack of preparedness, the scale of the flooding and the impracticality of mounting ground-based operations left agencies with little option other than to resort to a response involving expensive means of delivery of assistance, involving air-lifting supplies and boats.
2. Broadly, response planning commenced quickly once the enormity of the crisis was recognised. Three weeks passed, however, before significant response implementation was evident, over a period when flood victims were in need of immediate rescue.
3. The overall purpose, structure, and planning of the Joint Logistics Operation was collaborative and well conceived, with the Regional Office of WFP providing the Country Team with invaluable assistance throughout the operation. The consolidation of materials in Nairobi, and their forward delivery provided effective support to other agencies.
4. Air logistics operations were managed with great professionalism. The inclusion of complementary specialists within the Logistics/Communications and Security Group led to the success. The understanding of the Kenyan Government, the availability of fixed-wing aircraft in the regional marketplace, the positive response of donors to the appeal and their close involvement in planning and problem-

- solving all contributed positively. Airlift, air-sprinkle and air-dropping operations were undertaken without serious incident.
5. Several issues emerge from the exercise of securing and operating the helicopters. While there are many helicopters available around the World that meet the required specification, most are in the hands of the military. Commercial heavy-lift is available, but the market is narrow and specialised. UNICEF had little knowledge of this market. Clearly they were unfortunate in selecting a company, that while appearing to come with a recommendation, failed to honour the contract. UNICEF Somalia should re-examine why it chose to undertake a procurement exercise in a specialist area, and why Copenhagen did little to support their efforts. Given that WFP were the Logistic Service providers to the Joint Operation, WFP should have been given the task of securing the helicopters in the first place. However, even given that WFP has a permanent fixed-wing contract officer in Rome, they have relatively little experience in the rotary-wing marketplace. Much of the UN experience resides within the Department of Peace Keeping Operations. Of course MCDU may have made further efforts and had greater success if the South African contract had not looked so secure, for so long.
  6. Helicopters would have been of enormous utility in early/mid October, when they could have rescued people from death by drowning (the initial objective), and invaluable too, but earlier, in a secondary role of rapidly identifying isolated communities that boats, donkey carts, tractors possibly, and rafts could then reach, delivering small amounts of critical relief commodities to those otherwise inaccessible. Indeed once the helicopters arrived, 6 weeks after the start of the flooding, it was this second role that they fulfilled.
  7. Once the operation was established, timely provision of assistance to isolated communities was achieved by the use of boats. A majority of the Flood Management Team felt it was inappropriate that local boat owners should financially benefit from the emergency, and that the response should be characterised by Somali's showing the World they can help themselves. Undoubtedly, local hire is, by contrast to importing boats and expatriate boat teams from Europe, a much more cost effective proposition.
  8. The presence of the boats and boat operators on the rivers helped to build confidence with the Somali communities and to avoid large population movements to the main centres of distribution. Contagious disease spread may have been reduced through the success of this strategy, possibly saving the lives of those otherwise weakened and vulnerable.
  9. WFP should have been more selective in its hiring policy. It was clear that one or two individual expatriate boat operators were ill-suited to the environment. Training of Somali boat operators could have commenced earlier.
  10. It was clear that as the operation continued a high degree of complementarity was achieved between the helicopters, air-drop teams and the boat operations.
  11. The presence of established national and international NGOs along the main axis of the affected regions led to WFP especially, very promptly forming new working partnerships with competent parties having proven response capacities, local understanding and outreach. Clearly without these on-the-ground capacities, the operations would not have been so effective.
  12. Adequate levels of supervision were maintained throughout Phase I. What appeared weaker was the ongoing monitoring of impact.

## **Recommendations**

- I. A competent body within the UN system should be assigned by OCHA to take responsibility for maintaining at readiness a global database of commercial helicopter operators who can provide response agencies, at 48 hour notice , with the assurance of being able to secure helicopters with a 2 Mt. Payload and 500 mile range.**
  
- II. Given the undoubted utility of helicopters in search and rescue activities, and the likely recurrence of flood, earthquake and hurricane disasters in countries where western military assets are unlikely to be released, donors should consider funding commercial arrangements to secure such specialised equipment on an immediate call-forward basis on behalf of the UN.**
  
- III. A systematic monitoring system needs to be in place, not only to ensure goods reach the rightful communities, but to continuously re-evaluate the needs and ongoing appropriateness of emergency responses. Further consideration needs to be given to monitoring the equitable end-use and impact of assistance.**
  
- IV. To assist in lesson learning, arrangements to capture and record ‘best practice’ should be incorporated in the system. Given the wealth of experience gained during the Flood Response Operation, everyone directly involved should have been asked to record ‘best practices’ developed or witnessed during the operation. In future emergency operations in Somalia this should be formalised in a standard and mandatory after-action questionnaire and a full debriefing. Since many relief workers soon move onto other contracts, programme managers should safeguard and distil the detail findings, to improve future system-wide performance.**

## 9. SUPPLY ISSUES

### 9.1 Introduction

At the time of the floods, several of the agencies holding limited stocks of emergency materials and "drought-titled" food in Somalia released these promptly. In response to appeals for assistance, financial resources and loans were arranged to permit procurement in the region and internationally, with some materials already pre-positioned in Nairobi. Certain donor nations offered donations-in-kind (d.i.k.'s) which were transported to Kenya. WFP, ICRC and a number of NGOs made purchases of seeds and food from traders within Somalia.

Kenya represents the commercial hub of the region, the support centre for response activities in Somalia. Suppliers in Nairobi offer fast and effective procurement, storage and forwarding services. For contingency purposes, some international agencies, with programming throughout East Africa still choose to hold modest emergency stockpiles of specialised emergency materials, goods with a long procurement lead-time, or items that are cheaper overall to import (and store) themselves from overseas. The UN agencies have mechanisms to permit the release of further goods from strategic stockpiles and through 'in-house' procurement capacities held in Europe. Operational arms of certain donor countries also hold goods at despatch-readiness in European logistics centres.

### 9.2 Relief Packages

During the early planning, UNICEF, in consultation with NGOs, decided upon a relief package to serve 1,000 families (6,000 people), which included a one-week ration. UNICEF received a HQ loan of \$1million to initiate immediate procurement in advance of donor pledges being realised.

#### Standard Relief Package

ITEM	UNIT	UNIT COST	QUANTITY	BUDGET
Tarpaulin Sheet	Roll, 50m x 4m	\$355	30	\$9,000
Blankets	Bale of 100	\$355	84	\$29,820
Oral Rehydration Salts	Carton of 100	\$90	1	\$90
Health Post Renewable kit	Kit	\$160	1	\$160
BP5/1 box/family/week	Box 12kg	\$43	1000	\$43,000
<b>TOTAL</b>				<b>\$82,070</b>

[Total kg: 19,174 Total volume: 110.709 cum]  
[N.B.: if MRE's available, addition of 7,000 rations would provide sufficient food for a total of two weeks, 3.5mt additional weight]

[Report Extract, Somalia Inter-Agency Co-ordinated Flood Response, Nairobi, 7<sup>th</sup> November 1997]

As materials were procured and assembled, and donor nations responded with d.i.k.'s, some line-items were inter-changed with goods of reasonable equivalence. For instance, tarpaulins came in differing sized rolls, some even pre-cut. As stocks of Norwegian-sourced BP5 were depleted, purchases were made of high protein biscuits

manufactured in Kenya. As a result, constituents of the 'standard relief package' varied over time.

Some agencies, World Vision notably, chose to distribute mosquito bed-nets or rolls of netting. A Swedish cash donation allowed purchase of 60,000 sandbags and 20,000 cooking pots, 20,000 plastic sheets, the latter representing 58% of the total value of the Swedish donation.

Substantial quantities of essential drugs, especially anti-malarials were provided by WHO from its reserve stocks in Nairobi or stocks already pre-positioned prior to the floods, in Luuq and Kismayo, in anticipation of an exceptionally high malaria morbidity.

The US Government donated 10,000 cartons of Humanitarian Daily Rations and funds to purchase 400 drums of "chlorine" for water treatment. Numerous other donations in kind were received, including 1,051 cartons of dates from the Arab League, and various emergency items from the Italian Government, including 103 bales of blankets, 240 rolls of plastic sheeting, 2 boats with engines and 8 medical kits. Egypt made the sole African government donation of materials, comprising blankets, food and drugs.

The majority of supplies arrived in Nairobi in time for distribution during Phase I, though some, for example Egyptian consignment only reached the field in early 1998. Consignments from USAID and Norway were the first to arrive, in the week the appeal was launched, with the remainder of the USAID donations landing a few days later.

### **9.3 Appropriateness of supplies and equipment**

In the early stages of the flood response, supplies provided were generally appropriate. Given the considerable displacement of people away from sources of shelter, warmth and means of cooking, provision of plastic sheeting, blankets and emergency foods that required little or no preparation were most appropriate.

Plastic sheeting proved to be the most welcomed material, and enabled displaced families to protect themselves from the cold torrential rain. Blankets helped parents to keep their children warm, and to protect them from mosquito bites. Donated blankets were seen covering bush-wood shelters in the absence of sheeting. (Carter, 1998, July 6).

#### **9.3.1 Boats**

The Swedish Boat Teams made a number of comments on the utility of their vessels:

The aluminium Buster Boats were not very good in transportation of heavy goods. They were however, stable and had a built-in petrol tank. The fibreglass canoes were very good load-carriers but much less secure in heavy streams. The lack of spare parts, such as plugs, petrol filter, spare propellers, impellers made it impossible to do any servicing. The outboard and propeller should be designed for the boat; come with

an anchor, a boat-hook, First Aid Kit, rescue line, and a lockable space onboard. The ideal would be some kind of bigger canoe, with matching engine.

Another review notes:

The flat-bottom boats proved to be the most suitable for this operation, while the Norwegian boats (with deep shafts) were useful for moving supplies on the river only; access to flooded areas in the bush was difficult for these boats. (SACB, 1998, January)

The UN Chief Security Officer did attempt to secure powerful “jet-boats”, which could have carried large quantities at high speed in shallow waters. Specialists would have been needed to maintain and operate such vessels, and comprehensive spares-packages carried to contend with arduous conditions. If this option is to be considered for any future emergency, arrangements must be established in good time, and pre-agreements struck with the appropriate releasing authorities.

### **9.3.2 Humanitarian Daily Rations**

The Humanitarian Daily Ration (HDR) was developed in the United States in 1993 as a less expensive alternative to the military MRE (Meal-ready-to-eat), to be acceptable for the widest range of cultural and religious dietary restrictions, and to maintain the health of moderately malnourished recipients until normal or targeted feeding can resume. They require no cooking and no water for preparation. They can be air-dropped via a triad system whereby individual packets flutter to the ground relatively harmlessly. They are pre-positioned in various locations world-wide and used by many departments in the US Government, including USAID’s OFDA. Six million have been donated in total, including gifts to UN agencies and NGOs on several occasions since ’93 for use in relief and refugee situations. After much discussion at the onset of the floods, a consignment of 50,000 were air-lifted from Italy to Nairobi on the 19<sup>th</sup> November, taking a further 7 days to clear customs. A second 50,000 arrived on the 29<sup>th</sup> and was cleared by the 3<sup>rd</sup> December.

The HDR’s were welcomed and deemed appropriate by the recipients. Sprinkling from low-flying aircraft proved a safe practice. Broadly, people wanted more of them.

Sweeter elements in the packet, such as jam, peanut butter and biscuits, were set aside by some people and stored for Ramadam, to be used in lieu of traditional sweets such as dates, fruit, jam and samosa’s, and taken to break the daylight fast at the end of each day. (Carter, 1998, June 11)

### **9.3.3 Other Supplies**

Chlorine distribution was effective, and supervision of use seems to have prevented the common misuse problems encountered in many other relief operations. In the agricultural projects initiated during Phase I, appropriate seed types were introduced. Drug distribution was undertaken through doctors or trained Community Health Workers wherever possible, although poor prescription of drugs was reported in the thriving private sector.

High protein biscuits proved valuable at the early stages of the floods when people were displaced to areas without means of cooking. There was evidence in some locations of an oversupply of BP5 biscuits. These were sold or bartered by recipients. However, with demand for such products apparently low, so were the terms of exchange.

### **Recommendations**

- I. Consideration should be given to establishing and maintaining a strategic stockpile of emergency equipment and materials in East Africa, a pooled resource serving an alliance of all agencies, holding standard, proven items. Decisions on types of equipment and materials to be held and cycled should respect views of both operational staff and recipients. For example, mosquito nets should be included in all flood relief packages.
- II. Standard specifications equipment should have been issued prior to the Appeal with offers of inferior equipment being rejected. The ideal specification of boat could be produced locally within the region, with donor support. Ex-military equipment could be field-tested prior to the next emergency and held in stock.
- III. All technical supplies must be accompanied by sufficient spares to ensure safe and durable use in field conditions, and full training provided as necessary.
- IV. All specifications and necessary pre-agreements for access to specialised equipment and services should be re-examined in readiness. Much of this activity could be achieved as part of a preparedness training exercise.

## **10. SECURITY**

### **10.1 Introduction**

Instability and insecurity have come to characterise Somalia over the years since 1991. During the UNITAF/UNOSOM operation (1992-94) the lives of many civilians, militia members and soldiers of foreign contingents were lost. Since then, with no consistent and effective law and order structure having been established, and inter-clan conflict and continuing in certain areas, risks to local and foreign aid actors have included murder, kidnapping, hostage-taking, banditry, extortion, road and air transport fatalities and injury, accidental involvement in fighting and, though rarely, involvement or proximity to land-mine and ordnance incidents.

### **10.2 Regulating the Operation**

Experience in Somalia has shown that the ‘humanitarian imperative’, when driving initiatives by actors inexperienced in this context, has unwittingly contributed to the escalation of insecurity. In recent years, implementers have been directly endangered, and mistakes have also jeopardised the staff and ambitions of other longer established and better acculturated programmes.

As an apparent consequence of these experiences, and those gleaned in Rwanda in 1994, donors and response planners on this occasion chose to work through existing partner agencies, rather than support agencies considered new entrants to Somalia. Where staffing needs demanded, implementing agencies chose regionally-based expatriates to supplement their teams, wherever possible contracting people with relevant Somalia experience. Whilst a number of offers of assistance were received by the Emergency Coordinator from humanitarian agencies outside the region, these were either declined, or the agencies were confronted by a restrictive funding environment. The newcomers that were admitted were asked to work in close partnership with established, well networked and experienced agencies.

### **10.3 Staff Hire and Experience**

Given the lack of warning, and tailored preparedness for a severe flooding event, the response was late commencing. With journalists reporting the apparent lack of humanitarian action there was mounting pressure upon the UN operation to deliver against its mandate and rapidly mount a meaningful response. Additional staff were swiftly hired, particularly for the boat teams. Established systems and safeguards for recruiting appropriate staff generally worked well. However, some incidents of cultural insensitivity among newly hired individuals were reported to the Evaluation Team. Thankfully, no serious security incident resulted. The individuals concerned were soon reprimanded or removed from the scene.

Another initial question mark over safety was related to how much local knowledge of the special circumstances prevailing in the Juba Valley was held by expatriate staff in the UN. Many staff, due to normal staff-turnover and pre-flood security rules had little or no recent experience in the flood-affected regions. It was clear, however, that very experienced individuals were placed in key co-ordinating positions. The Evaluation Team met several highly competent UN staff who contributed much to the safety of newcomers, having lived through many past trials in aid implementation in Somalia, and who understood well the context.

#### **10.4 UN Security System**

Humanitarian operations in Somalia have over time become adjusted to devoting considerable levels of resources and time to security and related issues. One notable carry-over from the days of UNOSOM has been the retaining of security specialists by the United Nations. The Designated Official (DO), the UNDP Resident Representative, is responsible for the management arrangements of the UN system and is accountable to the Secretary General through the United Nations Security Coordinator (UNSECOORD) for ensuring the safety and security of UN personnel. The DO is supported by the UNCT and the Security Management Team (SMT). The DO has a security staff comprising of a Chief Security Advisor (CSA), and up to 6 Zone Security Officers (ZSO's) the latter being employed by individual UN agencies.

Together, the team have developed and maintained a rigorous security management system and continuously monitor UN operations for adherence to safety practices and standards. Their understanding of the shifting alliances and allegiances of militia leaders, their grasp of the regional and international dimensions to the "war-economy" and financial/military support by neighbouring and interested foreign powers, provides a resource which is valued and drawn upon heavily by operational planners. Their direct security assessments lead to protective and preventative actions and recommendations related to the humanitarian arena.

Based upon a Somalia Security Manual, Security Officers develop, update and disseminate supplementary Briefing Sheets to all staff reminding them of agreed procedures and safe practices, reiterating to them their individual responsibilities to contribute to the relevance and readiness of the security system. Security Levels are assigned by location on a rising scale, with evacuation/relocation being the highest and demanding actions in strict adherence with standard "published procedure".

Prior to the onset of the flood emergency response, no Zonal Security Officer had been permanently stationed in the affected regions. UN operations were respecting an imposed Security Level which proscribed UN International staff travel unless accompanied by a security escort. It soon became clear that humanitarian needs would make necessary a swift review and adaptation of security procedures. It was later reported that:

The concept for security cover worked on the principle that UN International Staff were authorised to work in the area unaccompanied, provided the following conditions were met. Firstly, that sufficient air assets were available (for emergency relocation/evacuation). Secondly, that personnel in the field had necessary communications and at least one UN security officer was air mobile in the region and based in Garissa. Thirdly, that there was an approved security emergency plan for the region. (UNDP, 1998)

The security officers issued VHF and HF Radio Channel frequencies for the crisis period, Mayday procedures, and ensured 24hr contact was tenable to/from operational centres in Somalia through a Nairobi-based communications centre. The HF radio frequencies, however, were not always workable, with signals often being markedly attenuated by the propagation conditions generally prevailing during daylight hours.

### **10.5 NGO Security**

International NGOs are not bound by the UN Security system, its thresholds and procedures, and though clearly adopt practices deemed appropriate to the Somali context, are apparently comfortable working in conditions that the UN Security System deems imprudent. In the event of medevac/rescue, INGOs broadly feel reassured by the availability of assets and competence held within the UN system for that contingency, though some have their own arrangements, including access to air-rescue services from Kenya. At the onset of the flood emergency, several INGOs had active programmes in affected areas, which at that time were deemed insecure by UN thresholds. These agencies naturally became the UN partners of choice, and this greatly facilitated swift and locally informed responses.

### **10.6 Air Cover**

The joint response operations escalated, with the deployment of boats and boat operators along the Juba river, the establishment of two logistic bases (Bardera and Kismayo), and the simultaneous establishment of the main logistics and operational centre at Garissa (Kenya). Aircraft, initially UNCAS, then commercial Nairobi-chartered Buffalo, Caravan and Twin Otters supported the operation. Helicopters were seen as central both to the concept of 'rescue and relief' of affected populations, and indeed also to the coherence of the UN Security Plan. Their late arrival was a general cause for concern. Bulk relief support to otherwise inaccessible areas commenced in mid December. Mobile teams together with local authorities prepared drop-zones for air-drops by C130 aircraft. UN International Staff numbers soon exceeded 10 and peaked at between 25-35.

Until Garissa opened on 18<sup>th</sup> November, as the forward logistic centre, security cover for locations without a resident ZSO was at times only provided by Security Officers based in Nairobi. With no aircraft allowed to overnight in Somalia, and no night flying permitted, Bardera and Kismayo-resident ZSO's could not in any case be re-deployed any quicker than Officers based in Kenya, and only then by day once flights had commenced.

## 10.7 Impact of the Floods on Security

With almost everyone, irrespective of status being personally affected by the floods, the militia and their families were as much victims of circumstances as anyone else, and pre-occupied with self-help and survival of family and clan. One flood 'dividend', from the security viewpoint was that vehicle movements were curtailed for some months. The conditions effectively rendered the militia 'battle-wagons' immobile, even those with 4-wheel drive transmissions. These 'technicals' could not readily carry out attacks or otherwise frustrate relief activities. Predictably, as roads dried and routes reopened in 1998, such practices resumed. A second security-related observation was that air-dropping allowed goods to reach isolated communities without aid staff being exposed to the risks often associated with cross-line road transportation.

## 10.8 Access Negotiations

Bardera became the initial operational base for the UN. The security assessment and immediate response activities were undertaken by a team including a UN Security Officer. Bardera had a landable airstrip, facilitating both access and evacuation if necessary. Negotiations with the local administration led to agreeable working arrangements. The district was already benefiting from the security and stability provided by the District Administrator, the local SNF chief. Certainly, international staff security depended crucially upon mutually respectful relationships developed locally.

In Kismayo, negotiations with General Morgan were entered into robustly. The ambition of the UN was to disabuse local militia of the idea that a large relief response inevitably carried to Somalia the opportunity for flagrant profiteering and crude diversion of resources away from the rightful recipients. The agreement struck allowed the use of the air- and sea-ports to mount extended relief operations. The agreement kept the peace - with the only resources being shared with the local militia being access to paid work opportunities in portering. Three of the local clan groupings were in turn rotated through this employment. The arrival of Somali-chartered aircraft carrying the mild and locally favoured drug Khat (*Catha edulis*) was sometimes a source of insecurity at the airport, until that area of the apron was fenced off. The town itself throughout this period was prone to regular and often serious security incidents, in marked contrast with other towns along the Juba axis.

## 10.9 Co-ordination

Poor inter-agency co-ordination impacted negatively upon the UN security system.

The initial lack of coordination between Nairobi, Garissa and the Field seriously undermined UN security's ability to log and keep track of International Personnel stationed and moving around in the region. However, as control moved away from Nairobi and into Garissa, and along with the publication of a security

emergency plan and necessary briefings of staff, improvement was apparent. (UNDP, 1998)

### **10.10 Operations and Equipment**

UN-supported boat operations commenced on 18<sup>th</sup> November, initially local to Bardera. While Garissa had HF and satellite telephone communications equipment, the first boat teams carried none. Boat movements down-stream, to Buaale, Sakow and Marere and up-river from Kismayo were undertaken without radio cover. Neither carried a UN security officer, nor navigation equipment. This was a great worry to the security team, who considered it important that all staff should be in radio contact with base. In contrast, Swedish boat crews arrived very well equipped, even making daily calls directly to Europe via satellite phones.

The eventual arrival of the first helicopter, shortly followed by a second, lifted the security cover to a level regarded by the security officers as reasonable. Prior to that the security strategy was deemed by some as being “essentially in tatters”.

While the two helicopters were based and over-nighted in Garissa to satisfy provisions of the aircraft insurance policy, one helicopter was assigned to service operations around Bardera and south along the Juba River to Buaale, the second covered the southern reaches of the river, north from Kismayo. Each carried a security officer. Security cover was transformed from resident-but-isolated Officers who would have taken a long time to respond to an incident, to a flexible “air-mobile” state of readiness, covering the whole of the Juba-based relief operations. No such cover was provided to the Shabelle. The helicopters, together with fixed-wing operations, greatly facilitated security assessment and consultation visits, often in areas where no recent UN operation had taken place.

One enduring concern and consequent criticism leveled by the security staff against the operational planners was the shortage of essential communication equipment and its professional installation..

At no time during Phase I were the newly opened operational bases properly equipped as per the initial security strategic principles. (UNDP, 1998)

Equipment that was supplied, such as the MacPac System, worked well within the limitations of HF. However, the problem of inappropriate frequency allocation and initial training impaired their utility. Later, the airdrop teams came to rely heavily on this equipment and found it effective. Some new satellite-phones proved unreliable.

The helicopters provided welcomed air assets for the security team and facilitated forward reconnaissance exercises. The lack of functional HF equipment on-board held the potential for serious problems once the aircraft flew beyond the line-of-sight range of VHF. In the event of an emergency landing or diversion to address a security incident, this would have only been recognised once the aircraft failed to return to base at the pre-assigned time. While a contingency plan was in place, namely to deploy HF-capable

fixed-wing surveillance aircraft to the probable area of the forced landing/incident site, to establish VHF airband contact and relay messages, the lack of long-range radio communications was disconcerting.

### **10.11 Security Incidents**

A series of serious security incidents were recorded within the After Action Report in relation to Phase I of the Flood Response Operation:

- UN International Staff (with the ZSO) were held up at the “Green Line” approaching Kismayo from Gobwein. They were unable to communicate with Kismayo due to lack of radio equipment, but fortunately negotiated their own release.
- There were regular gunshots at Kismayo airport, which occasionally resulted in riots towards the apron. Any aircraft on the apron were thus forced to leave quickly and UN staff were forced to shelter in the hangar. The difficulty in communicating with Kismayo base and initial lack of airband often resulted in a lack of warning to approaching aircraft, or personnel traveling from the town to the airport.
- A riot outside the UNICEF Kismayo compound resulted in armed men from inside the compound shooting and killing a pregnant woman and wounding a child outside the compound. The town was very tense for a number of days and reprisals were threatened. Difficulty with radio communications meant that UN staff at the airport and seaport were unaware and could have unknowingly become involved.
- ACF staff in Bardera were targeted and shot at by gunmen upset over the employment policy of ACF. As a result ACF pulled out of Bardera.
- The looting of a vehicle in Jamame and subsequent negotiations to retrieve the stolen commodities resulted in armed militia surrounding the World Concern compound. International staff were held hostage for 24 hours before being safely released. An earlier rescue flight by helicopter failed due to lack of radio equipment in the helicopter and in the compound.
- The Southern Region helicopter was often troubled by riots at drop sites, largely since it proved difficult to arrive unannounced. This was in contrast to the northern operations where faster receding flood-levels had allowed community representatives to swim and wade into Bardera and make well planned delivery arrangements with the relief team.
- A Russian crew member (helicopter) was threatened by armed Kismayo airport staff as a result of a misunderstanding.
- The crew of a Buffalo were warned not to fly to Bardera, following an earlier misunderstanding.
- On several occasions, shots were fired around aircraft on the ground, one closely missing the EC Representative.
- There were two reported aircraft accidents, due to landing on narrow roads in cross-wind conditions, but neither resulted in injury or death.

Other reports and cables described additional incidents:

- In mid-November, 10-12 “technicals” from North Mogadishu attacked the CINS compound in Balcad, killing two Somali staff and kidnapping two Italians. The Italians were carried back to Mogadishu and held for a few hours before being released. They were threatened that if they ever returned they would be killed. All expatriates were evacuated from Mogadishu following this.
- On 18<sup>th</sup> December - shooting was reported by the WFP boat crew operation from Marere. The officer-in-charge of boat operations, who was in Marere during the incident, reported that a member of the militia fired a single shot in the air, not at the boat.
- On 28<sup>th</sup> December - a shooting at Jamame while the Twin Otter was on the ground. The airstrip in Jamame was temporarily located on the main road between Jamame town and Bandar Jadeed village. The shooting occurred between the towns' people and villagers who were to receive the food delivered by the Twin Otter. This was judged to be a local squabble over food; the aircraft was not a target and was able to depart safely.
- Also on the 28<sup>th</sup>, the UN Buffalo aircraft received a single round through the radar dome. The bullet hole went unnoticed until the aircraft returned to Garissa when it was impossible to establish where the incident had happened. Damage was minimal.
- On the 29<sup>th</sup> December, two WFP boat operators were held for 3 hours at Hargeisa village. They were threatened, some shots were fired and their personal possessions and a HF radio from the boat were looted. Local elders reacted quickly and all items were returned that afternoon. The perpetrators were said to be local “hooligans”. Two senior elders of the Ogadeni were brought in from Kismayo by helicopter to resolve the situation and ensure security for future UN operations in the area.

The number and seriousness of security incidents escalated during Phase II of the operation.

A key report concludes that:

The UN was unprepared from a security point of view.....UN should consider themselves lucky that an International Staff member was not killed or seriously injured. (UNDP, 1998, May 22)

### **Recommendations**

- I. All field personnel should be provided with compatible pre-programmed hand-held VHF radios, navigational aids (as necessary) and a full security briefing. A thorough introduction to political and sociological issues in Somalia should be provided, supported by written materials.
- II. Security clearance should be achieved through one central officer, to whom all personnel be required to report prior to entry to the field.

- III. All future aircraft contracts should include a clause stipulating that functional multi-frequency HF radios are installed, and captains/first officers are fluent in English.
- IV. That clarity is pre-agreed as to which organisations and authorities will lead in key operational roles, and who will follow.
- V. An arrangement should be established to secure immediate guaranteed access to appropriate communication equipment. To ensure that equipment is of adequate standard, a UN office should be charged with administering an approval process prior to procurement, and that an audit and rational augmentation of existing-held stockpiles of sector-specific equipment/materials be undertaken to facilitate future rapid humanitarian start-up operations. An alternative to stockpiling and maintaining radio equipment would be a standing arrangement with a specialist service provider such as the Cable & Wireless plc. Emergency Response Unit, who provide communications in emergency areas at short notice.
- VI. Standby staff rosters should be re-examined quarterly to ensure availability of appropriately experienced personnel at short notice.

## 11. OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOUR

*...the bigger the operation, the more difficult its management in the Somalia context.*  
(LPI-HAP, 1997e, November 21)

### 11.1 Introduction

Since UNOSOM there have been important changes in the international aid system. The rapid rise in relief expenditure apparent in the early 1990s has been reversed. There is greater reticence in the international community to intervene in conflict related emergencies on humanitarian grounds, especially with the use of force. The unwillingness of governments to provide military helicopters during the Flood Response operation reflects this.

The ambivalence towards humanitarian interventions in part arises from an appreciation of the complexities of working in war induced emergencies. The risks of humanitarian aid being diverted into war economies to fuel wars or weakening local livelihood systems and institutional capacities, has given rise in aid policy to conceptual models that link relief and development and operational maxims such as 'Do No Harm' (Anderson, 1996). In addition there has been a rash of 'codes of conduct' and 'principles' to regulate humanitarian aid interventions. This section examines the Operational Principles and the Standards of Behaviour developed for the Somali Flood Response Operation.

### 11.2 Lessons Learned

Much has been written on the policy lessons and technical lessons learned from the 1991-1993 famine and the UNOSOM intervention.<sup>1</sup> The 1996/97 and 1998 UN CAP list a number of principles and strategies based on 'past lessons'. The spectre of UNOSOM clearly hung over the Flood Response operation, as the words of a former US Marine who was head of Civilian Military Operations Centre in Somalia during 1993, illustrates:

This is a fractious and poverty stricken society where large influxes of aid attract vultures as well as save lives....After a month of flooding, people are desperate and we need to help them quickly, but also carefully. Otherwise the help we bring might also hinder and prompt a return to the looting and anarchy we witnessed in '92.  
(MacPherson, 1997, November 16).

Some of the lessons of working in Somalia articulated by those interviewed during the Evaluation included:

- the infusion of relief into a resource poor environment can unintentionally fuel conflict;
- emergencies are seen by Somalis as money making opportunities;
- Somalis are dependent on external assistance for the provision of social services, and should take more responsibility for helping themselves;
- relief interventions are unsustainable;
- the external management of relief aid in the past has marginalised Somalis, overridden and undermined local structures and capacities;
- a coordinated response by donors and agencies can reduce the potential for the manipulation of aid, and increase local tensions;

- and Somali communities should be involved in any relief activities;
- carefully managed, relief assistance can contribute to building solidarity, reconciliation and peace.

These lessons informed the approach of the Flood Response operation, and were codified in the Operational Principles and Standards of Behaviour for agencies involved in the Flood Response operation and developed by the Life and Peace Institute (LPI).

### **11.3 The Role of the Life and Peace Institute**

Although the initial Plan of Action of 7<sup>th</sup> November envisaged developing 'guiding principles', it was not until 18<sup>th</sup> November that this was taken further. At the time it appeared that some of the fears about the negative impact of the operation were being realised.

In the third week of November, before the international fleet of boats had been deployed in the Lower and Middle Juba, information was received in Nairobi that local boat owners were asking exorbitant payments to rescue people stranded on dykes and islets (Al- Nammari, 1997, November 16). This appeared to threaten the ethos of the Flood Response operation and reconfirmed negative impressions of Somalia. At the same time the operation was looking to open a second logistics hub in Kismayo. Unlike Bardera, which was already operational, Kismayo was a divided town. In January 1997 Harti forces, lead by General Mohamed Said Hersi 'Morgan' (SPM/SSA) and Colonel Ahmed Hashi (SPM/SNA), ejected their former allies the Marrehan militia (nominally SNF) from Kismayo. Prior to the floods reconciliation talks between elders of the Harti, Ogaden, and Marrehan are reported to have left 'Morgan' marginalised, and for much of October he was out of the country. As the Flood Response operation geared up, initial contacts by the Flood Response team with the faction leaders led to demands for landing fees.

In response to these incidents the Coordinator invited LPI to assist the Flood Response operation to identify 'sympathetic voices' to work (Paganini, 1998, May 9). LPI, an international centre for peace research, with a particular interest in governance, civic education and peace building, and with a long term presence in the Juba valley, accepted the role. Their involvement in the operation had four main elements:

- The development of a set of Operational Principles and a Code of Behaviour for agencies involved in the Flood Response operation.
- Assisting the response teams to identify the legitimate local structures, community leaders and elders for the operation to work with.
- Mobilising Somali communities for self-help.
- Mobilising Somali communities for solidarity, reconciliation and peace building.

### **11.4 Principles and Standards**

LPI developed three papers which set out the principles and modalities for the flood operation: i) a concept paper on why there was a need for a 'new approach' in the emergency; ii) Operational Principles, and iii) Standards of Behaviour for implementing partners (LPI-HAP, 1997a,b,c November 21).<sup>2</sup>

## A 'New Approach'

The Operational Principles and Standards of Behaviour were preceded by a concept paper reflecting past 'lessons' (see box). Foremost among these was an understanding that:

emergency interventions more often than not do unintentional harm to the affected communities and their institutions. (LPI-HAP, 1997b, November 21).

To address this the paper proposed certain preconditions for the Flood Response operation. These included:

- giving due regard to local capacities;
- working with implementing partners who had proven knowledge and experience of flooded areas;
- effective coordination of information and publicity through the SACB Flood Response Operations.

These preconditions were developed further in the Operational Principles and Standards of Behaviour.

## Operational Principles

The Principles and Standards had distinct aims. The Principles (see box) sought to "regulate the activities of implementing partners" in their interactions with flood affected communities. In this way the operation would avoid doing harm and effect certain outcomes in community relations. The Principles articulated a set of assumptions and value judgements based on the experience of LPI. These assumptions were:

- An emergency operation could only succeed if the institutional resources and capacities of Somali communities were integrated into the flood response operation.
- Local administrative and authority structures should be utilised to form a bridge between the international community and affected populations.
- By working with these structures, the operation would avoid doing harm.
- That there were 'legitimate' representatives of communities whose local knowledge could best determine the needs of populations.
- That the relief operation provided an opportunity for mobilising community solidarity, reconciliation and peace building.

The Operational Principles gave LPI staff responsibility for liaising with and mobilising local leaders and social groups.

## WHY A NEW APPROACH IS NEEDED IN THE INTER-AGENCY FLOOD EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN SOMALIA

Cognisant of the rushed nature of emergency operations and aware of the fact that emergency interventions more often than not do unintentional harm to the affected communities and their institutions, LPI would wish to underline the following pre-conditions for the Inter-Agency Flood Emergency Response in Somalia. Our proposal draws upon lessons learned from past interventions in Somalia and elsewhere in the region.

1. That external intervention should give due regard to and build upon existing local community structures and capacities rather than by-pass and undermine their relevance and effectiveness to the ultimate solution of the problem faced;
2. That those implementing partners with an extended period of presence and valuable knowledge and experience of the actual field situation in the various flood affected areas act as Focal Point agencies for co-ordinating intervention operations, and that all other agencies that are willing to take an active part in the intervention should co-ordinate their contributions to the response through the Focal Point Agencies in their respective areas of operation;
3. That all interested agencies should submit in writing their areas of interest and specialisation plus available capacities, logistic, human and financial, to the SACB inter-Agency Coordinator through the Focal Point Group in their area of operation and operate through this channel;
4. That, to begin with those agencies and their staff with proven knowledge of the affected areas should start to identify and map out the different community groups and the size of populations within each group who live in the flood affected areas prior to the emergency and feed this data into the SACB Flood Emergency Operation Unit, through the NGO representative in that body;
5. That a regular information update be furnished to all members of the inter-Agency Flood Emergency Response in order to enable them to periodically review their intervention strategies and operational modalities;
6. That to avoid risk to life and person of people involved in emergency operations on the ground, all information dissemination and publicity should be well co-ordinated and issued in a manner that does not put emergency workers at risk.

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Horn of Africa Programme  
Nairobi, November 21, 1997

### Standards of Behaviour

The Standards of Behaviour (see box below) was intended to form part of a 'general agreement' between the agency and the Flood Response Coordination body. Its purpose was to minimise the risks of an uncoordinated external intervention by establishing a common set of practices. As such, it aimed to:

- Strengthen coordination, by 'binding' agencies to the overall coordinated Flood Response operation under the direction of the Coordinator.
- Reduce the risk of insecurity by establishing the humanitarian and non-political nature of the operation, and ensuring respect for local culture, religion.
- Reduce the potential for aid manipulation and aid fueling conflict by establishing standardised fees for contractual services.

- Reduce inter-agency competition and strengthen collaboration and coordination through the appointment of a focal point agency.
- Ensure the transparency and effectiveness of the operation by giving local communities responsibility for identifying needs and distribution.

Copies of the Principles and Standards were distributed at SACB meetings, and were sent to focal point agencies in Somalia to disseminate to participating agencies. LPI also briefed international staff - in particular the boat operators - on Somali history, culture and religion in Nairobi and Bardera (Selaasie, 1997 December 2).

**STANDARDS OF BEHAVIOUR FOR IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS INVOLVED IN THE FLOOD RESPONSE OPERATION IN SOMALIA**

This Standards of Behaviour shall constitute part of the general agreement to be concluded between the SACB Inter-Agency Flood Response Body and all implementing partners and shall be in force and binding throughout the flood emergency operation period.

Any agency which agrees to become an implementing partner in the co-ordinated flood response operation shall adhere to and be bound by all the directives and guidelines issued by the SACB Flood Emergency Co-ordinator;

All implementing partners and their staff shall respect the strictly humanitarian nature of the operation and shall refrain from indulging in political and other non-humanitarian activities;

All implementing partners and their international staff shall respect the local peoples culture, religion and traditions and shall refrain from any offensive behaviour and/or action in the performance of their humanitarian duties;

All implementing partners shall use standardised and agreed upon prices for local contractual services and shall not submit to unacceptable demands coming from any member of the local community they deal with;

There shall be a lead agency in a given operation locality which shall be charged with the responsibility to co-ordinate the logistics and emergency relief work at the local level and all other agencies operating in that locality shall liaise with the lead agency; and,

The lead agency in a given operation locality shall work in close co-operation with and ensure that the local community is charged with the responsibility of identifying the needy populations and the delivery and distribution of all relief commodities according to determined needs and priorities.

Life and Peace Institute  
Horn of Africa Programme  
Nairobi, November 21, 1997

## **OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES FOR AN INTER-AGENCY FLOOD EMERGENCY RESPONSE IN SOMALIA**

This Operational Principles paper is formulated in response to the request made by Dr. Paganini, the co-ordinator to the international response to the flood caused emergency in Somalia. LPI has been asked to act as the lead agency for the mobilisation of local community resources and capacities to the international efforts to save the victims of this natural disaster, as well as to use this difficult situation to forge alliances and create broader solidarity among the different communities living in all the flood affected areas in the Juba and Shabelle valleys. This is conceived with the aim of helping bring about and consolidate reconciliation and peace in the country.

LPI has taken this invitation both as a challenge and opportunity and accepted the task. And as a first step to demonstrate its commitment it decided to second five of its Somali staff to the Somalia Inter-Agency Co-ordinated Flood Response which is co-ordinated by Dr. Paganini, UNICEF's Country Representative for Somalia.

When accepting this rather difficult task, LPI was required to formulate a concept paper and operational principles for collaboration by all implementing partners. Following are the Operational Principles which would regulate the activities of all implementing partners in the flood response operations:

1. The international co-ordinated response to Somalia's flood caused emergency should recognise that the various affected communities have own institutional resources and capacities which must be recognised and integrated into the flood response operations and further strengthened if need be;
2. In the absence of a national government in Somalia to co-ordinate flood emergency operations and to liaise with the international community, it is LPI's conviction that the existing local level administrative structures should be identified and utilised to form a bridge between the local communities' needs and on the one hand the efforts and resources of the international community on the other, and should be re-activated when required. This calls for new and innovative ways of relating to local authority structures in addressing the emergency situation at the local community level;
3. The international community's response to the flood emergency at the local community level should, in order to ensure community ownership of the process, work through and strengthen existing local administrations and not by-pass and weaken them as is commonly the case in emergency interventions, in other words we should be guided by the principle of "do no harm" in our intervention strategies and practices;
4. That respected and legitimate representatives of the local communities should constitute as part of the flood response teams in every operational area and their local knowledge should be utilised in determining the needy populations and their priorities, e.g. in Bardera, Kismayu, Buale, Sakow, Jamame, etc.;
5. The LPI member of the Flood Response Team in a given locality should assume the responsibility to liaise with local elders, religious leaders, social groups and the local administrative bodies in aspects that concern community mobilisation, solidarity and peace building between various members of a community and in the verification of legitimacy of community representatives;

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## 11.5 Principal Findings

### 11.5.1 Principles of Humanitarian Action

The Operational Principles and Standards of Behaviour are an interesting development in the Somalia aid community. Like the SACB Code of Conduct, they can be added to a burgeoning list of what have been termed principles of 'humanitarian action' (Leader, 1998, April 7).<sup>3</sup> These include the Red Cross/Red Crescent and NGO Code of Conduct (ODI, 1994, September), the Providence Principles, the Sudan Ground Rules (Levine, 1997), the Joint Policy of Operations in Liberia (Atkinson, 1997).

Principles of humanitarian action are distinguished from humanitarian principles (Leader, 1998, April 7). The former seek mitigate the negative impact of humanitarian interventions in conflict environments by regulating aid interventions, and are the responsibility of humanitarian agencies to uphold. The latter are a set of ethics or values codified in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols which aim to regulate the conflict and the behaviour of warring parties and are the responsibility of states and warring parties to uphold.

A defining characteristic of complex political emergencies is the collapse and deliberate undermining of legal institutions and processes. In this 'governance gap' mass human rights abuses can be enacted with impunity. In Somalia, for example, human rights agencies explain:

There is no international or traditional law working in the riverine areas. The international community cannot force the warlords to protect the rights of these [Bantu] people. (Hassan S. Sheik, 1998, May 27).

In such environments powerful elites are able to accumulate assets without fear of regulation, and link into global grey networks of trade.<sup>4</sup> Somalia is perhaps more stark than many complex emergencies, without a government to provide a protective and legal framework for its citizens; one reason for the reversion to clan-based protection. The emergence of *sharia* courts in Somalia, whatever their merits or demerits, are one adaptation to the lawless environment.

The proliferation of principles of humanitarian action or codes of conduct in the international aid community reflects the particular nature of the environment in which humanitarian agencies find themselves working. Their proliferation also reflects the rapid and largely unregulated expansion of the international humanitarian system since the late 1980s with a burgeoning number and type of organisations involved the provision of humanitarian assistance.

The development of the Operational Principles and Standards of Behaviour goes some way to answer the question - *How does the international community respond to an acute emergency in a country where there is no government?*. First, these principles and codes begin to articulate the values by which the international community intervenes in a conflict induced crisis and engages with local authorities and partners. Second, where there is no agreed framework or principles for the delivery of aid, the probability of aid being integrated with the dynamics of violence are high. Such principles can therefore play a role in ensuring the

security of aid operations (see also Security). An assumption behind them is that a more principled approach to the provision of aid will result in less diversion and less harm.

### 11.5.2 Appropriateness

The LPI Operational Principles and Standards were developed over three days. They were based on the individual and collective experience of LPI (Svensson, 1998, May 29; Selaasie, 1998, July). No reference was made to other principles and codes noted above. No reference was made either to the draft *Guidelines for UN Humanitarian Relief Operations in Somalia* developed by the IASC mission to Somalia in 1996 (IASC, 1996 February).

While apparently constructed in ignorance of these, the LPI Principles and Standards do share many of the same notions: impartiality and neutrality, respect for local custom, the need to build local disaster response capacity, involvement of beneficiaries in the management of aid, the need to avoid competition for media coverage. The LPI Principles and Standards differ, however, in not specifying the rights of populations in distress to receive assistance, or the rights of humanitarian agencies to provide assistance. Absent is any mention of gender. These are explicit elements in the Sudan humanitarian principles of the Ground Rules and the Red Cross/Red Crescent and NGO Code of Conduct (see box below).

**Red Cross/Red Crescent and NGO Code of Conduct**

**Principle 1. The humanitarian imperative comes first**

The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As members of the international community, we recognise our obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Hence the need for unimpeded access to affected populations, is of fundamental importance in exercising that responsibility.

The prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster.

When we give humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such.

ODI, 1995.

The LPI Code was called Standards of Behaviour to distinguish it from the SACB Code of Conduct (Svensson, 1998, May 29; Selassie, 1998, June 25). The Principles and Standards are distinct from the SACB Code of Conduct in seeking to condition the role and behaviour of the aid providers, rather than the aid recipients. As such, the Evaluation Team considers the LPI Principles and Standards a significant development.

### **11.5.3 Humanitarian Intervention and Protection**

The interest in humanitarian principles complements a shift to rights-based programming in agencies such as UNICEF.<sup>5</sup> In conflict-generated emergencies where the destruction of production, welfare systems and displacement are deliberate strategies of war, protection is a critical issue. Unless and until basic human rights are respected 'development' will not resume (Macrae & Bradbury, 1998). In such environments preventing and holding parties to account for human rights violations is especially difficult. Protecting civilians from physical abuse, however, is only one part of the equation. Protecting peoples' entitlements and their 'positive' rights to education, health, and therefore life, is equally important. Promoting humanitarian principles should thus also be about the maintenance of resource flows to populations in distress.

Rights are not referred to in the Operational Principles or Standards of Behaviour. The only time that the Evaluation Team came across any reference to 'rights' in the whole Flood Response Operation was in the series of meetings held with 'social groups' in Kismayo (Safia M. Giama, 1997, November 27). In Kismayo the aim was to mobilise Somalis to respect civic rights.

### **11.5.4 Timeliness**

LPI was only invited to participate in the Flood Response operation ten days after the operation was formally launched. By the time the Principles and Standards were drawn up agencies were already distributing assistance and were working with local councils. By the time LPI's Senior Programme Officer visited Bardera on 29<sup>th</sup> November, for example, agencies and the District Council had been running the operation for over two weeks. Not surprisingly implementing agencies typically felt that they were already working according to the principles.

### **11.5.5 Common Policies**

One of the easiest ways for warring parties to divert aid is to manipulate aid agencies. When agencies do not coordinate or cannot agree common strategies and policies they can in effect hand over coordination to warring parties. The LPI Standards emphasised the need to establish standardised fees for services. During the floods this practice was observed at least within districts and regions. In Bardera there was good coordination among the agencies in terms of remuneration's and vehicle hire. As one agency noted, they had 'learnt the lesson to pay people equally'. Only one agency encountered a problem when they tried to arrange to hire a vehicle in the area through contacts in Mogadishu. Between regions there was some discrepancy in rates paid for services, but this did not affect the overall operation.

### **11.5.6 Common Values**

The strength of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols in part rests on them codifying a set of universalistic values (Leader, 1998). In Somalia, the ICRC/SRC has sought to link universal humanitarian values with Somali traditional codes of warfare (ICRC/SRCS, 1997). In Sudan, the OLS humanitarian principles programme emphasises cross-cultural concerns for the rights of children when disseminating the Ground Rules (Levine, 1997). The SACB Code of Conduct has been criticised for being imposed from outside, rather than

developed through dialogue with Somalis. The LPI Principles and Standards could be similarly be criticised.

Several agency staff interviewed stated that they were already implementing the principles by working with local structures, claiming that: 'Those of us on the ground would not need those principles' (NGOs, 1998, June 4). Interpreted positively this means that there was (and is) a common approach among agencies about the best way of working in Somalia. This is too simple. Not all agencies, for example, accept the notion of linking relief and peace building. Despite the coordination efforts of the SACB, achieving coherence in policy and practice amongst aid agencies and donors has been problematic.

### **11.5.7 Dissemination**

The dissemination of humanitarian principles is a vital aspect of the work of ICRC and the Red Cross/Crescent. In Sudan dissemination is seen as critical to the effectiveness of the Ground Rules. Dissemination is essential for advancing acceptance of the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention for Ending Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). A weakness with the SACB Code of Conduct has been the lack of effort put into dissemination. Although the former EC Envoy did invest some time in this, the SACB Code of Conduct is known by few Somalis.

The Evaluation concurs with the finding of the SACB Flood Management Team report of January 1998, that the LPI Operational Principles and Standards of Behaviour were not widely disseminated. Agency personnel involved in the Flood operation remembered 'seeing them'. Most thought they were a good idea, but few had time to study them. The Evaluation Team came across only one case where the Standards of Behaviour was explicitly utilised. In Bardera the OIC used the Standards of Behaviour on one occasion to temper the behaviour of one expatriate boat operator.

If Principles and Standards have any value they should inform on-going activities. It is of concern to the Evaluation Team, therefore, that post- Phase I there has been no follow-up by LPI, UNICEF or other agencies on the Principles and Standards of Behaviour (Selaasie, 1998, July). It raises a question over the seriousness of this endeavour. Such follow up is essential if there is to be any principle of *accountability* to those people the agencies claim to assist.

### **11.5.9 Contractual Relations**

A critical issue with humanitarian principles is the monitoring and regulation of them. The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols signed by governments constitute part of International Humanitarian Law. Upholding humanitarian principles thus becomes a legal responsibility of the signatories to them. While this does not stop violations, the legal and contractual obligations involved in signing the Conventions does provide an avenue for accountability.

Binding 'non-state entities' to humanitarian obligations in a conflict is problematic, where violations of law and the undermining of legal processes can be a strategy of warring parties. The value of formulating humanitarian agreements with non-state entities is controversial and is still being explored in southern Sudan through the Ground Rules (Levine, 1997). A weaknesses of the SACB Code of Conduct is said to be that it has not been signed by any

party claiming authority in Somalia. Given the questionable legal status of the SACB this is not surprising. However, the lack of a formal agreement makes it difficult to hold parties accountable to it. As with the SACB, itself a voluntary association, voluntary adherence to the Code of Conduct amounts to little where people chose to ignore it. The only leverage available to the SACB is punitive, by withdrawing and withholding rehabilitation assistance.

Regulating the actions of aid agencies is also problematic. It is argued that a weakness of the Red Cross/NGO Code of Conduct is its voluntary nature; although there are attempts to address this through the 'Ombudsman Project'. Some 27 agencies were involved in the Flood Response Operation. A portion of the assistance was delivered by the UN, but much of the direct distribution was done by the 15 international NGOs and 4 Somali NGOs and, depending on the location, local relief committees and district councils. However, there were no formal contracts between the SACB, the UN and the implementing agencies or partners on the ground which set out the aims and principles of the operation, or the obligations of participating agencies.

Although the LPI Standards of Behaviour were intended to constitute part of an 'agreement' between the Inter-Agency Flood Response Coordination body and participating agencies, no agency signed up to them. Given the voluntary nature of the SACB and its questionable legal status, it is difficult to see who this agreement could have been signed with. Most NGOs involved in implementation did have standing project agreements with UNICEF for specific activities. However, these were not evoked in this emergency, and some agencies did not have such agreements.

Likewise, with the exception of Kismayo, no formal agreements were signed with 'local partners', such as relief committees or district councils. Some of the 'partners' in the flood response are also participants in the on-going conflict in Somalia. In Bardera, for example, the DC who was head of the Relief Committee, was responsible for negotiating the passage of SNF militia through Saakow on their way to fight in Kismayo. If programmes are to reflect the principles and values of a humanitarian operation and humanitarian agencies, it is important that these are shared and understood by partners - be they NGOs, local authorities, or donors. Contracts provide a means of accountability. And accountability has to work both ways, from beneficiaries to donors, and donors to beneficiaries.

#### **11.5.10 Conditionality and the Politicisation of Aid**

Withholding assistance is one means of leveraging respect for humanitarian principles among warring parties. Placing conditionalities on humanitarian assistance is controversial. A trend towards greater conditionalities, it is argued, reflects a growing politicisation of humanitarian aid (Duffield, 1997). In Somalia, it is an 'open secret' that an informal embargo on aid exists in Bay and Bakool regions. In part this is a consequence of the military actions of the SNA, and the killing of an MSF doctor in Baidoa in June 1997. In part this is a reflection of EC and US relations with Aideed. One fallout of this has been a difference of opinion between USAID and WFP over the delivery of food aid to Bay region.

While the SACB Code of Conduct places conditionalities on rehabilitation and development assistance, humanitarian assistance is in principle exempt. During the flood operation conditionalities were implied rather than practiced. These came in public statements and press released from the operation and SACB which were intended to influence attitudinal change

among Somalis and to encourage self-help. In Kismayo it was 'laid on the line' to faction leaders that it was their people who were suffering, and either they cooperated or there would be no assistance. The looting of a UNICEF convoy in November however did lead to a suspension of assistance to Bay region.

#### **11.5.11 The Future Development of Humanitarian Principles**

The tragedy of Somalia rests on the shoulders of those who have chosen fighting over negotiation. Responsibility also lies in the international community, and with those in the international humanitarian system charged to uphold the humanitarian needs of populations in distress. Principles like the LPI Operational Principles and Standards of Behaviour go some way to clarifying these responsibilities.

Within the SACB principles are not prominent. In one recent proposal for restructuring the SACB, principles were assigned to a mere footnote. Somali NGOs in Hargeisa and Boroma developed codes of conduct for their organisations as far back as 1995 (Bradbury, 1996). Similar codes are missing among the international agencies. The Evaluation Team recommend there would be merit in the SACB, UN and NGOs examining in some depth the possibility of developing a common set of principles and codes of behaviour for humanitarian assistance agencies operating in Somalia.

It has become something of a self-serving dictum to claim that 'Somalia is unique', one implication being that there is nothing to be learned from elsewhere. Where lives are at stake arguing for the status quo is unacceptable. There is much to be learned from humanitarian interventions in other complex emergencies. Principles for humanitarian action is one such area. In Nairobi two distinct institutions - the SACB and OLS - have evolved in response to two complex emergencies. There is little dialogue between them. In the context of the Flood Response in Somalia, this is baffling given that UNICEF is a lead agency in OLS in southern Sudan. As the SACB is being restructured, the SACB Code of Conduct will also be reviewed. There would be merit in investing time and resources in a comparative assessment of the SACB Code of Conduct and the Sudan Humanitarian principles and Ground Rules Programme.<sup>6</sup>

The challenge to maintain humanitarian principles is formidable in Somalia. The challenge comes not only from within Somalia, but also from within the international aid community whose involvement is not without reproach.

#### **11.5.12 Linking Principles and Standards**

The improvement of performance and standards among aid agencies was a clear recommendation of the Joint Evaluation of humanitarian assistance to Rwanda, where the lack of professionalism among NGOs is alleged to have been responsible for the deaths of thousands of refugees (Eriksson et al. 1996). An area that needs further development is linking principles and codes of behaviour with standards of practice.

Different assistance was provided in the Shabelle and Juba valleys. In the Juba there was blanket coverage. In the Shabelle assistance was targeted. Bay and Bakool were neglected. These differences were due to the types and amounts of supplies available to agencies in each region, capacity on the ground, and locally assessed needs. In the Juba valley agencies were

informed by UNICEF about the minimum package the operation aimed to deliver to each family. In the Shabelle, UNICEF was instructed to utilise their available stocks in Mogadishu. Guidelines or protocol for the utilisation of supplies did not form part of an agreement between implementing partners and the UN.

During the floods donor 'policy' was to restrict the entry of new NGOs, to avoid doing harm. Only a few donors chose to place resources through select NGOs, partly on the grounds that they were more 'efficient' (Mansfield, 1998, July 31). Concern, however, was raised by several interviewees about the capability of some NGOs to provide a professional response. Although the Evaluation found no evidence of poor performance among implementing agencies, the Evaluation Team suggest that future criteria for donor funding and UN-partner relationships should reflect an adherence to agreed principles, and acceptable standards of service.

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> See for example, Sommer 1994; Clarke & Herbst, 1997.

<sup>2</sup> UNDOS was also asked to contribute a paper which was considered with the LPI papers at a meeting with representatives of UNDOES, UNCOS and the EC on 21 November 1998 (Alai, 1997 November; Musa, 1998, November 21). Initially there had been an idea that UNDOES would draft guidelines for the Shabelle, and LPI for the Juba valley. The LPI Principles and Standards were presented to a meeting of the SAAB. Elements of the UNDOS paper were incorporated as 'additional guidelines' to the LPI papers (LPI-HAP 1997e, November 21).

<sup>3</sup>Strictly the SACB Code of Conduct is not intended to apply to humanitarian aid.

<sup>4</sup> These include, for example, narcotics (Liberia, Somalia) minerals (Ziara, Sierra Leone), timber (Liberia), banana (Somalia).

<sup>5</sup>Support for the Convention of the Rights of the Child forms part of the Ground Rules in southern Sudan.

<sup>6</sup> In this context, a comparative study of the Ground Rules in Sudan and the JPO in Liberia by Nick Leader of the Overseas Development Institute may be of interest. (ODI, Portland House, Stag Place, London SW1E 5DP, UK).

## 12. WORKING WITH LOCAL STRUCTURES

*Emergency response in Somalia can only succeed if the Somali communities and their leaders are clearly empowered to have the pivotal role in the activities. (SACB, 1998 January)*

### 12.1 Introduction

Since the outset of the civil war in Somalia, a key challenge for aid agencies has been to create and sustain a framework of consent to facilitate humanitarian access. Without consent humanitarian intervention can be damaging. During the 1991-1993 famine, the lack of consent meant that aid agencies paid for protection, thus drawing aid into the dynamics of the war. Efforts to enforce consent militarily failed.<sup>1</sup>

Access was identified as a key challenge to the inter-Agency Flood Response Operation. During the operation helicopters and boats provided a means of overcoming the physical constraints to access. Access was also dependent on the consent of local political and military authorities, and the quality of access was dependent on the relationship between the assistance agencies and Somali populations. A major criticism of relief aid in the UNOSOM era was that its external management marginalised Somalis and ignored local structures and capacities.<sup>2</sup> A key claim of the SACB Flood Management Team was that it worked with Somali communities and empowered them to take responsibility in the operation. This section assesses the basis of consent and the achievements of the Flood Response Operation in working with local structures.

### 12.2 The Role of LPI

LPI was invited by the Coordinator of the Flood Response to assist the Response Teams to identify legitimate authorities and institutions to work with, and to liaise between them and the Flood Response Teams. A key aspect of the Operational Principles drawn up by LPI, therefore, was the emphasis placed on engaging with and supporting local structures (see Operational Principles). This was to take place in two ways: i) by working with existing 'legitimate' administrations, and utilising their institutional resources, capacities and local knowledge to determine needs and priorities; and ii) by mobilising and supporting Somalis to assist each other. (The mobilisation of populations for self-help and peace are described separately below).

LPI, was closely involved in the design and implementation of the UNOSOM District Council programme, and has continued to train District Councils throughout the Juba valley. LPI therefore had an interest in seeing that the operation did not neglect these local structures. In working with the operation, its aimed to:

help strengthen local administrative and emergency response capacities rather than bypass and weaken them...(Selaasie, 1997 December 2).

To support the operation, LPI seconded five of its national trainers to the Flood Response Teams in Kismayo and Bardera. One trainer was later re-assigned to Jamame at the request of WFP, and another two were reassigned to Afmedow and Saakow.

LPI assess that their main contribution to the operation was to ensure that local resources, capacities and legitimate institutions were not ignored (Svensson, 1998, May 29). The fact that it works throughout the Juba valley region meant it was able to identify leaders across the region, an advantage over the single district perspective of most NGOs (Hassan F. Egal, 1998, June 9). This meant it was able to provide the operation in Kismayo with a list of elders from each *beel* and *tuulo* in the Lower Jubba to assist with the distribution of supplies. As a result of established relations with district officials, it was able to advise them to form relief committees for the international community to work with. In this they claim to have influenced the appointment of broad-based flood relief committees that included elders of minorities such as the Gosha and Rahanweyne (Svensson, 1998, May 28).

Operationally, they worked mainly in the Lower and Middle Juba. Assessing their contribution is hampered by the fact that the Evaluation Team was unable to visit these regions, and by the differing claims made by LPI and other agencies about their own contributions. In Kismayo, for example, where there were most concerns about security and the interference of the factions, the involvement by LPI in negotiations over access is debated. For LPI their work with elders was important in influencing faction leaders to sign an access agreement with the Flood Response Operation (Hassan F. Egal, 1998, June 9). While the role of LPI in helping to 'maintain the peace' is acknowledged by the OIC of UNICEF, according to him it was UNICEF's tough line with elders and faction leaders that brought the agreement; either they cooperated or there would be no assistance (Booth, 1998, May 21). Whether the agreement was achieved through this 'tough love' line, or the back door diplomacy of LPI, or a combination of both, is open to interpretation.

Elsewhere the picture is mixed. In Saakow the role of LPI trainers in handling contacts with the district committee and elders was appreciated by NGOs (SCR, 1997). In Bardera, their contribution was seen as less significant (Carter, 1998, June 11). It is clear, however, that the degree to which the Flood Response Operation engaged with local administrations varied from one district to another.

### **12.3 The Juba Valley**

#### Kismayo

Prior to the floods authority in Kismayo and much of the Lower Juba Valley was contested. Travelling up the valley from Kismayo entailed crossing several 'green lines'. Kismayo and its environs therefore presented the Flood Response Operation with the most security concerns. Although tensions dissipated during the floods, insecurity began to resurface by the end of December. This was one factor behind the decision to end Phase I of the Flood Response operation.<sup>3</sup>

Kismayo was the only place where a formal access agreement was signed between the Flood Response Operation and local factions. The agreement, signed on 19<sup>th</sup> November, took two days to negotiate. It was signed by General 'Morgan' (SPM/SSA), Colonel Ahmed Hashi (SPM/SNA), Sultan Musa Nur Jama, and 24 community leaders.

Under the deal, the SPM and Kismayo community leaders agreed to facilitate access for UN and international agencies to provide emergency assistance to flood victims in the Juba Valley and south east Somalia (see box). For its part, the UN agreed to pay standard UNICEF fees for labour and transport, although it was expected that 'the Somali people will be volunteering to help each other'. The benefits to Kismayo community were identified as accruing from income generated by the operation through employment and vehicle hire, and the 'short term' and 'long term' assistance that would be provided to get flood affected people 'back to normal' once the waters receded. The agreement also included the condition that :

**Agreement on Emergency Assistance to Flood Victims from Kismayo**

- provide effective security at the seaport and airport;
- provide free landing and storage facilities at the seaport and airport
- provide secure and free road access from the airport to the flooded areas;
- ensure only uniformed security personnel, and limited to 10, at the seaport and airport;
- ensure khat flights did not interrupt the emergency operation

should any security problems of a serious nature be encountered at any of these [seaport and airport] locations the emergency operation and assistance will be stopped and disbanded in the Kismayo area. (Mohamed Said Hersi, et al. 1997 November 19)

Again opinion differs on the significance of this agreement. Foreign aid workers complemented 'Morgan' on 'behaving himself' and for maintaining some control over the militia, thus allowing the operation to proceed without too many security problems. For LPI, who question the legitimacy of the District Council in Kismayo, the 150 member disaster committee appointed to handle the flood response operation was ineffective because it was dominated by the faction leaders. They credit traditional elders like Sultan Musa Nur Jama with keeping the peace.

What is clear, is the fact that a formal access agreement was required reflected the higher levels of insecurity in Kismayo. Elsewhere in the Lower Juba, the Flood Response Operation worked through local relief committees and District Councils without a formal agreement. Furthermore the level of participation and pre-planning that was feasible elsewhere during the operation was not feasible in Kismayo because authority was contested.

Jamame

Jamame, some 60kms north of Kismayo, was the main centre for the boat operations. WFP was the focal agency, and MSF Belgium and the African Muslim Agency distributed some medical supplies. In early December WFP requested LPI to second one of their team to the operation.

Jamame town straddles the river, with the east and west banks controlled by different factions. While the floods prevented military manoeuvres, they did forced militia into the town. The operation worked with the District Council and a relief committee that comprised 19 elders. Although the District Commissioner and his deputies were reported to have worked well with the operation, participating in planning distributions and mediating problems, they had no control over the militia and as a result some security incidents did occur. (LPI-HAP, 1998b January).

## Middle Jubba

In Jilib, Buaale, Saakow and Salagle, in the Middle Jubba, the picture appears much the same, with international agencies working through District Councils and local Relief Committees where feasible. In Saakow, where the formation of the District Council has proved difficult, relations between the Council and some agencies were reported to have been problematic despite daily coordination meetings (LPI-HAP, 1998b, January; World Vision, 1998, January 30). In Buaale, where the District Council is better established, the situation was reported to have been better (Roderigues & Vechio, 1998, June 2).

In Jilib and Mareerey, where 5 of the Norwegian boats were stationed, the Somali NGOs SCS and Mercy International were the focal point agencies, supported by CARE (CARE Somalia, 1998, May 6). As elsewhere distribution is reported to have been through elders.<sup>4</sup>

## Bardera

Bardera town was the first logistics hub for the Flood Response operation in Somalia, opened on the 9<sup>th</sup> November. The Flood Response Operation in Bardera District contrasts with that in Kismayo. A critical factor behind this was the political control achieved in Gedo during 1997 by the SNF.<sup>5</sup>

Bardera town sits astride the Jubba. The Rahanweyne predominate in the eastern part of the district, and the Marehan in the west. Some 58 of the 80 or more villages in the district are reported to be Rahanweyne. Much of Bardera town is inhabited by repatriated Marrehan refugees from Kenya. As elsewhere there are underlying tensions between the *waamo* ('indigenous') and the *galti* ('outsiders'), the latter coming mainly from Abudwak in Mudug.<sup>6</sup>

Prior to June 1997, when Al Itixaad controlled Gedo's main towns, Bardera was one of the more unstable towns in southern Somalia. No-one exercised authority over the militia in Bardera. Following the intervention of Ethiopia forces in Luuq in support of the SNF, and the killing of an expatriate doctor in Baidoa, MSF France and SCF UK withdraw from Bardera. The situation was brought under control in June 1997 when the SNF overran Gedo supported by the Ethiopian government. With military training from Ethiopia, a proper command structure and discipline were introduced into the militia.

After the SNF's take over, the District Council was changed, with the District Commissioner the only person to retain his post (LPI-HAP, 1998b, January). With a police force, a dual system of civil courts and *sharia* courts and (since March 1998) a tax system<sup>7</sup> the District Council in Bardera has begun to establish a functioning administration. Taxes are used to pay the militia, who were encamped on the outskirts of the town, and are now seen as protectors rather than predators. The order installed by the SNF in Bardera, and the strength of the District Commissioner, in the opinion of most people interviewed, meant that the Flood Response Team was able to establish a good partnership with the local authorities and the local Flood Relief Committee (FRC).

During the UNOSOM period there was a proliferation of Somali NGOs as international agencies sub-contracted out work. Relatively few have endured. At the beginning of the operation the District Council were concerned that international agencies were again planning

to work through Somali NGOs and the operation was temporarily halted while the issue was settled.<sup>8</sup> The OIC for UNICEF made a clear decision to work with the FRC rather than through Somali NGOs (Carter, 1998, June 10). Personnel and vehicles were hired through the administration and remuneration rates standardised, and made transparent. Rather than contracting Somali NGOs, UNICEF employed individuals from those NGOs on a casual basis. UNICEF's own operational team remained small, consisting of two expatriates and three Somalis. In Kismayo the operation was criticised for under-utilising local expertise and resources (LPI-HAP, 1998b, January; Safia M. Giama, 1997, November 27). In Bardera reliance was placed on local people, expertise and resources.

The Bardera FRC initially consisting of six people rapidly grew to 33, including the District Commissioner, the Vice District Commissioner, members of the Development Management Group (DMG)<sup>9</sup>, women, religious leaders, and the health committee. The large number meant that no one group was favoured. However, as the size became unmanageable it was reduced again to a committee of 6, including the Commissioner, the Vice Commissioner, a Rahanweyne and Marehan elder, and a respected religious leader (Carter, 1998, June 11).

From Bardera the operation covered areas south along the river to Buaale, east to Bay, and 80 kms west in Gedo to Fafadon, and involved several international agencies: UNICEF as the focal point agency, Terra Nuova, and InterSoS who were already resident in the area, WFP boat operators, an ACF seconded a logistician, and ICRC. In December a Kuwaiti NGO Al Ibrahim Foundation also distributed some food items in Bardera.<sup>10</sup>

A division of labour was agreed between the international agencies and the FRC. Terra Nuova coordinated distributions by WFP boats to villages along the river. InterSoS oversaw distributions to displaced populations in Bardera, and to accessible areas inland from the river. UNICEF oversaw distributions by helicopters, trucks and donkey carts. The FRC, assisted by the DMG, registered the affected populations and decided on distribution plans utilising peoples' own knowledge of the area. When it became known that there was relief available from Bardera, elders came to Bardera to lobby for their villages. The WFP boat operators received their daily and weekly work plans direct from the FRC. There were checked by the international agencies, and according to the OIC the only problem was a tendency to exaggerate population figures (Carter, *ibid*).<sup>11</sup> Villages were instructed how to prepare the landing sites. Elders travelled with helicopters to their villages, and took responsibility for the off-loading of supplies and their distribution once the helicopter had departed. A doctor from the health committee also travelled with the helicopter and the boats. In the view of the OIC, the operation in Bardera was very much a Somali operation:

We assisted the Somalis with logistics (Carter, *ibid*)

A critical factor behind the approach adopted by the operation in Bardera was the personal approach of the OIC. He was specifically recruited by UNICEF for his knowledge of Somalia, having lived and worked there since the early 1980s (Metenier, 1998, July 2).

The level of participation by the FRC in the Flood Response operation in Bardera receives some praise from LPI (Selaasie, 1997, December 27). LPI claim some responsibility for this, by working closely with the Commissioner, the DMG, religious leaders and militia to mobilise the community. They assert that there was little coordination between the international agencies and the District Council prior to their visit there in late November

(Selaasie, 1998, July 9; Selaasie, 1997 December 2) Others agencies contest that they were working with the District Council before LPI arrived, and some suggest that the Flood Relief Committee would have worked well without LPI's input. What both LPI and other international agencies do agree on is the capability of the District Commissioner, who they suggest is a good leader, well respected locally, and who has gained from several training courses provided through LPI in Arusha.

Elsewhere in Gedo the pattern appears to have been much the same, with international agencies working in collaboration with District Councils. In Bulla Xaawa, for example, Trocaire worked with the District Council on the repair of the town drainage system. They also collaborated in the repatriation of displaced from Bay, with Trocaire providing fuel and the Council the trucks (Trocaire - b).

#### 12.4 The Shabelle Valley

##### Beletweyne

In Beletweyne, after a long period of contested authority - during which the Xawadle sub-clan, Ali Madah Weyne, was responsible for widespread looting, and the town was occupied by the forces of General Aideed for some nine months - a tripartite form of authority has emerged comprising traditional elders, a *sharia* court, and regional and district administrative councils. Together they have brought some stability to the area.

The *sharia* court has been instrumental in providing security. It has been able to do this by collecting taxes to pay a court militia. The function of regional and district councils which were formed during UNOSOM, is said to be solely one of interlocutor with international agencies. Their legitimacy is questioned by the population has little confidence in them. Indeed, the UN, which has established a joint office in Beletweyne, has decided not to provide direct support to the Councils, on the grounds that this could destabilise the region (Higgins 1997, September). The establishment of a joint UN office in Beletweyne, however, does reflect the UN's confidence in the security situation, and Hiraan region in general is defined as a 'zone of transition'.

In contrast to Bardera the level of collaboration between district authorities and international agencies in Beletweyne during the flood operation was limited. SCF and IMC, who have worked there since 1992 and have capable local staff with good local knowledge, took a direct role in the operation and relief distributions. SCF who work in some 138 villages north and south of Beletweyne town coordinated distribution to those villages using their own system of 'key villages' developed for their agricultural extension work.

Members of the District Council solely advised on distributions to those displaced from the Beletweyne. Outside Beletweyne they had no capacity to distribute and were not trusted by people (SCF, 1998, June 14). Significantly, however, the regional and district Councils were reported to have been more active during the floods than the *sharia* court. Although some *sharia* militia were hired by the UN to provide security for the boats and other aspects of the operation, it was local authorities who facilitated the evacuation of people from the town and the preparation of sites for people displaced to K115. During the floods the authority of the *sharia* court declined as its ability to collect tax to pay and control its militia declined (SCF, 1998, January).

On the west bank of the Shabelle at Beletweyne the operation faced particular distribution problems due to an on-going conflict between the Gaaljeel and Jeeley clans. The floods did nothing to dissipate this conflict.

### Jowhar

From 1995 until early 1997, Middle Shabelle was considered the model 'zone of transition'. The 'peace dividend' meant that it was eligible for EC rehabilitation funding. In 1996, UNOPS, UNICEF, InterSoS, ADRA, CEFA, and MSF Spain were all operational in the regional capital Jowhar. In the first quarter of 1997 security deteriorated. Disputes between the Daud and Agoniya sub-clans of the Harti Abgaal over land, and linked to fission's within Ali Mahdi's political alliance in Mogadishu north, led to a series of security incidents involving aid agencies in Balcad, Jowhar and Mahadday. This culminated in an attack on the compound of the Italian NGO CINS in Balcad on 24<sup>th</sup> November, in which 20 people were killed and international staff were briefly taken hostage.

International staff of other agencies operating in Middle Shabelle withdrew in solidarity. The EC stopped all rehabilitation funds and reverted to emergency funding, thus creating problems with the funding of on-going projects. With the agreement of the SACB, UNICEF international staff initially stayed due to the developing flood emergency, until they too withdrew in early December due to pressures placed on them by local authorities (McTyre, 1998, June 23). National staff of agencies ran the agency operations for one and a half months until international staff returned in February. DBG and ADRA continued to operate in the area throughout the floods.

The involvement of local authorities in the Flood Response Operation was limited. The Regional Governor and District Council in Jowhar did take the initiative to call an emergency meeting of agencies around 19<sup>th</sup> November (a few days before international staff withdrew). The Governor called on international agencies to bring their situation in Jowhar to the attention of agencies in Nairobi and Mogadishu, in order to 'balance better the assistance mostly provided to the Jubba valley.' (UNICEF, 1998 November 19). A local flood committee was formed which included local NGOs and the Jowhar Women's Organisation. Initial needs assessments were reportedly done by UNICEF and members of the relief committee with Jowhar women's groups (Jowhar Women's Organisation, 1998, June 21). However, there is little evidence of close collaboration with the authorities.

The Flood Response Operation did not target Middle or Lower Shabelle. In the view of the UNICEF OIC in Jowhar, Phase I of the international Flood Response Operation did not really become active in the Middle and Lower Shabelle until after January 1998. Few additional relief supplies were sent there. Potential collaboration with local authorities was limited by the evacuation of international staff. Agencies which continued to respond, such as DBG, had little contact with the District or Regional authorities (Priske, 1998, July 2). Furthermore, rather than working with local authorities, UNICEF instead preferred to work with Somali NGOs. Twenty-four women from Jowhar women's organisations were employed to distribute relief supplies and provide EPI coverage, with only one man from the Flood Committee accompanying them. Villagers interviewed during the Evaluation did not report any help from the local authorities, although they did mention some assistance around Mahadday (Nukay, 1998, June 23). UNICEF suggest that the main contribution of the local authorities was in

maintaining security. With the exception of Jowhar, the only place where UNICEF faced problems was in Awdheegle (McTyre, 1998, June 23).

### Lower Shabelle

In Lower Shabelle District Councils are nominally appointees of the 'broad based' government of Aideed, although their allegiance to his government is fragile and is said to be changing.

The level of collaboration between aid agencies and the local authorities during the floods was variable. In Qorioley, some agencies chose to work through the District Council, while others reportedly worked through elders (Hussein Moalim et al. 1998, June 19). In Sablaale, Brava, and Kurtunwaarey, ACORD encouraged the formation of relief committees in each district. Like SCF in Beletweyne, they also tried to work through village committees formed in the process of their development programme in Sablaale. In Kurtunwaarey collaboration on a flood protection scheme is reported to have been successful with the community mobilised and contributing materials and manpower (Omar A. Mohamed, 1998 March). In Brava relations with the DC were reported to be problematic with the DC attempting to divert relief supplies.

## **12.5 Principal Findings**

### **12.5.1 Working with Local Structures**

The principle of working with local structures in the Operational Principles echoes principles 6 and 7 of the Red Cross/Red Crescent and NGO Code of Conduct (see box). Such principles are built on an understanding from famine literature that people affected by disasters are not passive victims but survivors with capacities. The focus on institutions also reflects an analysis that equates individual vulnerability with institutional weakness vulnerability, and that there is a need to address the structural aspects of disasters as well as their immediate impact. In a collapsed state and a vacuum of government services, the UN and INGOs do need effective structures to support the delivery of humanitarian services. However, the 1998 CAP describes aid being a catalyst for 'effective governance', rather than just a means to deliver goods (OCHA, 1998 March: 6).

#### **Red Cross/Red Crescent NGO Code of Conduct**

**Principle 6:** We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.

**Principle 7:** Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.

(ODI, 1994)

In general, the Flood Response was positive in involving structures in the planning and distribution of relief supplies. However, despite this, and the claim that emergency interventions can only succeed if Somalis are *empowered* to have a pivotal role (SACB, January 1998), the role that local administrations played during the relief operations is surprisingly lacking in the documentation on the floods reviewed by the Evaluation Team. With a few exceptions, agency reports primarily document their own rather than local efforts. Agencies therefore have difficulty substantiating the rhetoric.

The Evaluation Team found that the degree to which the operation engaged with local authority structures varied. The factors determining the degree of engagement were several:

- the extent to which local authorities were perceived as 'legitimate' by the international agencies;
- the extent to which the local authorities had the confidence of their people;
- the degree of political authority and military control the local authority exercised in the area;
- the level of conflict within the community;
- the number of international or national agencies in an area;
- the capability of the administration;
- the attitude of the focal point agency.

Ultimately, it was the degree of political settlement (imposed or otherwise) in an area that determined whether local administrations were engaged with, or were capable of engaging in the international operation.

### **12.5.2 The Capacity of Local Structures**

The ability of authorities and administrations to provide consent to the humanitarian operation was dependent not only on their political control, but also their administrative and technical capacity. In this respect most Councils are at a disadvantage. If aid agencies have problems recruiting professional staff, administrative councils have an even harder time. Working for a Council is hardly an avenue for good career prospects! Many talented nationals have left Somalia. Many of those who have remained work for international agencies or Somali organisations supported by international agencies. Most of the Somali staff with NGOs and UN agencies interviewed during the course of the Evaluation had previously worked with the government, or with international agencies. In this way international agencies do nothing to build up the human resource capacity of administrative councils. The decision in Bardera not to work with Somali NGOs but directly with the Council is a recognition of the fact that local Council need external support to be effective. It is insufficient to assume that Councils can function solely on their own capacity.

### **12.5.3 The Issue of Legitimacy**

LPI were tasked to identify 'legitimate' local structures, community leaders and elders to work with (LPI-HAP, 1998 January 19). District Councils and Regional Councils in Somalia are controversial, both among Somalis and international agencies. Under UNOSOM they were intended to be key to the process of grassroots nation building. The results, however, have been mixed. In some areas they have become defunct, elsewhere they have been modified and have a more meaningful role.

The ways in which aid agencies engage with local authority structures varies. While LPI concede that there are problems with determining the legitimacy of District Councils, they argue that there are no structures that are any more legitimate (Svensson, 1998, May 29) Others assert that the Councils lack a mandate from people, and exist only to dialogue with foreigners. The only legitimate and stable authority structures, it is argued, are those built on the basis of the Somali *xeer*. and if outsiders engage with institutions that do not have a local mandate then they may disturb an indigenous process. (Bryden, 1998, May 30).

For many agencies District Councils are structures to be avoided rather than to be worked with. Many international agencies prefer to build relations of their own choice with communities. CARE, for example, supports Somali NGOs as their interlocutors with communities, while UNOPS in Gedo have supported the development of the DMG. If the District Councils can be criticised as structures created by and for international agencies to dialogue with, so can SNGOs and DMGs. A danger with supporting the latter is that they may undermine whatever legitimacy local Councils may have.<sup>12</sup>

Different agencies therefore work with different formulations of ‘governance structures’, which has come to replace ‘civil society’ as the key issue for the aid programme in Somalia. Definitions of ‘governance’ differ between agencies, and even within the same agency. The debate over governance is beyond the scope of this report. The issue of legitimacy, however, is crucial to humanitarian interventions in conflict, and to the debate on the relief-to-development continuum. It has significance, given the plans of the UNCU to strengthen local disaster preparedness and response mechanisms (Gourdin, 1998, June 2).

First, if movement from relief to development is defined in terms of the level of community involvement and the transfer of resources and responsibility to local structures, then such a move involves making decisions about the legitimacy of the structures to work with. The varied approaches of agencies to local councils suggests there is no firm basis or principles on which external agencies can make such decisions.

Second, the involvement of LPI in the Flood Response brought relief, governance and politics together. In the opinion of some people this led to a more systemic response. However, their involvement also contained some contradictions. On the one hand the Operational Principles stress neutrality. On the other LPI was asked to make decisions about the ‘legitimacy’ of authorities. The combination of humanitarianism and politics is potentially problematic as UNOSOM discovered. When asked what the difference was between the Flood Response Operation and UNOSOM, some Somalis offered the following opinion:

The difference between this operation and UNOSOM is that UNOSOM was concerned with politics. This was a humanitarian operation. UNOSOM failed.  
(Bardera District Council, 1998, June 11)

This Somali ‘lesson’ learned from the days of UNOSOM highlights again the difference between a natural disaster and a politically and conflict induced disaster. While it may be appropriate for LPI or UNCU to strengthen local institutions and mechanisms for a natural disaster, it may not be appropriate (or feasible) to strengthen them for a politically induced disaster. In a complex political emergency separating humanitarian assistance and politics may be necessary for a sustainable framework for consent.

#### **12.5.4 Humanitarian Access: An Issue of Capacity or Protection?**

The accepted wisdom that ‘Somali solutions to Somali problems’ is the best way forward in Somalia leaves unanswered the important questions of which Somalis, whose problems and whose solutions? The objective of working with local structures and supporting local capacity assumes that Somalia’s problems are solely to do with capacity, and neglects these questions.

An alternative analysis suggests that access is the critical factor determining the food security and health status of populations :

High malnutrition in Bay region in 1992/3 did not reflect a lack of food, but the fact that *people had been harvested*. (McAskill, 1998, July 2).

Furthermore:

The main causes of malnutrition are disease and loss of assets...It is not a problem of food availability but accessibility; not deficit but access. (Largard, 1998, June 9).

It is significant that those areas in southern Somalia where famine is currently predicted - Bay - are where people have not been able to employ coping strategies due to on-going conflict. As one perceptive Somali nutritionist notes, the greatest factor preventing people from employing coping strategies is violence:

Fighting is a critical factor affecting people's coping mechanisms.....Given these realities, it is a foregone conclusion that without peace and stability the efforts to improve the nutritional situation of the community and/or to prevent further deterioration of the nutrition security are only palliative. (Safia M. Giama, 1998, March)

Vulnerability, nutritional status and economic well being are manifestations of political and social status. Those who died in the largest numbers in the 1991-1993 famine were marginal and minority groups, such as the Rahanweyne, Bantu, and Bravanis. Although vulnerability may be transient as a group's political power waxes and wanes, it is clear that some groups remain more vulnerable than others. Landless labourers or the displaced in Mogadishu are amongst the most vulnerable.<sup>13</sup> In the Middle and Lower Shabelle, it is the various 'Bantu' groups that are most vulnerable, where non-Bantu groups are reported to be continuing to encroach on their farm land (ibid). The situation of the Bantu is reported to be worse in Lower Shabelle than in Middle Shabelle, because they have lost land to the banana plantation owners. A process that has increased in some places with the floods. While it was claimed that floods had a 'levelling effect' because they affected everyone, some groups suffered more than others:

People who had something may have lost. But people who had nothing to start with lost everything. (Priske, 1998, July 2)

In Lower Shabelle some of these people moved to Merca and to other places on the inland side of the sand dunes to escape the floods. Many were still displaced at the time of the Evaluation.

There was some recognition among agencies involved in the Flood Response Operation that some groups were more vulnerable than others. Several statements were made to the Evaluation Team to suggest that in some areas certain groups were discriminated against during the flood operation. (Yusuf A Salah & Hassan S. Sheik, 1998, May 27 Nairobi). The Evaluation Team was unable to investigate this issue. Most agencies in fact expressed satisfaction with the distributions. In Bardera, for example, where the Rahanweyne make up a

large proportion of the population, but the District Council is Marrehan dominated, the OIC assessed that the distributions were fair:

Perhaps 80% of relief items went to the Rahanweyne during the floods....No-one left the Bantu off the distribution lists....Supplies were not dispatched to the District Commissioner's village more than once.(Carter, 1998, June 10).

The fact that distributions were made direct to villages by boat, helicopter and by air reduced the possibility of diversion and ensured that most people probably received something. In Beletweyne, where it is reported that relations between the Xaawadle and Bantu populations are particularly poor, the airdrops of food arranged by SCF UK to communities outside Beletweyne meant that the food reached its target. This contrasted with Buloberti and Jalalaqsi where it was reported that a significant amount of food was diverted.<sup>14</sup>

In Brava and Sablaale there is some indication that access may have varied depending on how the goods were distributed (Kloppenburg, 1998, June 30). Non-food items were distributed to people on the spot, while food was distributed from stores. Given that many Bantu's chose to stay in their villages rather than move with other displaced, they may not have benefited from food distributions.

The Evaluation Team found little evidence that much effort was put into monitoring distributions during or after Phase I of the relief operation beyond the distribution points. This was potentially a important omission. If vulnerability and livelihood insecurity are related to access, then the critical issue humanitarian agencies should be addressing is not capacity building or sustainability but protection.

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Areas where consent might have been negotiated in the north east or north west were by and large ignored.

<sup>2</sup> See for example African Rights 1993; Bradbury, 1994.

<sup>3</sup>In March 1998 heavy fighting resumed in Kismayo between Harti militia forces under General Mohamed Said Hersi 'Morgan' and Marrehan forces under Colonel Omar. Since then a build up of Harti forces from north east Somalia and Marrehan (SNF) forces from Gedo supported by Habr Gedir Ayr (USC/SNA) threatens to make Kismayo again one of the main military flash points in Somalia. Reasons for this are several: access and control of Kismayo port; the disputed claims of the so-called *waamo* ('indigenous') and *galti* ('outsider') populations (Bryden, Ahmed F. Yusuf, 1998, May 26); an attempt by 'Morgan' to maintain his authority, having been marginalised in reconciliation talks between the Harti and Ogaden during 1997; the arming of both sides by the Ethiopians on the pretext of containing the threat of Al Itixaad. It is also alleged by some Somalis that the flood relief operation provided Morgan with resources to resume the fighting.

<sup>4</sup>The Evaluation Team was unable to obtain written reports from these NGOs.

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<sup>5</sup> Reflecting this settlement, and in contrast to Lower and Middle Jubba, Gedo region as a whole is defined as a 'transition zone' and thus eligible for rehabilitation assistance.

<sup>6</sup> Ken Menkhaus Personal communication. The latter are also thought to be more prominent in the conflict over Kismayo, one explanation for the involvement there of the Habr Gedir Ayr who share a border with the Marrehan in Mudug.

<sup>7</sup> Tax is collected on goods at official checkpoints, and direct from employees and drivers of hired vehicles. In Bulla Xawa the administration is now said to be able to pay its own teachers.

<sup>8</sup> Before the Flood Response Team became operational one Somali NGO in Bardera distributed food which had been received for drought relief.

<sup>9</sup> An organisation formed throughout Gedo by UNOPS.

<sup>10</sup> MSF Holland, operating out of Kenya, also assisted in the repair of water sources once the floods receded.

<sup>11</sup> The practice of the OIC was to halve the estimates.

<sup>12</sup> The DMG in Gedo, for example, have seven members. It is reported to that District Council in Saakow has been influenced by this to reduce their membership from 21 to 7. However, a consequence may be that a smaller Council is no longer as representative of the community.

<sup>13</sup> See FSAU food economy reports, and ACF's report on Mogadishu (Broudic, 1997)

<sup>14</sup> Interview. Abdi H. Roble, 1998, June 17.

## **13. SOMALI RESPONSES TO THE FLOODS**

*It is not only the international community that has good will.<sup>1</sup>*

*The Somali situation is evolving in a positive way. There is a strong grassroots movement in Somalia to get the situation resolved.<sup>2</sup>*

### **13.1 Introduction**

A personal donation of US \$1,000 to the Somalia Flood Response Flash Appeal by Somaliland's president Mohamed Ibrahim Egal was widely publicised by the SACB. Notice of the donation was combined with an appeal to Africa leaders, individuals, businessmen and community personalities to contribute to the flood emergency, 'so that African children may be saved by African, as well as international solidarity' (SACB, 1997, November 16). The appeal noted that 'the world is waiting for this kind of response.'

Humanitarian interventions are commonly criticised for neglecting the capacities of disaster victims. The focus by relief agencies on the vulnerabilities of beneficiaries rather than their strengths and capabilities as survivors creates an impression of vulnerable dependency (Adams & Bradbury, 1995). The spectre of aid fueling dependency was another 'lesson' gleaned from the days of UNOSOM. As has become common policy, the notion that Somalis must take responsibility for solving their problems and needs was integral to the Flood Response Operation. This section assesses some of the individual and collective responses made by Somalis to the floods, and efforts by the Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation to support these.

### **13.2 The Role of LPI in Mobilising Self-help Initiatives**

When LPI were invited to participate in the Flood Response Operation, the Coordinator stressed the need for Somalis to take care of themselves, and to improve their image through their own response to the floods (Svensson, 1998, May 29). In addition to liaising between local structures and the international agencies a key task of LPI was to mobilise self-help efforts among Somalis, by 'underlining the responsibilities Somalis themselves should shoulder and the leading role they should play in responding to the flood..' (LPI-HAP 1997a, November 21). LPI's interest and qualifications for this aspect of the operation arose from their support to 'civil society' groups in Somalia. In Mogadishu and Kismayo in particular, LPI trainers were involved in raising public awareness of the floods and its consequences.

### **13.3 Mobilising Self-help Initiatives in Kismayo**

On 20th November, two days after the Flood Response Operation obtained an access agreement with elders and faction leaders in Kismayo, a meeting was held in Nairobi between the Coordinator of the Flood Response Operation and 14 Absame and Harti elders from Middle and Lower Juba (Safia M. Giama, 1997 November 21). In the meeting the elders were advised to appeal to the Somali Diaspora for donations of funds.

In Kismayo this was followed up by LPI organising meetings with various 'social groups': religious leaders, women groups, youth, middle ranking militia leaders, Somali NGOs and intellectuals (LPI-HAP, 1998b January). The meetings were organised together with a

UNICEF consultant posted to Kismayo to assist UNICEF national staff in mobilising community support for flood victims (Safia M. Giama, 1997, November 27). The purpose of these meetings was threefold:

- to use the floods as a springboard to mobilise the community on issues of civic rights;
- to discuss the collective and individual civic responsibilities of each group;
- to define areas where each group could be engaged in assisting flood victims.

At the time the UNICEF consultant noted that there were already positive signs of the local community supporting flood victims without the involvement of the international community. Interestingly, the meetings in Kismayo appear to have been the only occasion when the issue of 'rights' appears in the Flood Response Operation.

As a result of these meetings, the religious leaders, women and youth all made public appeals to their constituencies for support. The religious leaders, who came from different Islamic sects, formed a Committee of Muslim Scholars that preached against 'opportunistic elements' and jointly appealed to the Islamic world. Governments of Islamic states were admonished for not assisting, when governments of non-Islamic states had responded (Committee of Muslim Scholars, 1997 November 26). Their appeal was released to Ambassadors of Arab countries through UNICEF and the BBC Arabic Service, and complemented the appeal to African leaders noted above. In response to their appeal, Kuwaiti and Saudi NGOs did deliver assistance to Kismayo in early December.

This collaboration between religious leaders, who reportedly had never previously met, was considered a significant indicator of the level of collaboration among people in Kismayo. In addition to the appeals they also collected and distributed food and non-food items from businessmen in Kismayo. The women also organised the local collection and distribution of food and non-food items, while the youth participated in registering newly displaced flood victims in Kismayo. Somalis abroad also remitted funds.

Both LPI and the UNICEF consultant assert that their mobilisation efforts with the militia leaders in Kismayo did much to ensure the security of convoys, and the arrival of relief supplies at entry points at the airport and port.

#### **13.4 Spontaneous Responses**

A common fallacy with notions of 'dependency' is to over-estimate the importance of humanitarian assistance. It is impossible to place a financial value on Somali self-help activities. It is clear, however, that Somalis did 'shoulder responsibility' during the floods. This occurred both in a spontaneous manner, and through planned collective and collaborative efforts. However, as one Somali suggested:

Local responses were not visible, nor recognised or seen as important by outsiders (Abdillahi M. Ali, 1998, June 13).

The following are just a few examples of spontaneous local responses to the floods.

## Rescue

Given that the boats and helicopters of the international operation arrived too late to physically 'rescue' people, it is a fair assumption to suggest that most people rescued themselves. The common view among those interviewed during the Evaluation is that, while helicopters and boats were able to serve people stranded on dykes, by the time they arrived people had already rescued themselves.

In Jamame, where it was reported that 82 out of the 84 villages in the district were flooded, the majority of people moved themselves to the town. In Beletweyne, where people had advanced warning, people moved themselves en mass to higher ground at K115 before the mass of water from Ethiopia hit the town. It is reported that throughout the floods Ugas Khalif encouraged people in Beletweyne to help each other. Local authorities, traditional leaders and businessmen responded by working together organising the collection of people and their re-settlement at K115. Some people loaned their vehicles while others contributed fuel. The *technicals* of the *sharia* court were used to evacuate people from the town (Abdillahi M. Ali, 1998, June 4).

## Flood Protection

All along the rivers people were involved in flood protection, mostly using sand bags to repair and reinforce embankments. The 294 bales of sandbags provided by the international response supported their efforts in this. In some places agencies paid incentives to repair breaches in the river bank. DBG, for example did cash for work to reinforce river embankments (DBG, 1997 November). In most places people worked voluntarily. On the west side of Beletweyne, for example, it is reported that some people collected money to purchase sandbags for flood protection (Abdillahi Warsame, 1998, June 14).

In Jowhar, the Flood Committee formed by the District Council, local NGOs, businessmen, women and youth collected sacks (including from UNICEF) to reinforce the river embankments to protect the town (Abuker Sheik et al, 1998, June 20) At Mandhere south of Jowhar villages have collaborated several times since late October to repair a *buqda* (river breach). Villagers reported that four people had died and three people had been injured trying to close the breach. UNICEF and DBG have assisted at different times. When the Evaluation Team visited Mandhere in June the breach was again being repaired, this time with the support of a Somali plantation owner providing food and bulldozers (Mandhere & Nukay villagers, 1998, June 23).

## Shelter

In Jamame it was reported that women were particularly active in housing displaced, and mobilising the community. (LPI-HAP, 1998b January). Similarly in Buaale people gave shelter to the influx of displaced (Roderigues & Vechio, 1998, June 2). Mandhere and Nukay villages south of Jowhar, were still hosting families from neighbouring villages who had been displaced when their houses collapsed some six months after Phase I of the flood operation was ended (Mandhere & Nukay villagers, 1998, June 23). These are not isolated cases.

## Preserving Food Stocks

Many families lost food stocks when underground stores were inundated. In many places, however, some stocks were preserved. Sealed oil drums were used to keep some food, especially cow peas, dry. Some food was stored in roofs. In Jamame it was reported that 20% of maize production in private stores was recovered, and 20% stored in drums was also saved (Idris M. Osman 1997 December 28). The District Council in Qorioley reported a similar figure of 20% of food stocks saved through local efforts (Hussein Moalim et al, 1998, June 19). According to the FSAU, where households had sufficient warning they took food with them, and the majority of livestock were moved. The human death toll was due to health problems rather than food shortages. Therefore early people indicated their first priority was medicines, mosquito nets and blankets rather than food (Marai, 1998, June 3).

### **13.5 Collective Responses**

The Evaluation Team learned of a number of locally organised collective responses to the flooding. These included businessmen collecting together to repair various roads. In Qorioley, for example, the district council and businessmen organised collection and filling of sandbags for the protection of roads, and a pump to divert water from the town (Hussein Moalim et al. 1998, June 19).

The largest organised collective efforts appear to have taken place in Beletweyne and Mogadishu. In Beletweyne, the powerful and respected Ugas Khalif, who has initiated a number of self-help schemes, mobilised community resources to build a bund to protect Beletweyne airstrip from flooding. The project was in response to the heavy rains in the 1997 *gu* season, and was part of a larger project being coordinated with ICAO to rehabilitate the airport.

### **13.6 The Mogadishu Flood Committee<sup>3</sup>**

The largest collective response to the floods occurred in Mogadishu, where people became aware of the floods in the Juba and Shabelle valleys through Somali radio operators, as well as the BBC Somali service, CNN and Arab satellite channels. On 27<sup>th</sup> November a meeting was organised at the Ramadan Hotel on Mogadishu's 'green line', attended by some 75 people including, religious leaders, Somali NGOs, sports clubs, artists, 'intellectuals' and businessmen, including telecommunication and airline companies. The meeting attempted to revive a lost Somali tradition of self-help encapsulated in the Somali saying:

*Help each other by taking from yourselves to yourselves.*

At the meeting a voluntary Joint Relief Committee was formed to coordinate a collective response. Mosques, street meetings and local newspapers were used to mobilise support. The Coalition for Grassroots Women's Organisations organised house-to-house collections. Businesses gave office space to the committee with free use of fax and telephones from the Barakat and Olympic telephone companies. The Olympic telephone company organised a football match in December in Mogadishu stadium to raise money. National staff of UNICEF, LPI and other international agencies also contributed to the fundraising, and the committee received donations from Somalis outside Somalia.

The initiative is reported to have raised US\$100,000, and to have distributed some 125 Mts. of food medicines, clothes, cooking utensils to displaced populations in Lower and Middle Shabelle, Benadir, Bay, Bakool, Gedo, Hiran, Galgaduud and Mudug regions.<sup>4</sup> During the cholera outbreak in December the committee opened an isolation centre at Benadir hospital. Businessmen also contributed to the repair of the road between Merca and Mogadishu to enable trade to continue. Since the floods ended the committee has since formed itself into the *Natural Disaster Emergency Response Committee of Somalia*. It was reported to be active most recently in June 1998 responding to flood damage in Mogadishu and Merca.

Among Somalis involved in the flood committee, there was disappointment that this response in Mogadishu largely went unrecognised by the international community. Some reported that offers of volunteers by the committee to the international relief effort were not taken up. LPI, trainers reported that those involved were 'demoralised by the lack of international support for this local effort and that 'the gates of the UN compounds was shut' to the committee.

This flood committee is perceived by Somalis involved as a 'civil society' response. Attempts by the factions - whose leaders were meeting in Cairo - to form their own committees failed. Several of the organisations and individuals involved come from 'civil society' organisations, who have received international support in the past in capacity building, and conflict resolution training. Several of these saw this response as a significant 'turning point'. This was the first large Somali corporate fundraising activity. The fact that it worked across clan lines throughout southern Somalia is seen as a positive development. It confirmed for them a belief that change is coming. International support for civil society organisations they argue has helped to create a new platform outside of politics, a civil society movement that allows people to be active.

The floods galvanised people to act together. Some Somalis interviewed reported that the contribution by Egal set an example, but denied that the appeals from the Flood Response Operation for solidarity had any influence. The lack of international support can be explained by the absence of international agency staff in Mogadishu at the time due to insecurity. Some Somalis suggest that it was partially their absence that encouraged people to look to their own resources. The use of the word 'natural disaster' in the title of the committee also suggests an explanation. As with the international response, the floods were a 'natural disaster' - rather than a man-made political disaster - around which people could organise. And in the words of one expatriate observer:

We underestimate how much Somalis want to help themselves.<sup>5</sup>

### **13.7 Supporting Local Capacities**

Once it is recognised that disaster-affected populations are not passive victims, the argument, as summarized in the LPI Operational Principles, is that disaster relief should support local capacities. Effective support for coping strategies and capacities needs an detailed socio-economic understanding of communities. The FSAU is building such a knowledge base. Without it, they argue, there is a tendency to jump from crisis to crisis. Turning their rich information into an alternative response, however, is problematic, as there is a tendency in each crisis to revert to negotiating food inputs, rather than examining alternatives (McAskill, 1998, July 2). The evidence that the Flood Response Operation was prepared to respond to 'alternatives' is mixed.

### 13.8 Trade and Economic Activities

It is argued that trade is the life-blood of Somalia. The significance of trade was recognised during the UNOSOM intervention, and led to food monetisation. The significance of trade was apparent in the isolating effect of the floods on communities. The floods immediately damaged the roads, leaving important trading centres cut off for several months. Bulla Xawa and Mandera were virtually cut off for six months. Bardera, a major trading centre for goods passing from Mogadishu through to Kenya, was virtually cut off by road until March. The impact was evident as food prices began to rise. Even in Jowhar, which was considered to have been less affected, the milk trade with Mogadishu was disrupted when floods cut the road to Mogadishu at Balcad and Afgooye. This has a particular impact on women who are the main milk traders.

Like the international relief agencies, access was a major problem for traders. An interesting aspect of the Somali responses were the initiatives made by businessmen to keep trade going. Mogadishu businessmen repaired the Mogadishu-Merca road and the bridge at Burhakaba. Businessmen from Bulo Mareer and Merca in Lower Shabelle repaired the Golweyene-Shalambod road (Istarlin A. Arush, 1998, June 17). In Qorioley businessmen utilised an oil drum raft constructed by women to move supplies along the river to Kurtunwaarey (Hussein Moalim et al. 1998, June 19). Businessmen in Mogadishu were reported to have purchased boats to move supplies by river (Priske, 1998, July 2).

Trade is clearly not all positive and can be extractive and exploitative. However, if 'capacities' are the strengths on which communities can draw to avert or mitigate disaster, then Somali skills in trade should not be ignored. Some agencies recognised this and proposed action in support of it. In mid-November, for example, Trocaire, AMREF, NCA and MEMISA in Gedo region, wrote to the Flood Response Coordinator, suggesting that the Flood Response Committee consider assisting local merchants to fly their supplies to Mandera Luuq and Garbahare, as an alternative to the donor community purchasing food (Fahy, 1997, November 18). The proposal was not supported. In part one assumes because it is difficult raising funds to move commercial commodities. In contrast, the Kenyan army did transport food to Mandera for merchants there during the floods in Kenya (NGOs, 1998, June 4).

There are examples where the operation did assist traders. However, this was on an ad hoc basis and not a strategic part of the response. In Jamame, for example, efforts were made by to keep a route to Mogadishu open. A local NGO Juba Shine was paid to clear a 120km road through sand dunes from Jamame to Kuniyaburo on the border of Lower Shabelle (Marai, 1998 June 3). In Bardera, the operation facilitated traders to transport goods by boat when they were returning empty. They also ran a ferry across the river so that people on the east bank could access the market on the west side, so helping to keep the market running (Carter, 1998, June 10). It is thought that the sale by beneficiaries of BP-5 biscuits and other relief items on the market also helped stimulate market activity in Bardera.<sup>6</sup> The team, however, were not prepared to facilitate flights for traders to bring goods from Mogadishu when approached to do so by merchants.

It was suggested by several people interviewed that as the floods were not a food emergency, when food was delivered later in the operation it may have been more appropriate to provide

high value commodities rather than cereals, so giving people options of selling their goods or not. There are higher security risks associated with high value goods. Nevertheless DBG and some Islamic agencies did deliver high value food items in Middle and Lower Shabelle. It is suggested that the assistance Islamic agencies gave in Lower Shabelle may have been of equal value to that provided by the Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation (Istarlin A. Arush, 1998 June 17).

### **13.9 Utilising Local Resources**

The Flood Response Operation, in general, was positive in working with and supporting local structures in the planning and distribution of relief supplies. Its record in the utilisation of local resources is more mixed.

#### **Local Purchase of Supplies**

WFP, ICRC, DBG and Islamic agencies all purchased supplies in country. In Qorioley, one Islamic agency established a voucher scheme, whereby people could exchange vouchers for supplies from a local store (Istarlin A. Arush, 1998, June 18). All other supplies provided by inter-agency response were brought from outside Somalia. As certain supplies were not available in country, and there was concern not to deplete local supplies or increase their costs, most supplies provided by the inter-agency response were therefore brought from outside Somalia.

#### **Local Boat Hire**

Prior to the arrival of the Norwegian donated boats and the UN purchased boats, some use was made of local boats. ICRC, for example, hired local boats in Brava, Kamsuma and Jamama, and even paid to have some constructed. In Mareerey, Somali Community Services (SCS) hired local boats to move people to higher ground (Abdi Hussein, 1998, July 3). In Beletweyne, IMC utilised local boats until the UNDP purchased boats arrived. (Abokor Yusuf & Jaffer Aminullah, 1998, June 14). In Jamame, the head of the FSAU organised the rescue of some 900 people using local boats (von Meijenfeldt, 1998, July 3). Swedish Church relief also hired two local boats during the first two weeks of the floods to rescue stranded people (SCR, 1997).

Furthermore, the ICRC, DBG and UNOPS hired Somali boat operators. The 20 boats brought into the Jubba by the UN were all run by expatriate boat operators. The original intention that the expatriate boat operators would 'build local capacity' by providing training to Somalis does not seem to have happened, except in Bardera (Carter, 1998, July 6).

The hire of local boats was controversial as it was seen to go against the self-help ethos that the Flood Response Operation was trying to promote. In November, four days before the boats donated from Norway were expected to arrive in Nairobi, UNICEF was confronted with a dilemma as to whether to pay local boat owners to rescue some 2,800 people stranded outside Mareerey. The boat owners were asking what was considered an exorbitant fee of US \$100 to carry 20 persons for a five to eight hour trip (Al-Nammari, 1997, November 16).

Although the NGO SCS was contracted to hire local boats, the boat operators who were charging to save their stranded neighbours were roundly condemned as 'opportunists'. The

help of the BBC Somali Service was enlisted to denounce these 'unscrupulous people', who were demanding money from agencies to save their people (Geldof, 1997, November 18). The head of the FASU in Jamame was also chastised for paying US\$7,000 to rescue 900 people.

On 19<sup>th</sup> November the Coordinator of the Flood Response Operation sent a memorandum to all UNICEF staff that set out the conditions on which the operation was to proceed (see box). Attached to this was the press release announcing Egal's personal contribution to the operation. The purpose of the memorandum was to counter what some people said was 'a strong sense of expectation of handouts' among Somalis. Expectations that were in part a consequence of a broadcast over the BBC Somali Service serving notice that the UN was appealing for US\$13 million for the Flood Response Operation (Hawa A. Mohamed, 1998, June 25).

Several people involved in the operation are of the opinion that while local boats did not have the capacity of the imported boats, more use could have been made of them. In terms of *timeliness*, the use of local boats for rescue was clearly more appropriate. By 26<sup>th</sup> November only 6 of the 20 boats destined for Somalia had arrived there (Ulrey, 1997 November 26). The first team from Swedish Services Rescue Agency (SRSA) did not arrive in Nairobi until 27<sup>th</sup> November. On a *cost-benefit* basis, the cost of hiring local boats was cheaper than importing boats and hiring expatriate boat operators.

As important, however, it appeared that there was a lack of consistency on what local resources it was legitimate to pay for. While the Flood Response Operation was prepared to pay porters in Kismayo airport or vehicle owners, they were not prepared to hire local boats. Somali boat operators who ran the UN purchased boats in Beletweyne were paid So. Sh. 30,000 (\$4) a day, a fraction of the cost paid by WFP for expatriate boat operators. Thus there appears to

This is not to criticise the foreign boat operators. While some WFP boat operators hired out of Kenya were not sensitised to working in Somalia, most observers asserted that they ran a professional operation and were even an 'inspired idea' (Haroon, 1998, June 30). However, these professionals received professional salaries, unlike the Somali boat operators.

In the West, the capacity to respond to such disasters exists in the emergency rescue services like the SRSA. However, if these rescue teams are volunteers, they are only able to be so because they have

#### Statement by the Flood Response Coordinator

As you are aware, past efforts to respond to emergencies in Somalia have often created long term problems for the Somali society, disempowering traditional leaders and boosting crooks and gangsters. This time [it] is my firm intention, with your help to approach the emergency as an opportunity to build self-reliance, solidarity and to promote good governance.

As you represent our best link with the communities, please pass to all Somali the following message: *The international effort will only complement the response of local community and respectable leaders: it will not provide any opportunity for hyenas, jackals and vultures.*

*If communities and leaders will tolerate extortion, blackmail and exploitation we will just leave. It is sad, but I prefer to leave people without much assistance than create the base for many more years of gangsterism, violence and war.*

.....I am counting on you to promote solidarity, self-reliance and responsibility...

(Paganini, 1997, November 19, emphasis added)

other sources of income. In Somalia in the past a rescue service capacity existed in the army, which were utilised in all floods between 1961 to the 1981. During the 1981 floods the Somali government mobilised civil defence forces (Carter, 1998, June 11). There was also a capacity to reinvest after (Marai, 1998, June 3).

The case of local boat operators was pertinent because many local boats along the Juba are owned by Bantus (Svensson, 1998, May 29).<sup>7</sup> Here was an opportunity for a marginalised section of the population to earn an income. However, the conditions placed on the hire of local boats, on the grounds promoting self-help, in effect penalised those least able to help themselves in normal circumstances. There is a danger of confusing 'opportunism' with coping or 'survival strategies'.

### **13.10. Principal Findings**

#### **13.10.1 Estimating Local Capacity**

The ability of people to reduce their vulnerability and survive conditions of extreme stress is well documented in the literature on famines and coping strategies. It suggests that under conditions of extreme stress people are not passive, but employ their intimate knowledge of the environment, or political and social relations to mitigate disaster, and so as to recover as quickly as possible. When crises outstrip local capacity to deal with them they escalate into disaster.

The general lack of information available on coping strategies makes it difficult to corroborate a view that the Flood Response Operation was a success because it was able to support Somalis efforts and their coping strategies (Langenbacher, 1998 May 25). The Evaluation Team would tend to concur with the view that in an acute crisis there are no coping mechanisms (Heinonen, 1998, May 28). The floods were an acute fast on-set disaster that warranted a large and rapid response.

Clearly self-help capacity and initiative does exist. Most, though not all, collective self-help initiatives occurred (or were reported) where there were no or few international agencies present. Promoting self-help, or supporting coping strategies, like sustainability, assumes a certain level of capacity. By definition, however, coping strategies are sub-optimal, a second best choice, which can involve permanent losses. An objective of supporting coping strategies and local capacity therefore carries with it the danger of over-reliance on capacities which do not exist, especially when coupled with a fixation on 'Somali solutions to Somalia's problems' and sustainability.

In Beletweyne, for example, it was reported that only 5-10% of middle and better of families can afford irrigation (Abdi H. Roble, 1998, June 17). Most farmers are in debt. In one village surveyed by the FSAU monitor only 47 out of 240 families were able to irrigate before the floods. Of these more than half had to take loans to do so. Those farmers invested in irrigation early in order to benefit from any early rains and cropped larger areas. By the time the floods came, people had already invested what little resources they had.

There is sufficient evidence to indicate that where services are supported by international agencies lives are saved. The response to the cholera outbreak in Lower Shabelle is an example. By 13 March 1998, 2943 cases of cholera were reported with 169 deaths (Zocchi,

1998 March 18) The highest death tolls were recorded in Qorioley (30) and Janaale (35). The highest mortality rates were recorded in Golweyene (13.20%) and Janaale (8.64%). The lowest mortality rates were recorded in the treatment centre in Merka hospital (2.76%) directly supported by COSV, which also had by far the largest number of patients (976). In Golweyene and Qorioley they had the lowest number of litres of infusion per patient (1.5 and 1.6), and in Merka the highest (6.4).

Evidence from ACF indicates that in Mogadishu incidents of cholera were lowest in displaced camps where a concerted effort had been made to improve water sources (Largard, 1998, June 9). Similarly, in Middle Shabelle MSF Spain report a correlation between protected water sources and improvements in cholera incidents (Goiri et al. 1998, June 21). The claim that Somalia has the lowest cholera fatality rates in the east Africa region clearly needs to be disaggregated.

Similarly, UNICEF suggests that the network of CHWs in the Juba valley was particularly beneficial during the floods (Heinonen, 1998, May 28). Although UNICEF were skeptical about the value of the CHW programme, given its cost, they recognise that it proved useful having people with basic health knowledge, and people who knew their villages and were trusted by them during the relief operation. The initial Plan of Action in fact targeted villages with CHWs (SACB, 1997, November 7).

The simple message is that where services are better more lives were saved! Like before the war, rural populations suffer more due to absence of qualified health staff. This is not to suggest that aid agencies should ignore or override local knowledge, and initiatives and capacity. Rather, there is a need to invest in upgrading it. Withholding outside assistance in order to motivate local initiatives penalise the most vulnerable where capacity is the weakest. Support for local capacities requires a real assessment of capacity, not just assumptions. Capacities and coping strategies need to be understood within a wider context of socio-economic and political relations. Assessments of local need and capacity often seem to be driven more by policy than empirical evidence.<sup>8</sup>

### **13.10.2 Preventing Population Movement**

Some 250,000 people were estimated to have been displaced by the floods. A key decision of the SACB meeting of November 7<sup>th</sup>, was that Phase I of the Flood Response Operation should avoid causing further displacement:

The operation was to be implemented in such a manner as to avoid population displacements and keep people near their villages where relief assistance could be provided. (SACB, 1998 January).

At the first inter-agency meeting on the floods on 30<sup>th</sup> October USAID advised caution that an 'all out' emergency response would invite project proposals with exaggerated numbers while at this stage the only major displacement was reported to be Bardera (FSAU, 1997 October 31). This suggests that early on there was a concern among donors that a large relief operation would encourage displacement. There was evident concern that the flood in 1997 might also force people to seek refuge in Kenya.

To try and assist these people in their location seems a reasonable strategy. Migration-induced stress has been identified as a proximate cause of death during the 1991-93 famine (Hansch et al, 1994) Over-crowded displaced camps or refugee camps can become centres of disease and a locus of tension with host populations - a particular concern in Kismayo. Displacement can lead to a breakdown of social and kinship ties, thus increasing vulnerability; although this need not always be the case as people tend to move to areas where they have kin.

The movement of people also has added costs for the international community. In 1996, a minor flood in the Jubba valley caused the movement of some 5-10,000 people to Kismayo. These people then had to be repatriated to their villages at an additional cost. USAID invested US\$1 million through ICRC to repair breaches in the river. Part of the aim of assisting people in their villages during the floods was therefore to avoid people becoming dependent on the international community (Metenier, 1998, July 2).

In Kismayo, the strategy to avoid population movements was to start relief deliveries up the valley. Although, this did cause some tensions between the relief operation and people in Kismayo, it is considered to have successfully prevented a large movement of population. The numbers of displaced in Kismayo were estimated to be only 5,000 families.

The possible spillover of refugees to Kenya was also of concern. UNHCR purchased seed to be distributed in Middle Jubba, Saakow and Buaale, in an effort 'to reduce the possibilities of internal migration and the displacement to Kenyan refugee camps'. (World Vision, 1998, January 30).

The concerns about population movement reflects the notion that humanitarian aid induces dependency. Clearly some people will move to refugee camps for the benefits they offer. In late 1997, when UNHCR undertook a re-registration in Dadaab camp on the Kenyan-Somali border, it is reported that a few thousand people arrived in the camp from Doble (Metenier, 1998, July 2). In the flooded terrain truck drivers used the seismological lines as roads to reach there. It is reported that people went there because the camp offered education, health services and food, and the opportunity to join the immigration lottery for the US. While presented as an example of the negative impact of aid, if there are benefits to being a refugee, it rather points to the lack of investment in the country's restoration.

Evidence of the 'pull' factor of relief assistance is in fact is limited. Few people are likely to willingly abandon their houses and farms for temporary assistance in Kismayo or Bardera. In most places during the floods members of families were left behind to protect homes and assets. The protection of assets is a common coping strategy noted in famine studies (de Waal, 1989). In Sablaale, in Lower Shabelle, Bantu villagers in Haway did not move when the town population moved to displaced camps (Kloppenburger, 1998 June 30). This suggests that people do not automatically move to access relief. Other factors are important. The villages presumably survived on fishing and local fruits. Possibly they felt their chances were better staying where they were, than moving to population centres where they might meet discrimination.

Evidence suggests that it is the 'push' factors - violence, depletion of assets, economic poverty etc. - that are more critical reasons for people to move. In this sense movement is a 'coping strategy'. For some people, moving to Merca and Mogadishu during the floods was clearly a coping strategy (Campezey, 1998, June 5; Nukay villagers, 1998, June 23). Some

agencies suggested that people in Beletweyne, and Middle and Lower Shabelle were not as badly off as those in the Juba valley precisely because they were able to move (Istarlin A. Arush, 1998, June 17). That migration is a coping strategy in a nomadic society should not be a surprise. Migration is also clearly an important coping strategy for the poorest, as seen in the seasonal migrations to Mogadishu, and to the banana plantations in Lower Shabelle. Encouraging people to stay put potentially leaves them vulnerable to the forces that caused the disaster.

If movement is a coping strategy, and one takes a view of coping strategies being the best informed response to a crisis, then theoretically one should support the movement of people rather than prevent it. In the floods it is unclear that it was the distribution of relief alone that kept people in place. The evidence is that the floods prevented people from deploying their normal coping strategy of migration. The thousands who migrate from Bay region to Lower Shabelle to work on the banana plantations, for example, were unable to do this in 1998 due to the flood damage to the plantations.

### **13.10.3 Opportunism and Dependency**

A common accusation laid against humanitarian aid is that it creates dependency. A mid-term Evaluation of the EC First Rehabilitation Programme in Somalia described the situation in 1994 as follows:

The final impact of these large scale emergency projects during ... UNOSOM was that the Somali population had become totally depending on the aid system to which they felt they were entitled to as beneficiaries (QuestConsult, 1997)

As coping strategies demonstrate, evidence for disaster victims' 'total' dependency on external assistance in any crises is debatable. Distressed populations may rely on external assistance for periods when other means of survival have collapsed. However, where suitable conditions exist reliance on welfare declines. Trocaire, for example, report that the 40mt of seeds they distributed during the floods was the first free distribution they had made since March 1993. Since then farmers have been able to reproduce their own seeds (Trocaire - b).

The demonisation of 'dependent' disaster affected populations has been equated by some people with that of single parent families or welfare 'scroungers' in the west. The Evaluation Team was struck by the negative view of Somalis in the eyes of many people interviewed during the evaluation. The following description by one aid worker interviewed is not uncommon:

Militias steal in the name of the Somali people. Businessmen stockpile drugs to force up prices. Ringers lactate costs \$1 litre in Kenya, but \$14 in Somalia. So-called local authorities with links to pharmacies refuse to chlorinate wells. While our priorities may be women and children, to many local decision-makers the health of their camels comes first. Too many locals visualise our intervention as an income generating opportunity.

Such descriptions at best indicate a fatigue with Somalia. To write off a nation on the basis of sweeping statements about Somali men's concerns for their camels over wives and children indicates a cultural insensitivity. In all places visited by the Evaluation Team there was

evidence that women and children were the first to be evacuated first from flooded villages, with men staying to guard property.<sup>9</sup> The so-called Somali 'camel complex' has to be understood within the culture and political economy of Somalia. If it is true that Somali men think of their camels first, it indicates a concern to protect family assets for the future benefits of the family and clan, rather than selfishness.

During the floods opportunism and selfish actions did occur. In Jowhar, it is believed that opening the Sabun and Chinese storage canals at Mahadday would have helped reduce the flooding downstream. However, people farming besides and inside the canal refused to open them without adequate compensation:

The flooding in Mahadday can only be stopped if the Chinese canal is opened, but so far the authorities have not been able to satisfy demands of people whose crop land will be affected by the opening of the canal. (UNICEF, 1997, November 26)

In the opinion of some, those farmers are responsible for causing the deaths of people downstream.

In Lower Shabelle, it is reported that banana plantation owners pumped out water from their haciendas onto the farms of their workers. Displaced families in El Jalle in Merca told the Evaluation Team that they were unable to return to their villages because the plantation owners had blocked canals causing their land to be flooded.<sup>10</sup> In Lower Shabelle the DC of Brava is reported to have attempted to divert relief supplies. ACORD was presented with an excessive bill for vehicles they hired to evacuate sick people from Sablaale (Kloppenburg, 1998, June 30). In Beletweyne distribution of relief supplies to the west side of the town were prevented by a clan dispute. In Kismayo militia stationed at the airport disrupted relief flights. Looting of some supplies are reported in Beletweyne, Bardera, Bay, Saakow, and Buaale.

The level of looting and opportunism, however, was minor compared to during the 1991-93 famine. Indeed, even Somalis were surprised at the behaviour of militia. The reason lies with the nature of the crisis. This was not a conflict-induced disaster, where looting and asset stripping was a strategy of warfare, and most goods were not being moved across lines of conflict.

The FSAU reports which provide the most detailed descriptions of wealth and poverty do not indicate dependency but different levels of need. What they describe are problems of access. There is a danger of confusing dependency with the political control of aid. It is no coincidence that those who define populations as dependent are those who control aid, be they warlords, local NGOs, international agencies or donors. The comment of one aid worker sums this up well:

The brown hair is not just from henna.....If Somalis are dependent, no one asks why. In UNOSOM's time they were flooded with aid. But the blame is placed on Somalis who messed it up so they must take responsibility. No-one investigates how much goods UNOSOM people looted.... They talk of using aid to be independent and self-sufficient, but when Somalis see outsiders dependent on aid this encourages them....The warlords' complaint that the world has deserted Somalia is based on their concern at the loss of money not the loss of humanitarian aid.<sup>11</sup>

Given the consistent underfunding of the CAP, the reduction in other sources of aid, and the fact that a large percentage of aid stays in Nairobi, Somalia is not suffering from an over-abundance of aid on which Somalis could become dependent.

#### 13.10.4 Proportionality

One of the apparent lessons external agencies have learned from UNOSOM is that humanitarian aid 'fuels war'. The notion of aid fueling conflict, however, is based on an analysis that conflict arises from a resource poor environment. Somalia did not start its civil war as the world's fourth poorest country. Information on Somalia's economy is limited, but it has probably always been underestimated because the value of the pastoral economy is largely unknown (Jamal, 1988). Aid can have a political impact. Clearly the vast amounts of aid brought into Somalia during UNOSOM did much to sustain the power of the warlords. Currently, however, aid accounts for only a small proportion of the economy. UNOSOM estimate remittances into the north alone to be in the region of \$93 million a year (UNICEF, 1998, March). That is three times the funds received by the UN for the 1996/97 CAP!

In Lower Shabelle, the value of the banana industry is estimated at over US\$9 million a year. The value of aid invested in Lower Shabelle probably represents only a fraction of the tax extracted by Aideed's government. Similarly in Kismayo, the income raised by Morgan from charcoal export probably exceeded the value of aid being provided in Kismayo prior to the floods. There are few examples where the provision of assistance during the flood operation can be directly attributed to causing violence. For the causes of violence and conflict in Somalia one needs to look for other explanations.

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Interview. Svensson, 1998, May 28.

<sup>2</sup> Interview. Paganini, 1998, May 20.

<sup>3</sup> The Evaluation Team was unable to visit Mogadishu, or meet anyone involved in the Mogadishu Flood Committee. Information was pieced together from various sources: Hassan S. Sheik, 1998, May 27; Frauenrath, 1998, May 31; Mohamed M. Shirwac, 1998 May 25; Svensson, 1998, May 29; Yusuf A. Salah, 1998, May 27; Abdi D. Dirie 1997 December 11; Abdi A. Mohamed, 1998 July 2; Marian Abkow, 1998, June 20.

<sup>4</sup> The Evaluation was unable to confirm this in interviews conducted in some of the regions.

<sup>5</sup> Interviewed in Nairobi, 1998 May 31.

<sup>6</sup> Indeed the low price of biscuits on the market in December was used as one indicator of things recovering and was one factor behind the decision to end phase I (Paganini, 1998, May 19).

<sup>7</sup> Some assert that this was not the case in Mareerey, that the boats were owned by Somalis (Metenier, personal communication).

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<sup>8</sup> In Gedo region, for example, Trocaire concluded that they could not expect much contribution from villages towards well rehabilitation, because of the 'economic problems' caused by the floods. In Saakow and Buaale, World Visions concluded that the best way to ensure sustainability of the water systems was to privatise them. Does this mean that people in Saakow and Buaale were better able to afford the water systems than people in Gedo?

<sup>9</sup> Somalis would probably be as shocked at the macabre interest among western TV viewers with animal rescue programmes, suggesting a greater humanitarian concern for pets than kin!

<sup>10</sup> Interview in El Jalle, Merca, 1998, June 19. Merca

<sup>11</sup> Interviewed in Nairobi (1998, July 2.)

## **14. BUILDING SOLIDARITY, RECONCILIATION AND PEACE**

### **14.1 Introduction**

Following the involvement of LPI in the operation the objectives of Phase I were expanded to encompass solidarity, reconciliation and peace-building.

### **14.2 The Role of LPI**

As a peace research institute LPI has been actively and consistently engaged in grassroots or 'second-track' peace-building in Somalia since the time of UN Envoy Mohamed Shanoun in 1992 (Heinrich, 1997, November). Along with assisting in access negotiations in Kismayo, and identifying structures to work with, LPI was invited to:

use its accumulated experience in peace building work in Somalia to help Somali communities forge solidarity in a time of crisis... (LPI-HAP, 1998 January 19)

LPI, who have been providing low level support to reconciliation processes in the Lower and Middle Juba regions, took the invitation as an opportunity and challenge to link relief to peace-building (LPI-HAP, 1997a November 21). From LPI's perspective the floods were an opportunity was to build on and strengthen the 'natural sense of cooperation and self-help that exists in response to a disaster.' (Selaasie, 1998, July 9). The Operational Principles were therefore:

conceived with the aim of bringing about and consolidating reconciliation and peace within the country. (LPI-HAP, 1997d November 21).

From its involvement in the operation, LPI concluded that (LPI-HAP, 1998, January 19):

- it is possible and also desirable to do peace and reconciliation work during times of major disaster or crisis.
- divided communities facing similar problems possess greater receptivity to peace, reconciliation and solidarity messages;
- peace work should be linked to relief, rehabilitation and development work in a continuum.

### **14.3 Building Bridges**

The Evaluation Team came across few examples of where these objectives of solidarity and peace building were actively pursued. In Kismayo the mobilisation of civil groups, elders and militia was described as an opportunity 'to build bridges for peace and reconciliation' (Safia M. Giama, 1997, November 27). Facilitating elders to meet as relief committees, to work on common problems, and to ensure an equitable clan balance on relief committees, was another example given (Selaasie, 1998, July 9). Working with and strengthening local administrations - both District Councils or local relief committees - through their involvement in the relief operation, and promoting civic rights and responsibility, are conceived as part of the process of peace building.

LPI assert that the tense situation that existed in Kismayo prior to the floods dissipated in the first two months of the operation as a result of the cooperation of the elders and faction leaders, and the efforts made by LPI and UNICEF offices in Kismayo (LPI-HAP, 1998b, January). LPI and a UNICEF consultant contend that their work with militia leaders in Kismayo helped ensure the security of convoys and relief supplies at the airport and port (Hassan F. Egal, 1998, June 9; Safia M. Giama, 1997, November 27). The extent to which this 'security' was ensured and conflict prevented by LPI's intervention or the agreement of the Flood Response Operation to pay landing fees and portage fees to airport militia is debatable. Despite the community mobilisation and the payments to militia, Kismayo had the worst security record during the Flood Response Operation. The reason for this is that Kismayo and the Middle and Lower Jubba valley are contested areas. Elsewhere in the Juba and Middle Shabelle, the worst security problems were encountered during the floods where conflict was on-going.

In Bardera it is suggested that the relief operation, and the transparency of the distributions, has improved local relations between the Marrehan and the Rahanweyne communities (Carter, 1998, July 6). In Beletweyne, some argued that the relief operation also contributed to peace building (Higgins, 1998 June 5). The floods exposed the Governor to be incapable of acting decisively, which led to moves to remove him and to reform the local administration. However, the operation was unable to access the west bank of the river, where the need for reconciliation was arguably greatest. As LPI did not visit Beletweyne during the floods, and the agencies there claimed not to have read the principle, it is difficult to evaluate whether the operation had any direct impact on the changes that have or will occur there.

#### **14.4 Principal Findings**

This broadening of the operations' objectives to incorporate solidarity and peace building were not discussed widely with participating agencies. Had they been, not all participating agencies would have agreed to work with them.

The broadening of the objectives of humanitarian relief to include peace building is a common trend. Ideas of 'do no harm' and supporting 'local capacities for peace' have fast become part of the aid orthodoxy. This is evident in the 1998 CAP, which states that:

humanitarian assistance is an opportunity to foster peace-building and responsible, accountable local governance (OCHA, 1998, March).

The linking of relief and peace reflects the growing prominence of developmental agencies in conflict zones, which were previously the preserve of relief agencies. In such contexts, linking relief and peace-building seems an obvious strategy, where the provision of relief makes little sense if the structural causes of the disaster go unaddressed.

The notion of building peace and solidarity through emergency relief programmes is not new. In Sudan 'humanitarian diplomacy', with peace corridors, immunisation days, guinea worm programmes and negotiated access programmes, has a long history. The reasons why these initiatives have not led to sustained peace need to be understood (Duffield, 1997). Similarly notions of 'cooperative integration', such as bringing elders together on a relief committee to work on common problems and to promote trust, understanding and solidarity are not new (Suhrke, 1997).

Notions of humanitarian diplomacy and cooperative integration reflect a view of war as arising from ignorance, misunderstanding or communication breakdown. Their incorporation into relief operations perhaps reflects the trend towards 'behavioural change' strategies in other aspects of the aid programme in Somalia. The pressure exerted on 'opportunistic' Somalis through the media during the floods was aimed at attitudinal change. Reducing internal war to a problem of communication has a levelling affect, in that both the perpetrators of violence and the victims are blamed for lack of communication.

Furthermore, humanitarian aid is normally conceived in terms of the unconditional provision of relief based on need. Adding the objective of peace, carries with it the danger of imposing conditionalities on assistance. The implications of this have been noted with regard to the 'peace dividend' approach to rehabilitation and development assistance in Somalia.

The Evaluation Team is unable to conclude whether the exercise in solidarity and peace-building worked or will have any long term impact. To assess their social impact would require a much longer study. On a brief review, it would appear that where authority was contested before the floods it remains contested, and where communities were united before the floods they remain united. While the Flood Response Operation sought to build on a sense of cooperation in response to a natural disaster, it would be a mistake to assume that relief can be linked to solidarity and peace-building in all disaster situations. As a 'natural disaster' the floods were thus fundamentally different from the politically and militarily induced famine emergency of 1991-1993 when a 'natural sense of cooperation' was absent, at least among the protagonists. Then people did not just lose their harvests, 'people were harvested.'

## **15. MEDIA AND PUBLIC INFORMATION**

*What is difficult, is to keep the media interested when there isn't a flood.<sup>1</sup>*

### **15.1 Introduction**

The mobilisation, management and creative use of the media and public information channels has become an essential part of humanitarian operations. On-the-spot satellite broadcasting, print and radio media have become crucial in evoking massive public and political responses in recent large-scale humanitarian crises. Charges that competition among resource-strapped aid agencies for media profile and fundraising opportunities degrades the quality of humanitarian operations, is combined with criticisms of aid agencies' undignified portrayal of disaster victims.

In Somalia, it is generally accepted that the so-called 'CNN factor' was influential both in generating the international response to the 1991-1993 famine emergency, and the eventual collapse of UNOSOM's mission as TV images of dead American soldiers led to public questioning of the mission's objectives in the US (Johnston & Dagne, 1997; RPG, 1994:42). Common media descriptions of the 'chaos' and 'anarchy' of Somalia evoked compassion, but little understanding of the war and the humanitarian tragedy, and perhaps contributed to the lack of policy coherence in the international response.

The number and range of media channels in Somalia is greater than pre-war. Newspapers, though often of poor quality, are found in most large towns. Throughout the conflict the BBC Somali Service, and more recently Radio Voice of Peace (RVOP) in Addis Ababa, have been influential in Somali affairs as news and public information channels. The increasing availability of satellite TV in urban areas has given the television a new, important public news and information role.

This section assesses the mobilisation and role of the media in Phase I of the Flood Response Operation.

### **15.2 Coordination of the Media and Public Information**

A coordinated approach to the media was adopted at the beginning of the Flood Response. The guidelines for this were endorsed by the Executive Committee Meeting of the SACB on the 7 November (see box), who stated that press releases should be from the 'Somalia Inter-Agency Coordinated Flood Response'. UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, CARE and World Vision information officers were designated as the information focal points, and their contact details were attached as a 'boiler plate' on all press releases. The primary purpose of the information guidelines was to ensure coordination and to prevent 'unseemly competition' among agencies. Information coordination was also important for security reasons. The principles drawn up by LPI for the operation noted that 'information dissemination and publicity should be well coordinated and issued in a manner that does not put emergency workers at risk' (LPI, 1997b, November).

### **Guidelines for the Coordination of Media Information**

1. That the operation be called the Somalia Flood Response.
2. That the media be appraised of the determined shift from what was perceived as unseemly competition to coordinated information flows among agencies and NGOs.
3. That the respective agencies or NGOs speak in their own area of competence i.e. WFP on food distribution; UNICEF or NGOs on health issues.
4. That 2 and 3 above be facilitated by the daily provision of very brief updates to the UNICEF Somalia office as coordination point.
5. That WFP/FSAU Somalia provide daily updates on the flood and agricultural situation to the information coordination officer at UNICEF Somalia.
6. That UNDOS provide satellite maps of affected areas and rainfall patterns every 10 days to the information coordination officer.
7. That UNDP compile a daily brief and send out to the information officers involved.
8. That press releases by agencies or NGOs should also contain a condensed version of the brief to ensure the media are informed of the activities of the Somalia Flood Response as a whole.
9. That the names and contact numbers of all information officers be carried on all print information sent out.
10. That agency and NGO badges, caps etc. identity be abandoned except where security is involved.
11. That donors should decide if they wish their logos to be used.
12. That the information officers call press conferences or briefings as required on behalf of the Somalia Flood Response.
13. That a 10-seater press flight be arranged ASAP funded by the media.

Source: SACB 1997, November 13

Journalists were briefed through daily situation reports compiled by the UNDP information officer from reports of UN agencies and NGOs in Somalia, and some Somali radio operators. These were faxed daily to some twenty print, radio and TV media, under the title 'Somalia Inter-Agency Flood Response'. At beginning of December the reports were renamed 'SACB - Situation on the Ground'. As the operation wound down the updates became weekly, and later monthly.

#### **15.3 Uses of the Media**

Prior to the floods, public interest and media attention on Somalia had declined. Donor fatigue was seen as a constraint to be overcome if the necessary resources were to be raised. The efforts of the agency information officers in Nairobi was crucial therefore in raising international interest in and awareness of the situation. Four channels were used for the dissemination of information: international and local press (including Somali print media), television (including CNN and the BBC World Service), radio (including the BBC Somali Service and RVOP), and the Internet with an SACB information website managed by the UNICEF Somalia Support Office (USSC).

During the Phase I of the Flood Response, the media was utilised in four main ways:

#### **To mobilise international interest in and donor support for the Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation**

On 11 November the UNDP and UNICEF press officers organised a flight for ten journalists over Kismayo and Bardera, including CNN, BBC World Service TV, BBC Somali Service,

AFP, AP, and the Times of London. The flight was paid for by the journalists. Concern was expressed by some agencies at the time that the Flood Response was not yet operational and there was therefore nothing to see. However, the insistence of the Flood Response Coordinator that the flight should go ahead was seen by others as an important first step in generating funding. Up until that point there was a certain skepticism that Somalis were 'crying wolf' (Booth, 1998, May 21).

Flash Appeals were issued with press releases. In early November the Coordinator of the Inter-Agency Flood Response issued a press release on the urgent need for helicopters and boats:

Unless we get helicopters and boats now, immediately, we may as well as hang our hats to it. Instead of saving lives, we will be helping to bury the dead. Thousands of people will die (SACB, 1997, November 9).

#### As a public information service for the Somali public

The BBC Somali Service and RVOP provided public health warnings and health prevention messages at the start of the Rift Valley Fever and cholera outbreak. The first airdrops by WFP of food into Gedo region in December were preceded by a weekend of public awareness broadcasts on the BBC Somali Service, warning people not to crowd the drop zones or to fire at aircraft (Daily Nation 1997, December 9). In support of this, particular effort was made to facilitate visits by BBC Somali Service reporters, including travelling with one of the helicopter operations.

#### For social mobilisation in Somalia

Cooperation between Somalis and the Flood Response Operation were highlighted. Sympathetic reporting was encouraged to counter the negative image of Somalia. Effort was made to ensure Somali journalists regularly received information; the floods were reported in the Hargeisa press. A US\$1,000 personal donation by Somaliland's President for flood victims in southern Somalia was widely publicised as an example for other Somalis and African leaders to follow (SACB, 1997, November 16). The BBC Somali Service was asked to publicise the 'tremendous cooperation among all Somalis' (Geldof, 1997, November 18). The Daily Nation carried an article on a voluntary committee in Mogadishu that was raising funds to assist flood victims, and on elders in Bur Hakaba who were rehabilitating a bridge at their own cost (Daily Nation 1997, November 28).

Equally efforts construed as 'opportunistic' were denounced. In mid-November, local boat owners in Mareerey were reported to be asking exorbitant payments to rescue people stranded on dykes, and militia at Kismayo airport were asking for payments from agencies to secure relief flights. In response to this, the operation enlisted the help of the BBC Somali Service to appeal to the Somali public to denounce such actions (Geldof, 1997, November 18).

#### To exert pressure on Somalis to cooperate with the international response

In a press release aimed at the Somali faction leaders who were meeting in Cairo, the UN Secretary General stated:

Delivery of assistance will depend on the support of the Somali faction leaders (SACB, 1997, November 10).

In December, foreign aid workers with CINS were taken hostage and there was mounting insecurity in Mogadishu and Middle Shabelle. This forced the withdrawal of international staff of aid agencies, thus jeopardising cholera response operations. In response the Chair of the SACB issued a strongly worded press release. This stated that, at a time when over 1,600 people have died and over 250,000 had been displaced by floods:

The irresponsible behaviour of a few Somali individuals is seriously jeopardising the lives of thousands of children and families in Mogadishu threatened by cholera and hunger...The lives of the Somali people are now in the hands of the Somali people (SACB, 1998, December 15).

In a later press release, the SACB Chair noted that:

...it is crucial that the security of aid personnel and their equipment and installation be assured and guaranteed....the flow of supplies must not be impeded by hindering factors such as local taxes and other formalities....I urge you to take all necessary measures to ensure the efforts of the international community receives the appropriate co-operation and support...(Brauzzi, 1998 November 25).

#### **15.4 The SACB Flood Response Website**

In the three years since the last UNOSOM personnel withdrew from Somalia there has been a great expansion in the communication tool kit available for humanitarian operations, with developments in the Internet, email, radio and telecommunications. There is more information on Somalia available on the Internet than there was three years ago. USAID FEWS, the activities of most UN programmes, and some NGO programmes in Somalia can all be accessed through Relief Web or individual websites. UNDOS has plans to compile information on Somalia on CD-ROM. The Internet, email, sitor, and satellite telephone communication has increased the potential speed of information flow. Mobile telephones are available in some parts of Somalia. Despite the 'chaos', Somalia is not totally missing out on the informational revolution, though access remains in the hands of the minority.

An innovative response of the flood relief operation in Phase I was the creation of the *SACB Inter-Agency Coordination Flood Response* website. Started on 14th November, the website was embedded within the UNICEF Somalia website and managed by USSC staff. Set up in the name of SACB, with information on 12 agencies (UN and NGOs) involved in the flood response, it was the first inter-agency website set up for Somalia.

Daily sitreps, logistical information, river levels, rainfall, airstrip and road conditions, and funding tables were all posted. The website was also linked to FEWS and the DHA Relief Web. The site offered visitors the ability to contribute financially or materially to the flood response. The last information included on the flood website was 7th April. Since then updates on flood affected areas are carried in the UNCT Monitor, also available on the Internet.

## **15.5 Principal Findings**

### **15.5.1 Media Coverage**

UN offices do not receive copies of press clippings from overseas offices, and press agencies themselves do not keep data on the uptake of stories. With no formal records of 'hits' in the press, or on TV or radio, the extent of media coverage of the floods and the Inter-Agency Response is difficult to gauge. The majority of the 41 press clippings read by the Evaluation Team were from Kenyan newspapers, like the Daily Nation; a potentially important source of information for the large Somali population in Kenya with links to southern Somalia.

The Flood Response Operation, however, did generate considerable media coverage of Somalia, particularly in its first few weeks. To an extent the information officers were helped in this by the fact that there was little other dramatic news in East Africa. By late December Somalia was competing with the Kenyan elections for attention. By the beginning of Phase II media interest had declined.

### **15.5.2 Mobilisation of Donor Support**

Visibility is achieved through media coverage, but drawing a direct link between media coverage and donor and public response is difficult. Those working in the Central Zone did feel that a lack of media coverage was one reason why they had few resources to work with, as explained by the OIC:

The eyes of the world were on the Juba. The flood was pernicious in the Shabelle, it was a grandstand CNN show in the Juba. We did not get the resources here because the floods were slower. In the Juba it was a more dramatic fast onset disaster. There was the expectation of the CNN factor, and donor dollars flowing. (McTyre, 1998 June 23).

The relationship between the media and donor response, however, is more complex than the 'CNN factor' suggests, with domestic politics and national interests needing to be factored in. Important also is the working relationship established between donors and aid agencies. In Somalia the relationship between donors and agencies through the SACB was important in generating a swift response (see Funding section below). The media's focus on the Juba was in part centred around the operation's need for helicopters. Decisions on which areas to cover therefore were the choice of the UN, not CNN.

### **15.5.3 Inter-Agency Media Coverage**

The coordinated media strategy and the presentation of the Flood Response Operation as an inter-agency initiative helped avert inter-agency competition. From the coverage reviewed by the Evaluation Team, the impression is that media coverage was UN controlled, and that this was very much a UN operation. While information on INGOs was incorporated in daily situation reports, they received relatively little press coverage. The exception was CARE, who are one of the few INGOs with a dedicated information officer in the region.<sup>2</sup>

While reference was made to the inter-agency response, there was difficulty in presenting the SACB to the media. Most articles can be traced to individual agencies. Information officers develop personal links with the media as members of an agency. Outside of Somalia (and even in Somalia) the SACB is not widely known, while agencies like UNICEF, CARE or SCF are household names. Therefore journalists will tend to name such agencies as their source. While the coordinated approach helped avert competition, it is possible that it may also have limited the fundraising potential.

Inter-agency competition was not totally absent. It was apparent during the visit of WFP's director to Bardera, when agency T-shirts and caps were distributed, suggesting that locally agreed codes are not always followed by agencies' headquarters. UNICEF's media coverage of their boat operations in the Shabelle is said to have so incensed local staff of the agency the boats belonged to that they painted their names all over them. In Lower Shabelle the Evaluation team noted that agencies had written their names on irrigation bridges rehabilitated through their funds. An agency name-plate next to a village of former displaced seemed particularly distasteful. Generally, however, 'unseemly' inter-agency competition was absent. No armed guards were seen carrying agency stickers - a great improvement on UNOSOM days. This indicates that it is possible to deliver a relief programme without resorting to a 'sticker war'.

It appears that it was mainly among donors, rather than aid agencies, that concern for public profile was highest. Several special press releases were made announcing individual donors contributions to the flood response operation. One donor in particular complained to the USSC information officer that their contribution had not received adequate press coverage. The reason given was that donor representatives needed such profile to garner support from their capitals.

#### **15.5.4 Media as a Public Information Service**

Information usually came too late to use the media, particularly radio, to warn people of flooding. In one instance it was proposed that the operation should enlist the support of the BBC Somali Service to advise Somalis in Jowhar to open canal gates to prevent flooding downstream. The notion was rejected on the grounds that it was interfering in Somali affairs (Frauenrath, 1998, May 31). There is evidence, however, that health warnings on the BBC Somali Service and RVOP about Rift Valley Fever were listened to, that peoples' behaviour about slaughtering livestock changes, and cholera prevention messages had an impact.

The impact of efforts to mobilise Somali self-help initiatives through the media is unclear. However, TV images of floods in the Juba valley did raise awareness of the critical situation among people in Mogadishu, and may have helped mobilise the Mogadishu Flood Relief Committee.

#### **15.5.5 Principles and Standards**

In response to criticisms of media manipulation by aid agencies, and negative reportage by the media itself, a number of aid agencies have drawn up guidelines for their work with the media. One example is the principle on information and publicity adopted by the *International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and NGO Code of Conduct for Disaster Response Programmes* (see box). In formulating the guidelines for the coordinated approach

to media and public information management, reference was not made to the principles or guidelines on media relations and standards of reporting that exist in many agencies. The formal guidelines on the media that do exist between agencies for Somalia relate to security issues such as hostage crises.

There was an implicit assumption by information officers that the basic code of ethics of journalism should apply, namely fair, well informed, accurate, and neutral journalism (Frauenrath, 1998 July 6). Based on the guidelines drawn up for the Flood Response Operation, the Evaluation suggests there is merit in agencies working in Somalia formulating a standard code or set of principles for working with the media.

**International Red Cross/Red Crescent Movement and NGO Code of Conduct for  
Disaster Response Programmes**

**Principle 10:**

**In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects.**

Respect for the disaster victim as an equal partner in action should never be lost. In our public information we shall portray an objective image of the disaster situation where the capacities and aspirations of disaster victims are highlighted, and not just their vulnerabilities and fears.

While we will co-operate with the media in order to enhance the public response, we will not allow external or internal demands for publicity to take precedence over the principle of maximising overall relief assistance.

We will avoid competing with other disaster response agencies for media coverage in situations where such coverage may be to the detriment of the service provided to the beneficiaries or to the security of our staff or the beneficiaries.

(ODI, 1994 September: 13).

### **15.5.6 Compassion with Understanding**

As a result of the perceived failure of the 1991-1993 intervention, Somalia has a negative international image. The role of humanitarian aid agencies in crises such as in Somalia and Rwanda has also come under media scrutiny. In quiet times, information officers strive to present positive images of Somalia.

From the evidence of newspaper articles covering the floods reviewed by the Evaluation Team, reporting on Somalia was generally positive. However, there were very few examples of articles presenting a more a contextual analysis of Somalia and humanitarian aid. Most articles seen by the Evaluation Team reported facts about the emergency, and the need for resources. The exceptions seen were some press pieces by CARE which tried to contrast positively the 1997 Flood Response with the 1992 intervention. These were controversial among agencies, as their use of quotes from a former US marine were seen as a potential security threat.

Balancing the need to generate interest and funds, the need to report accurately, and to inform is the difficult task of information officers, and one that is not unique to Somalia. The massive

and controversial media coverage of the famine in Sudan is a case in point. Some felt the balance of coverage in the Somalia floods was right, others that the opportunity for generating more thoughtful material was missed (Driscoll, 1998, July 10). What remains problematic is how to maintain media and international interest in the absence of major crises.

### **15.5.7 The Flood Website**

The Flood Website was an innovative experiment in the use of the Internet for dissemination of information about an emergency as it develops. The extent to which the website was utilised by those outside the Flood operation is unknown, as the system for recording 'hits' was not up and running.<sup>3</sup> Information from the daily situation reports posted on the web, in particular the death tolls, did appear in newspaper articles. However, this information was also disseminated by fax. It is not known whether any financial contributions were made by people visiting the website. Although the site was widely advertised, only one INGO interviewed was aware that the website was utilised by their headquarters.

The website was established at the beginning of the emergency and therefore developed on a somewhat ad hoc basis. Time constraints meant that information included on the site was selective. There is a lack of continuity in some of the information. FEWS rainfall data was only included up to the 26 November, while the funding status was updated only to 1 December. The accuracy of some information, such as the cumulative death tolls of humans and livestock, is doubted. However, demographic information on Somalia is always tentative, and these were estimates based on information fed back from agencies in Somalia.

The Flood Website demonstrated the potential of the Internet in emergency operations for the rapid dissemination of information.<sup>4</sup> Such a website, however, will be in competition with an increasing number of information websites such as IRIN. Consideration would need to be given to the additionality a dedicated website provides.

For any future operation, and with time available, consideration would need to be given to the type of information to be included, a system for monitoring the accuracy of information, and the possibility of links to other agency websites. Gender considerations may also be important, as evidence would suggest that more men than women have access to computers and the Internet worldwide.

Its use for dissemination within Somalia is limited as few, if any, Somalis in-country have access to the Internet. Outside Somalia there are a number of Somalia websites, and in the future, there may be merit in targeting these for information dissemination.

The website was a useful source of information for this Evaluation, and some material from the website is incorporated in this report. The potential of using such a tool for compiling and consolidating key information on an emergency should be considered.

## NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> Interview: Paganini, 1998, May 20)

<sup>2</sup> Elected to represent the INGOs to the media CARE was criticised by them for receiving too much coverage relative to their level of involvement in the region.

<sup>3</sup> Between 21 November and 11 December 1,507 'hits' were recorded.

<sup>4</sup> It has been suggested that the Flood Website could provide a model for other emergency programmes, such as Operation Lifeline Sudan (Kihara, 1998 June 3).

## 16. FUNDING

### 16.1 Introduction

A steady decline in humanitarian assistance to Somalia, from a peak in 1992, had left the UN, ICRC and many NGOs in Somalia in a fragile financial situation by mid-1997. The emergency response to the drought that preceded the floods had largely been financed within existing resources. Six weeks prior to the floods the UNCT announced that only 31% of the funding requirements of the 1996/97 CAP had been met (UNCT, 1997). The Humanitarian Coordinator in Somalia warned that a 'significant decrease [in] humanitarian aid has the potential to precipitate a repeat of the humanitarian crisis' (UNCT, 1997 September).

The Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation succeeded in securing the support of donors, who responded rapidly in cash and in kind. The Flood Response, as an inter-agency intervention, provided an opportunity for the UN to test the concept of joint programming and funding which had been introduced in the 1996/97 CAP, but had been poorly supported by donors. This section documents the strategies and modalities of fundraising for the Flood Response Operation.

### 16.2 The Flash Appeals

On 11<sup>th</sup> November, a 'Flash Appeal' for the 'Somalia Flood Response' was launched by the Humanitarian Coordinator, through DHA in Geneva. The Appeal requested a total of US\$9.6 million, including US\$ 4.6 million in supplies and US\$5 million in cash, and the use of between 2-10 helicopters (UNDP, 1997, November 11) (see table).

On the same day an appeal was also made for an emergency grant of US\$300,000 to the Relief Coordination Branch of DHA Geneva; the branch responsible for the coordination of responses to natural disasters. Parallel to this a request was submitted to the Military and Civil Defence Unit (MCDU) of DHA, by UNICEF Geneva and WFP Rome. The request was for 2 helicopters for UNICEF, and 8 hard bottomed boats for WFP (McDermott & Morton, 1997 November 11).

Once it became clear that no donor government was prepared to provide military helicopters, a further Flash Appeal was made on 19<sup>th</sup> November for US\$3.4 million to fund the cost of 4 mid-lift helicopters being hired from South Africa, and for a further 4 helicopters (UNDP, 1997, November 19). A total of \$13 million was therefore appealed for in cash and kind for the Somalia Flood Response operation.

#### Flash Appeal Requirements

Urgent Needs	Units
Helicopters	2-10
Aluminium boats (18ft; 2 tonnes)	30
Blankets (3 per family)	180,000
Plastic Sheeting (1 per family, of 4.6 metres)	60,000
Ropes for sheeting (1 roll per family)	30,000
High protein biscuits (BP5) 1 carton/family/week	60,000

(continued over)

Cash	US\$ 5 million
Further Needs	Units
Resettlement kits	60,000
Water jerrycans (25 litres collapsible)	60,000
Chlorine (50 kg drum)	200
Supermix	1,000
ORS (cartons)	500
Emergency Medical Kits	500

Source: UNDP, 1998, November 11.

## 16.3 Principal Findings

### 16.3.1 Income

Donors responded swiftly to the Emergency Rescue and Relief phase of the flood response. At the first 'Enlarged' meeting of the SACB on 7th November four of the major donors - the EC, the US, Italy and Britain - indicated a readiness to respond, and the US government committed itself to providing 50,000 HDRs. With the exception of the helicopters, the Appeals were successful, with donors actually contributing more than the US\$13 million requested for the emergency operation (see funding table breakdown).

Two sources of information on funding were available to the Evaluation Team - the January 1998 SACB Flood Emergency Management Team Report, and the 1998 CAP. The breakdown of funding is recorded differently in the two reports, leaving some variance in the records. The main one being that OCHA records funds received by ICRC. The 'over funding' of the \$13 million Appeal is in part accounted for by the inclusion of ICRC funds. The Evaluation Team has used the report of OCHA for March 1998, on the assumption that this represents the most complete public record.


**International Response to the Flash Appeal for the Somalia Flood Emergency Phase I  
4 March 1998**

Donor	Description	In Kind	In Cash	ENIGSO/OPS	UNICEF	WFP	DIAHOOD	SCF/UK	World Vision	RC/RCRC	Donor's Org	Subtotal	DATA	Total US\$
Canada	Emergency Operations		179,856							179,856				179,856
Denmark	Emergency Operations		530,361		305,810						224,551	not provided		530,361
	1,900 mt's food	x												0
														Subtotal 530,361
Egypt	Supplies		10,000		10,000									10,000
Rinland	Emergency health needs		93,808		93,808									93,808
France	Helicopter Operations		250,000		250,000									250,000
Germany	Food for flood victims		116,279				116,279							116,279
Ireland	Emergency Operations		74,962											74,962
Italy	Supplies (Supermix)		300,000		300,000									300,000
	Food for flood victims		1,000,000			1,000,000								1,000,000
	Supplies		145,000		145,000									145,000
	Emergency Operations		500,000									500,000		500,000
														Subtotal 2,490,049
Japan	Logistics		946,000			546,000						not provided		946,000
	2500 mt food	x												0
														Subtotal 946,000
Liechtenstein			14,085											14,085
Netherlands	Relief/Operational costs		2,000,000		500,000					1,500,000				2,000,000
Norway	Emergency Operations		40,000											40,000
	Freight for BPs		120,000		120,000									120,000
	10 motor boats		130,000		130,000									130,000
	6,000 cartons BPS		260,000		260,000									260,000
	15,000 jerricans		60,000		60,000									60,000
														Subtotal 2,624,085
Sweden	Operational costs/ supplies		396,936		396,936									396,936
Switzerland	Emergency operations		200,000			200,000								200,000
United Kingdom	Emergency shelter & food		416,666											416,666
	Shelter: potable water, medical supplies		416,666					416,666						416,666
	Survival kits, water/sanitation		416,666						416,666					416,666
	Logistics operation		416,666		416,666									416,666
														Subtotal 2,263,600




### Donor Contributions (Cash & DIK)

(Source: 1998 Consolidated Appeal)



### Funding by Agency (Cash & DIK)

(Source: 1998 Consolidated Appeal)



## Funding

Donor	Recipient*	DIK Value US\$	Cash US\$	Subtotal
Arab League	22 mts dates	44,000		44,000
Band Aid	UNICEF		800,000	800,000
Denmark	UNICEF		300,000	300,000
DFID	SCF UK		400,000	
DFID	World Vision		400,000	
DFID	UNICEF		400,000	1,200,000
DHA/SDR	WFP		211,000	211,000
DHA/Norway	WFP		38,800	38,800
DHA	WFP		50,000	50,000
DHA/OPEC	WFP		145,500	145,500
DHA/Liechtenstein	WFP		13,700	13,700
DHA/Japan	WFP		388,000	388,000
ECHO 1	WFP		1,143,000	
ECHO	UNICEF		262,000	
EU	UNICEF		300,000	1,705,000
Egypt	32 bales blankets; 24 crts medicine, 39 crts food items	16,000		16,000
Finland	UNICEF		91,000	91,000
France	UNICEF		253,000	253,000
German NatCom	UNICEF		91,000	91,000
Germany	Diakonia		115,000	115,000
Italy	103 bales blankets, 240 rolls plastic sheeting, 2 boats with engines, 2 medical kits D&F, 6 medical emergency kits	142,000		
Italy	WFP		1,000,000	
Italy	UNICEF		300,000	1,442,000
Japan	WFP		546,500	546,500
Luxembourg	UNICEF		133,000	133,000
Netherlands	UNICEF		487,000	487,000
Norway	UNICEF		118,000	
Norway	10 motor boats; 15,000 jerrycans; 6,000 crts BP5	447,000		565,000
Spanish NatCom	UNICEF		195,500	195,500
Sweden	UNICEF		387,000	
Sweden	SCR		250,000	637,000
UNDP	WFP		200,000	
UNDP	UNICEF		338,000	538,000
UNHCR-Somalia	2,000 blankets	6,000		56,000
UNHCR Somalia	WFP		50,000	
OFDA/USAID	60,000 blankets, 748 crts plastic sheeting, 600 crts jerrycans, 100,000 HDR	752,000		
OFDA/USAID	World Vision		560,000	
OFDA/USAID	WFP		750,000	2,062,000
Various	World Vision		200,000	200,000
WFP	10,000 crts HoM biscuits, 4053 crts BP5, 11 boats	305,000		305,000
World Vision Australia	Various drugs	85,000		85,000
WHO	Various drugs	232,000		232,000
<b>Total value</b>		<b>2,029,000</b>	<b>10,917,000</b>	<b>12,946,000</b>

Source: SACB Flood Management Team. 1998, January.

\*UNICEF was the focal agency for receipt of DIKs.


Several points are notable about the funding.

- The total contributions made to the Flood Response in Somalia will probably never be known. NGOs were not specifically mentioned in the Appeal. Some agencies received extra assistance from their headquarters that was not recorded by OCHA.<sup>1</sup> Some agencies received permission from their donors to redirect some of their regular programme money for the emergency. The significant contributions made through and by Islamic NGOs is not recorded.
- Cash contributions exceeded donations in kind (DIK), and were for the most part flexible funds. This provided the operation with greater flexibility.
- The largest donors by far were the US, Dutch, Italian and British governments and ECHO.
- It is unclear how much was 'new money'. DFID's contribution to UNICEF, for example, was reassignment of funds agreed for drought preparedness. Of the US\$1.3 million Italian contribution to WFP, only \$300,000 was new money.
- It is claimed that Phase I of the Flood Response Operation succeeded in reaching its target of assistance to 60,000 families. The cost of this was \$13 million. ICRC claim to have reached 45,600 families<sup>2</sup>. On the basis of income recorded by OCHA, the cost of ICRC's operation was \$2.5 million. While it is probable that ICRC received more than the \$2.5 million reported, it initially suggests a difference in the cost efficiency of the UN and ICRC operations. However, full information was not available to the Evaluation Team on the type and quantity of supplies provided by ICRC to warrant such a conclusion (see section on Response Effectiveness).
- No consolidated expenditure reports were produced to match the consolidated funding tables. It is unclear whether this reflects a lack of interest among donors or the UN agencies for such a report. However, the majority of donor contributions in cash and kind went to the Flood Response operation in the Middle and Lower Juba, with other areas receiving only minimal contributions.

### **16.3.2 Donations in Kind**

The largest DIKs were made by the US and Norwegian governments. African donations and Arab donations were mainly in kind, with Egypt providing blankets, drugs and food, and the Arab League providing 22 mt of dates.

Agencies in general preferred to receive funding rather than DIKs, although DIKs were received quicker than funding (see below).<sup>3</sup> The main problem was that few donors paid for their freight. The type of boats provided by Norway, for example, were expensive to freight. Likewise the US donated 50,000 HDR, but were unable to transport it. Transport was therefore paid by UNICEF Natcom Germany.



### 16.3.4 Distribution of Funds

UNICEF received the largest share (36%) of the income, with WFP the second largest (25.1%) (see charts). These proportions increase significantly to 49.8% and 35.3% if ICRC's income is not included. A significant proportion of UNICEF's income was in the form of DIKs. It had been agreed by the SACB that UNICEF would be the focal point for receipt of DIKs (SACB, 1998 January).

Significantly, NGOs received only 13% of contributions to the Appeal, based on available information. NGOs were not specifically mentioned in the Flash Appeal, although some were listed on the SACB flood website. This reflected a policy of donors to channel their funds through the UN, and to restrict the funding possibilities for NGOs. As one INGO commented, the problem for them was that 'the UN took all the money'.<sup>4</sup>

The decision by ECHO to put US \$1.2 million through WFP for logistics, and a further 500,000 ECU to ICRC is significant in this respect. At the meeting of SACB on 13<sup>th</sup> November, ECHO indicated that it would make \$1.5 million available to NGOs (SACB, 1997, November 13). In the end only three NGOs received ECHO funding during the floods - Terra Nuova, InterSoS and MSF Belgium (Sayer, 1998, June 9). ECHO's main implementing partners tend to be NGOs, but in this operation contracts with them were few. The rationale behind this was twofold. First, that the UN was the only institution capable of providing the logistics support that was required for the operation (Haroon, 1998, June 30). The decision of ECHO (and other donors) to fund the UN logistics support operation removed the need for NGOs to pay for logistics.<sup>5</sup> Second, to avoid an 'uncontrolled relief intervention' with an influx of NGOs in search of funding (Kaspers, 1998, July 8). An influx of new inexperienced NGOs, it was argued, would increase security risks.

An additional strategy adopted by the UK's DFID to encourage collaboration between NGOs was to fund one agency to contract in another. SCF contracted in Oxfam to assist with implementing a sanitation programme in Beletweyne (Mansfield, 1998, July 31).

As already noted, one implication of the funding strategy to control the entry of NGOs, is that donor 'policy' took priority over a rigorous assessment of needs. A few donors did elect to provide direct support to those INGO partners who had a track record in Somalia.<sup>6</sup> Outside of

these official donors, NGOs had difficulties raising public contributions. SCF UK, for example, compare the £16,500 they received from the public for the Somalia floods to the hundreds of thousands of pounds raised in the appeal for the Sudan. Only one agency, CARE, applied for funding from the UN for local administrative, logistic and extra staff costs for the Somali NGOs they supported.<sup>7</sup>

The policy of restricting funding to NGOs is generally considered by donors to have been correct. However, there are certain contradictions. The response of NGOs, such as NCA in Gedo, or SCF in Beletweyne, are considered by donors to have been swifter and more efficient than the UN. Some INGOs report that donors have encouraged them to go direct to them for funding logistics costs in the future.<sup>8</sup> Such comparisons, however, are unfair as the scale, nature and responsibilities of the UN operation were very different to the localised response of NGOs.

### **16.3.5 Fundraising**

Most of the fundraising for the operation was done locally by the Coordinator of the Flood Response. A general complaint donors have of the UN is the poor quality of their funding proposals. According to donors, much of the success in raising resources was put down to the Coordinator's understanding of donor needs in terms of proposals and formats (Bierke, 1998, May 21).

In launching the Appeal, however, no funding strategy was elaborated with OCHA, or agencies' headquarters. OCHA did not hold a donor funding conference, and there was little consultation between the UN in Nairobi and OCHA over the Appeal (Beigbeder, 1998, August 12). This led to a certain lack of clarity in needs. For example, the request to MCDU for helicopters covered all four phases of the Flood Response - air and river rescue, the provision of assistance to the displaced and the resettlement of displaced (McDermott & Morton, 1997 November 11).

The Coordinator's fundraising efforts were helped by the fact that the operation took place under the umbrella of the SACB, that donors were involved in formulating the Plan of Action. It undoubtedly gave donors confidence to place funds through the UN. In addition, the operation for the most part received positive media support through the work of the information officers. Furthermore, the floods occurred at the end of the year when donors are often looking to spend unused funds, and there were no other acute crises at that time that needing support.

### **16.3.6 OCHA**

The Flash Appeal was handled in Geneva by the Relief Coordination Branch of DHA Geneva (now the Disaster Response Branch -DRB - of OCHA). The DRB is used to responding to disasters in countries with governments which are eligible to receive bilateral funds and have some internal capability of responding. In the view of some, however, the DRB was not prepared for the level of emergency in the Somalia floods (Beigbeder, 1998). No donor meetings were held or funding strategies discussed. The donation of funds via OCHA were transferred via UNDP headquarters leading to a delay in receipt of funds locally. On the basis of this experience, direct contributions to agencies would appear to have been more efficient.

### 16.3.7 FRM

As Coordinator of the Flood Response operation UNICEF was designated responsibility for the receipt and management of funds. As such it was intended that it should fulfill the role of Fund Recipient Manager (FRM) assigned to it in the 1996/97 CAP.

The FRM concept is peculiar to the UN in Somalia.<sup>9</sup> The mechanism was developed following the conclusion of an IASC mission to Somalia in 1996 that the UN programme in Somalia could be improved through Joint Programming. The intention was to create a more coherent UN programme and to promote a more rational use of resources. The 1996/97 CAP outlined five Joint Programmes and three Joint Projects. Each Joint Programme had an Executive Committee with either UNDP, UNICEF, WFP or UNHCR as its Chair. The Chairs were mandated to 'animate, facilitate and coordinate' the Joint Programme. Their authority was enhanced by being made the recipient of all funds. As originally envisaged in 1996, the FRM would receive all funds earmarked for Joint Programmes or projects at their headquarters under an open trust fund scheme and with specific local accounts for Joint Programmes (UNCT, 1988). The Executive Committee would then to decide on the distribution of unearmarked funds in an open and transparent manner. The idea was to create a common pot and that agencies could 'do more with less' (UNDHA, 1996 December). It should also ensure inter-agency collaboration and integrated programmes.

Donor response to Joint Programming has been minimal. For example, UNICEF received only 5% of the specified requirements in the 1996/97 CAP for Joint Programming, in contrast to 14% for other agency requirements (Spring, 1997 September 26). The funds received were for emergency preparedness (later utilised in the Flood Response). Within the UN system in Somalia 'jointness' has worked with common services, such as the UN Combined Air Service. It is currently being promoted through the concept of joint UN offices. In programming terms, however, it has been less successful as agencies have found it administratively difficult to adopt (Gourdin & Lazarus, 1998, May 30). The floods provided an opportunity to further test the concept.

During the Flood Response the FRM partially worked as it was intended. Donors were directed to make their contributions directly to UNICEF as the FRM and focal point for all contributions made to the Flood Flash Appeal. In both Flash Appeals the only address given for contributions was UNICEF Somalia in Nairobi. OCHA also advised donors to put their funding through UNICEF. However, the FRM was not explained to donors. Donors interviewed during the Evaluation claimed not to be aware of the FRM system, and therefore were initially unclear how to make their contributions (Boyle, 1998, May 26; Mansfield, 1998, June 3).

UNICEF did receive most donations, and UNICEF did receive all DIKs. However, an early decision was made by UNICEF to direct donors contributions for logistics directly to WFP for the logistics operation. The Evaluation Team heard complaints that UNICEF did receive resources for logistics that should have gone to WFP. UNICEF, however, are categorical that these were funds specifically earmarked for UNICEF logistics such as the airlift of BP 5s, and Norwegian boats from Europe (Kilemi, 1998, June 2; Metenier, 1998, July 2).

A key sticking point with the FRM mechanism is agency overheads. UN agency headquarters

charge a levy on all funds received by agencies. For UNICEF the headquarter levy is 3% of any funds received in Kenya.<sup>10</sup> For WFP the levy varies between 6% and 13.9% depending on whether the operation is emergency or development. Funds transferred from one agency to another would be subject to two headquarter levies. Donors are clearly not ready to pay double. UNICEF did pay the headquarter's levy.<sup>11</sup> However, double overheads were avoided by the FRM paying suppliers directly for goods or services to other agencies on the basis of invoices (Kilemi, 1998, June 2; Metenier, 1998, July 2). Other overhead costs were minimised by the fact that UNICEF did not charge Somalia programme support overheads during the emergency.<sup>12</sup>

During the Evaluation concerns were raised by UNDP that WFP was charging 'excessive' overheads of 10% on funds received for the Flood Response operation. The Evaluation Team found no evidence of this. The Evaluation Team found it strange that having established the FRM mechanism, UNDP was unclear how overheads were being dealt with by individual UN agencies.

There is some agreement among UN agencies that the FRM 'is a good idea, but does not work'. Criticism of the FRM arises at three levels: administrative, political and programmatic.

- Bureaucratically, the administrative and financial systems are not in place to enable the FRM system to work. Agency budgeting and financial systems are not compatible. It would require changing the means agencies use for charging overheads. No agency headquarters, particularly in a resource tight environment, would agree to lay aside the overheads. Competing demands between agencies' headquarters creates competition at a field level. Agency headquarters are unlikely to accept an their staff at the field level passing up the opportunity of direct funding. The transfer of funds between agencies is slow. (Contributions to the Flash Appeal received by OCHA were not disbursed for five months). The FRM agency will be reluctant to be accountable for the activities of another agency. Furthermore, in a financially difficult environment the FRM does not allow for donor pledges or letters of intent, which are essential for agencies like WFP (Oberle, 1998 June 3).
- Programmatically, potential problems could arise where the mandate of the FRM differs from that of other agencies in the joint programme. An uneven distribution of funding for different elements of a joint programme could lead to inefficiencies including delays in implementation.
- Politically, the FRM system offers donors a greater range of funding options. The customary means of contributing to UN agencies through multi-lateral donations has in recent years changed to direct multilateral funding, with donors earmarking funding for a country, area of a country or region. As such, donors are able to be more directive. Some donors are particular about the agencies that they support. The joint programming and FRM mechanism takes this a step further as donors can contribute to a specific joint programme or project, to any number of projects within a joint programme, or to a set of activities within a project. This creates the potential for greater micro-management of programmes by donors. Greater donor selectivity can weaken the global capacity of an agency.

On the positive side it could be argued that the FRM mechanism forces agencies to coordinate, who otherwise would not. However, this does not necessarily lead to coherent policies, or the correct strategies.

### 16.3.8 Timeliness

Donors are praised for being 'generous and swift' in their response. However, while contributions of over US\$ 5 million had been committed by 13<sup>th</sup> November, it took much longer for these resources to materialise (SACB, 1997 November 13) (see table below). The problem arises from both donors and UN agencies' headquarters.

UNICEF Somalia received its first cash donation (from France) two weeks after the Appeal was launched. After one month it had received less than 25 % of the Appeal requirements. One donor issued a letter pledging money to UNICEF on 10th December. The money did not arrive until June 1998, six months later. Perhaps more surprisingly, contributions received through OCHA only became available in May, some six months after the appeal was launched.

UNICEF is unable to act upon a pledge, and can only call forward funds once the money has arrived in the bank. According to WFP, there have been so many retractions on pledges by donors that they are not allowed to spend money before they have it in the bank. As a result of the delay between pledges and receipts both UNICEF and WFP were advanced money from their headquarters. UNICEF was only able to start the operation because of an advance EPF (Emergency Programme Funds) of US \$1,000,000 to cover air operations. This was provided in two installments, on 12<sup>th</sup> November and 4<sup>th</sup> December, but had to be repaid by the end of December.

WFP funding is tied to the delivery of food, making funding precarious. Where there is no food, there are no funds. It was assumed by WFP that UNICEF would release funds to WFP for the logistics operation. However, when only pledges were received from donors WFP had to approach Rome for US \$400,000 advance on the assumption that food would become an issue once the floods receded (Oberle 1998, May 25). A further US\$700,000 was raised, effectively by mortgaging the office (von Meijenfheldt, 1998 July 3). In December 1997, it had been agreed that all money received through OCHA should go to WFP to cover the shortfall for the cost of logistics (Metenier, 1998, July 2). The delay in the transfer of funds from OCHA was problematic. In late January WFP advised donors that due to a funding shortfall for logistics, WFP had been instructed by its headquarters to phase down operations and close the Garissa and Mombassa bases as of the end of January (SACB, 1998, January 22). At the end of February the airlift for Phase II was scaled down while new pledges from donors were negotiated, and it resumed in March.

Donor contributions of DIKs were more timely than the cash donations (see tables below). However, the UN was only able to respond as soon as it did because of the stockpiled and pre-positioned supplies UNICEF held in Kenya and Somalia. Some DIKs did not always arrive on time. An Italian government donation of 2 boats and plastic tarpaulin and medicine arrived on 19<sup>th</sup> December.

In contrast donor funding for NGOs was transferred much faster, one reason why NGOs could respond more rapidly.

## Timing of Cash Contributions

Donors	US \$ (000)	Date of Pledge	PBA Issued	Initiated	Week
France	253	20-11-97	27-11-97	Nbo/Gen/Pfo	2
Sweden	387	24-11-97	05-12-97	PFO	3
Norway	118	17-11-97	06-12-97	Geneva/NBO	3
German Nat	97	18-11-97	05-12-97	Geneva	3
Finland	91	26-11-97	12-12-97	Geneva	4
ECHO	262	26-11-97	18-12-97	NBO	5
Netherlands	487	09-12-97	16-12-97	NBO/PFO	5
Denmark	296	08-12-97	22-12-97	Geneva	6
Luxemburg	133	18-12-97	14-01-98	Geneva	9
Spain Nat	197	21-11-97	14-01-98	NBO	9
UK	404	22-11-97	26-01-98	NBO	11
South Africa	91		11-02-98	NBO/Geneva	13
Band Aid	805	12-12-97	11-02-98	NBO	13
Oman	97	17-02-98	17-03-98	PFO	18
Italy	300	10-12-98		PFO	+ 23
Total: 15	4018				

(Source: Beigbeder, 1998) UNDP also contributed US\$ 338,000.

## Timing of Donations in Kind

Donors	Description	US \$ (000)	Date arrival	Initiated	Transport	Week
Norway	10 motor boats	130	19-11-97	Geneva	UNICEF	1
USA	100,000 HDRs	200	19-11-97 29-11-97	Geneva	UNICEF	1
USA	60,000 blankets	366	17-11-97	NBO	USA	1
	748 ctn plastic	141	25-11-97			2
	600 ctn jerrycans	45	29-11-97			2
UNHCR	2,000 blankets	6	Nov. 97	NBO	---	2
Norway	6,000 boxes of BP5	259	03-12-97	Gen/Nbo	Norway	3
Norway	15,000 Jerrycans	58	16-12-97 18-12-97	Geneva	Norway	5 5
Egypt	32 bales blankets 24 ctn drugs 39 ctn food	16	19-12-97	NBO	Egypt	5
Arab League	22 Mt of dates	44	22-12-97	NBO	Arab League	6
Italy	103 bales blankets	142	23-12-97	NBO	Italy	6
Total		1,407				

(Source: Beigbeder, 1998)

### 16.3.9 Long Term Funding Needs

The generosity of donors to the Flood Response needs to be set in a context of declining humanitarian assistance to Somalia, a problem even faced by ICRC who were under pressure to spend cautiously (Cuttat, 1998, May 25). Prior to the floods there was a recognition that donor fatigue was in part related to a feeling that nothing was being achieved in Somalia. As one NGO worker explained, there was an assumption that 'everybody is doing a bad job'. (Ahmed, 1998, May 26). The floods were a visible emergency where resources could be seen to be having an impact on lives, and donors responded.

However, donors clearly have problems dealing with the chronic nature of the needs in Somalia. Like the 1991-1993 intervention which saved lives, but left chronic needs unaddressed, donors were prepared respond rapidly to the 1997 floods, but were much slower in responding to post-flood rehabilitation needs left in its wake. In the flood affected regions of southern Somalia chronic problems of malnutrition, food insecurity, and tattered social services remain unresolved.

Some agency representatives recognise they have a responsibility to better articulate to donors the impact of their work (Paganini, 1998 May 20). This is true. A more rationale and efficient use of resources, and a greater investment in Somalia rather than Nairobi by all agencies and donors would also undoubtedly help. With the shift to developmental programming in Somalia, the use of the CAP has changed. The Flash Appeal process is utilised for raising funds for an acute emergency within a chronic emergency. The presentation of the CAP as an 'integrated programme' document should be reviewed. As an appeal document for country in a complex emergency there should be a prioritisation of humanitarian needs. However, in the global context of declining oda, such 'technical' solutions by themselves may be insufficient.

### NOTES

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<sup>1</sup> ACORD received funds from its headquarters. SCF UK received private public donations in UK, the value of staff seconded to the operation, such as ACF staff, is not recorded.

<sup>2</sup> ICRC reported that by the end of December 1997, 228,000 affected people had been assisted with high protein biscuits, basic shelter materials and medical supplies (ICRC, 1998, Feb).

<sup>3</sup> Some donors prefer to provide DIKs for domestic reasons. For Norway, for example, the production of BP-5 biscuits is a means of subsidising their farmers.

<sup>4</sup> Interviewed in Nairobi 1998 May 26.

<sup>5</sup> Although some NGOs complained that they still had to meet the costs of unloading and storage on the ground.

<sup>6</sup> This included the UK DFID support to SCF UK, DFID and USAID to World Vision, the Swedish government to Swedish Church Relief, and the German Government to DBG.

<sup>7</sup> Some of these costs were reportedly still being disbursed in June at the time of the Evaluation. While the sums are small they are significant for a Somali NGO (ABI Hussein, 1998, July 3).

<sup>8</sup> Interviews with: Mulcahy' 1998, June 17; Roderigues & Vechio, 1998, June 2.

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<sup>9</sup> Something similar is reported to exist in Afghanistan.

<sup>10</sup> During the floods it took one month for UNICEF headquarters to approve a waiver on charging overheads on the \$800,000 donation from Band Aid towards the helicopter operation. (Metenier, 1998, July 2).

<sup>11</sup> Except in the case of the BandAid donation.

<sup>12</sup> UNICEF charge up to 25% for Nairobi and in-country overhead charges on regular programmes. As there was no budget for the floods, administrative costs were not itemised. Since the floods UNICEF now charge overheads on emergency budget lines (Metenier, 1998, July 2)

## 17. RESPONSE EFFECTIVENESS

### 17.1 Introduction

As measures of effectiveness of the Flood Response Operation, the Evaluation Team were asked to examine whether *'the target population was reached'* and the *'cost-effectiveness'* of the operation.

### 17.2 'Reaching' the target population

Across the agencies involved in the operation, there was little standardisation on reporting standards. The variety of reporting periods, geographic zones and assistance sectors covered, differences in what constitutes a basic relief package, assumptions of family size, and the interpretations of what truly represents 'reaching' a population, made it difficult for the Evaluation Team to reach definitive conclusions.

Various target figures were recorded at the early stages of the response. On 13<sup>th</sup> November at the SACB meeting figures were adopted of 800,000 people affected, and 200,000 in need of immediate rescue (SACB, 1997, Nov 13). Later it became established that the global target figure guiding the response operation was 60,000 families displaced (300,000 people), and anything up to 1 million people otherwise affected by the floods. (SACB, 1998, January)

The Emergency Flood Management Team reported that during the two months of the Phase I operation, a basic relief package is estimated to have reached 55,000 families in the Juba valley and 5,500 families in the Shabelle valley and conclude that *the majority of the displaced population (estimated at approximately 300,000 people) and part of the affected population (estimated at one million people) received support from this operation* (SACB, 1998, January).

In a later report provided to ECHO by UNICEF, they record that an estimated 71,500 families benefited from the receipt of a basic emergency package (UNICEF, 1998, June 22).

The majority of relief materials distributed by NGOs including ARC, CEFA, COSV, DBG, IMC, NPA, SCR, SCF, UNOPS, WC and WV were provided by the UN and so are recorded in the above presentations. SCF(UK), WV and DBG received direct donor support for part of their activities, which may translate into results not included above.

WFP reported that a total of 4,063.67mt of food commodities were distributed in response to the floods in Southern Somalia. Assuming an average full ration of 96kg, serving a family of 6 for one month, this amounts to 42,329 full rations (or 253,979 people for a month). Due to differences in the assessed capacities of certain target groups, and hence ration sizes they received, WFP claim to have reached 344,090 people in Phase I. (WFP, 1998, January 7)

Examination of figures made available to the Evaluation Team in July 1998 shows that approximately 1,332mt of this figure appears to have been distributed in September 1997, 70mt throughout October and November, and 2,325mt distributed in December, of which 1,008 was consigned to Bay Region. (See the detailed breakdown of WFP distributions over those 4 months in Section 8.) Since the food element within the relief packages provided by other agencies was limited to one or two weeks supply of 'emergency food items', WFP distributions of maize, beans and oil (considering only October, November and December totals) represent an important complementary input sufficient to support 150,000 people fully for one month. If the assumption is made that the September consignments became available for consumption during Phase I - a further 100,000 people benefited from a one-month ration.

In summary of Phase I, if the UN figure of 60,500 families is taken, at an assumed family size of 6, this represents a total of 302,500 people. Making the above assumptions with regard to WFP, their food assistance represents support for approximately 250,000 people during the same period.

**The Evaluation Team conclude that the target figure of 60,000 families (at 6 persons per family) received emergency relief assistance within Phase I of the Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation, as did a proportion of the wider affected population.**

Although ICRC was not officially part of the Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation, over the period of 7th-30th November, they report reaching 97,950 beneficiaries (ICRC, 1997, Dec 1) and that by the end of December, 228,000 affected people had been assisted with high protein biscuits, basic shelter materials and medical supplies (ICRC, 1998, Feb). Further reports indicate reaching 151,000 people with 'non food and biscuits' and 112,000 with 'water and sanitation assistance'. Commencing early in Phase I, but over a period overlapping with Phase II, ICRC report that 258,500 people received 'seeds and protective food'. During the course of the operation, 608mt of seed and 2,326mt of food assistance were distributed, although this again includes activities undertaken in 1998 (ICRC, Feb, 1998).

It is clear that ICRC provided a significant complementary role in the emergency response. Since beneficiaries of one programme can also benefit from other programmes the Evaluation Team make the conservative assumption that ICRC offered support to at least 151,000 people during the period of Phase I, with a combination of emergency food, non-food items, and medical services. If one combines this figure with results of the Inter-Agency Operation, and assume that ICRC assistance covered a population that did not overlap with the UN reported achievements, it is fair to suggest that well over 500,000 people benefited overall during the period of Phase I. Recognised, though undocumented, were the considerable additional contributions made to support flood victims, through and by Islamic NGOs, particularly in the Shabelle regions. The likely 500,000+ beneficiaries overall of emergency support represents one-in-three of a total estimated population for Lower/Middle Juba, Gedo and Lower Shabelle of 1,471,920.

The total estimated population of Southern Somalia, including Middle Shabelle, Hiran and Bay & Bakool is approximately 3 million (an additional 1,572,000).

### 17.3 Cost Efficiencies

Data was available for the logistics sector, allowing some examination of the relative ranking of cost efficiencies of options chosen by, or forced upon, the response planners and managers in this area of the operation.

#### 17.3.1 Air Operations

By virtue of the conditions prevailing, the operation was characterised by a heavy reliance upon aircraft, with up to 40% of overall expenditures related to aircraft operation and related logistics.

No optimal transport model was developed, the operation grew on a basis of emerging needs, aircraft availability, and opportunities presented in stages by the success of the Appeal. Any idealised approach was naturally compromised by the need for urgency, the lack of lead-time in planning and establishing contracts, new systems, the lack of rehearsal, and the need to simultaneously pre-position relief materials, fuel and staff for intermediate and forward operational support.

The operation drew upon regional resources. Alongside the Somalia programme, WFP also managed the Kenya Flood Response and the Kenya Refugee Operation. This provided access to both expertise and economies of scale with regard to aircraft charter.

As the operation commenced, smaller aircraft were utilised to overcome difficulties in access. Based on available data, the following comparisons indicate approximate relative efficiencies.

#### SAMPLE AIRCRAFT EFFICIENCIES

**Andover:** 11-20 November, 11 rotations ex-Nairobi: Berbera, Belet Weyn, Garbahare, Jowhar, 53mt, (\$108,170/53.232mt) **\$2,032/mt**

**Buffalo:** 5Y-GAA, 22nd Nov to 2nd Dec, 16 rotations ex-Nairobi: Bardera, Kismayo. 6.4mt Average, average return block hrs 4; (fuel @ 1000l/hr @ \$0.2309/litre = \$923.6) + (4x\$1,995/hr = \$7,980) = \$8,903.6. **\$8,903/6.4 = \$1,391/mt**

**Buffalo:** 5Y-GBA, 20-30 Nov, 18 rotations ex-Nairobi Garbahare, Bardera, Saccouein, Kismayo. 7.7mt average, average return block hrs 3.2. (fuel @ 1000l/hr @ \$0.2309/litre = \$738.88) + (3.2x\$1,995/hr = \$6,384) = \$7,122.88. **\$7,122/7.7 = \$925/mt**

(continued overleaf)

**Twin Otter** ZS-NJK, 21-29 November, 9 rotations, mainly ex-Nairobi (some ex-Garissa), Garissa, Jamaame, Bardera. 9 rotations. Total uplift ex-Nairobi 7.8mt + one pax. Apparent under-utilisation, based on data to hand. Average payload: 0.87mt. Average return block hrs 4. (fuel @ 350litres/hr @ \$0.25av/litre = \$350) + (4x\$700/bh = \$2800) = \$3,150. \$3,150/0.87mt = \$3,620/mt (this may be somewhat misleading, the DHC-6 has considerable ability to carry bulk, and blankets, tarps and sandbags were carried forward. Also its short-field capabilities are comparable to the Cessna family of light singles permitting access denied to other aircraft)

**Grand Caravan** ex-Nairobi, 25th - 30th Nov. Jamaame, Some under-utilisation evident from summary data: 4 rotations. Total uplift Nairobi, 1.12mt + 36 pax.

**Hercules C-130** 59-CAI 27th November to 2nd Dec, Kismayo ex-Nairobi: 7 rotations, 18mt weight carried, on average. Average block hrs 4. (fuel @ 2,268litres/hr @ \$0.2309/litre = \$2,094 for 4 hrs) + (4 x \$2,395/aircraft block hr = \$9580) = \$11,674.  
Total /18mt = \$648/mt

*The above figures give an indication of direct air transport costs, and do not include fixed and variable charges for management staff, office, storage, handling, customs, overflight payments etc. which WFP averaged at around \$80 per MT. In addition the FOB/tonne value of commodities are: Maize \$170, Wheat \$165, Vegetable Oil \$695, Sorghum \$236, Lentils \$450. Utilisation is based on Waybill data.*

Clearly larger aircraft types, such as the Hercules C-130 prove more efficient in cost/tonne-forwarded terms. However, there was no landing strip available to the larger aircraft near to the majority of the flood-affected populations, and limited onward transportation available from Kismayo, where a C-130 could land. Operation managers were forced to employ smaller aircraft which could land on bush strips in order to position relief staff and required materials. Even then, optimal capacities were frequently compromised by the distances (requiring more fuel to be carried), less than favourable wind direction and strengths, and the need to carry bulky items, or arrive with reduced weight at destination (after fuel-burn) to permit safe short-field landings.

It was apparent that aircraft continued to be despatched from Nairobi direct to field locations, even after the intermediate logistics base at Garissa was established. This can in part be explained in the early days of the operation by the finding that the highway, Nairobi to Garissa, was unserviceable to larger vehicles for at least a week at the end of November, with some journeys taking 8-10 days.

Airdrops from the Hercules started on the 10th December ex-Mombasa to Garbarharay, forming a key part of the delivery matrix, serving Lower, Middle Juba and Gedo. Operating overheads in Mombasa were reduced by the warehousing having been provided to WFP by the US Government.

The operations ex-Garissa supported 221 rotations of aircraft in Phase I. Examination of all waybills indicates that very few aircraft departed Garissa carrying less than maximum useful payload. The data also records that landings were made at over 20 field locations in the south of Somalia, although the primary destinations were Kismayo and Bardera - to first establish and then service the helicopter, boat and localised land operations<sup>1</sup>.

### **17.3.2 The Cost of Helicopter Operations**

Within Phase I, two helicopters made a total of 42 rotations ex-Garissa; (ZS-RIR 6th-14th, LZ-CAR 10th-31st Dec, RA-22891 15th-31st Dec). Each carried an average of 2.6mt. The average return block hours each day was 7.6hrs. Each helicopter consumed around 800 litres of fuel/hr. Of this, 75% was uplifted in Garissa @ \$0.301/litre, 25% uplifted in the field at an average cost of \$ 0.492/litre. A total operating cost for the day is achieved by adding fuel to rental costs: \$2,120.4 + (7.6hrs x (\$1,500/hr(+ \$250/hr as proportionate share of positioning costs)) giving a figure of \$15,420.4 per day (7.6hrs). In Bardera, as an example, over 9 days between 11th December and 31st December helicopters helped forward 47.33mt of materials ex-Bardera to a number of isolated populations. This indicates that each helicopter moved 2 full-capacity loads forward each day (2 x 2.6mt).

If one assumes that 2.6mt were carried Garissa-Bardera, this gives a cost of around \$2000/mt for relief material delivered by helicopter over that period. At least half of the materials forwarded ex-Bardera had been pre-positioned by fixed wing aircraft already incurring costs, at times exceeding \$1000/mt, as shown in the above table. Given the inaccessibility of communities, and the distance of many operational bases from viable truck routes and a seaport, no other viable means of pre-positioning was available.

The helicopter operation was a costly exercise. In Bardera the 47.33mt of materials was targeted to benefit 4,434 people, over \$21/person for local transport of relief goods costing around \$14/person.

### **17.3.3 Boat Operations**

The boats provided ready access to isolated populations, and delivered both relief materials and health services directly to people in need. In contrast to the helicopter operations, where time spent on the ground was minimal, visits by boat permitted an appropriate period of discussion, information-sharing, needs assessment and provision of assistance to those most vulnerable or sick. The boat crews also ferried people across rivers and at times carried produce to market on behalf of villagers, thus supporting their own self-help efforts.

However, a number of constraints reduced their maximum effectiveness. Certainly, concerns over the security of expatriate boat operators precluded an expansion of the fleet. The 'imminent', though long delayed arrival of the helicopters, had the apparent effect of reducing additional investment in the boat operations.

The inappropriate 'recreational' design of the boats provided for the operation was a severe constraint, and was not corrected. Little consideration was given to the local construction of boats, or rafts and pontoons which could be towed, to maximise the outreach of the operations. The boat operation could have been mounted on a much

larger scale, using boats with greater carrying-capacities and fully employing local boats and Somalis as boat operators within a larger fleet.

#### **17.3.4 Road Transport Operations**

Over the period of the operation, relatively little material was delivered over-land, due to the condition of main roads and bridges. Many secondary roads were also flood affected and around Baidoa, there remained the fear of landmines. Both ICRC and WFP moved goods from Mogadishu into the lower Shabelle, though with great difficulties experienced en-route, leading to long delays. Both food and some relief items were available on the market in Mogadishu throughout the period of the floods, and a number of implementing agencies purchased seeds there for inclusion in their agricultural rehabilitation activities. Insecurity at the time of the floods, however, precluded the use of Mogadishu as a forward logistics base for the operation as no international staff could be resident.

At local levels, tractors and light vehicles, donkey carts and people-power were all effectively employed in transporting relief items.

#### **17.4 Cost Effectiveness**

Formal cost effectiveness analysis of Phase I would be unrealistic. A cost effective response is one where specific objectives are achieved at lowest cost. The difficulty here is isolating the particular effects of the intervention, the indicators that the objectives were achieved, at a cost that can be fully determined, and a cost that is as low as can be 'reasonably' expected, given the required urgency of operational start-up, the lack of both early warning and tailored preparedness for such an event.

The Flood Management Team estimated that the cost per beneficiary was \$45/person in the Juba Valley, \$8/person in the Shabelle operations (SACB, 1998, January).

#### **17.5 Measurable Impact?**

On one important level, the original ambition of the intervention - the 'rescue' in 'rescue and relief' - was not achieved. There were reports, although regarded by the Evaluation Team as unreliable, of many hundreds of lives lost to the floods before the response commenced. Once underway, the relief support delivered valuable and greatly welcomed benefits. The floods came on the back of a drought in Somalia, with vulnerable populations already weakened by malnourishment compounded by malaria, and with high parasite burdens evident in many of the children.

Clearly, time should not be spent undertaking base-line studies before responding to the needs of people in manifest distress. However, given that no base-line assessments were undertaken, there are difficulties in evaluating impact - the relationship between inputs and effect over time. It is commonly assumed in rapid relief interventions that 'process

indicators' (the input of materials and services) are a proxy for 'outcome indicators' (measurable-impact on peoples health and survival). Relief materials did on the whole appear to reach people in genuine need, and there was little reported diversion. In Bardera there was evidence that those in greatest need were prioritised over others, in distributions planned by the local authorities. Supervised health activities faced few instances of abuse, having an in-built safeguard of 'self-selection', with those in need seeking out such services.

The expected nutritional crisis in the Juba Valley did not materialise, indeed evidence is recorded of some improvement in nutritional levels (Cambrezey, 1998, June 5). The blanket distribution of high energy biscuits may have helped avert a wide-scale nutritional crisis, providing an important supplement to the food that people carried with them when they fled their properties. However, there were pockets of increased malnutrition recorded in displaced populations, for instance those camped outside Merca, in Lower Shabelle. Tentative information suggests these were mainly Bantu farmers and plantation workers, who were amongst the most vulnerable populations prior to the floods, and who subsequently lost all income.

It had been assumed that pastoralists would be less severely affected, but in Afmedow and Gedo, pockets of isolated and displaced pastoralists were found with high levels of malnutrition. Communities experienced severe hardship in Bay and Bakool. There were particularly high levels of malaria-related deaths, that went under-reported until March 1998.

It is unclear whether the lower than expected occurrence of cholera in the Lower Juba was a consequence of response activities, or a result of the scale of the flooding, in that fast-flowing water, carrying lower parasite burdens was available and chosen as preferred drinking water. The Merka Hospital records indicate that the floods led to an increase in cholera, peaking earlier than normal, in November, and malaria that peaked in February 1998. This suggests that due emphasis should be given to the provision of clean water and mosquito netting during flood response operations.

Although not charged with evaluating the impact of the response, the Evaluation Team believe that the relief assistance provided did contribute to the reduction of mortality, morbidity and malnutrition for the 300,000 beneficiaries of the main operation. However, in the absence of base-line comparison, a direct linkage cannot be made definitively, only assumed.

## **Principal Findings**

1. Phase I of the Inter-Agency Flood Response Operation was a complex and expensive logistics operation to distribute ready-to-eat food items and emergency supplies of shelter and medicines to scattered and isolated populations. The floods seriously impaired ground movements for everyone, including the humanitarian community.

2. The response was the first truly integrated relief intervention in Somalia for several years. The initial ambition of rescuing marooned populations and saving lives from drowning was not achieved. The operation did, however, serve to support displaced people wherever they could be accessed, and hence help them avoid having to undertake additional, further weakening and dangerous journeys in search of sustenance and shelter. The slow start to the response, and delays in reaching isolated communities, undoubtedly did result in a continuance of fatalities. However, the majority of those who died as a direct consequence of the flooding probably did so at the time of the sudden flash floods, before the response operation even commenced.
3. Resorting to air operations in order to gain physical access, the response, although late to commence, delivered emergency food and materials in quantities sufficient to match the requirements of the target population. In some areas, provision appears to exceed the original assessment figures. This can be explained in that many areas were not adequately assessed at the onset, and any original assessment was modified by agency field managers, who called forward supplies on the basis of needs that were presented to them as access improved.
4. The helicopter operation, once underway, proved an effective, though not necessarily a cost-effective means of ensuring that isolated populations were identified and their basic needs met for a limited period. Given the high hourly rates, large savings and greater useful flight time could have been secured if the helicopters had been based nearer to the affected populations. The prevailing insecurity in Somalia precluded most of these options. The helicopters were not insured to overnight on Somali soil.
5. A recognised dividend of the use of aircraft was that over-flight helped implementers avoid the slowly emerging pockets of insecurity, and the problems inevitably linked with over-land operations. Also, without helicopters, air-drops zones could not have been established so promptly in many isolated areas, and deliveries so safely conducted.
6. The Management Team were approached by Somali traders with interest in chartering or subsidising aircraft to deliver their own commodities, so they could quickly re-establish their business activities. While the traders requests were denied on this occasion, a full examination of this approach to assisting disaster affected communities is called for. The operation did little overtly in seeking to incorporate measures to improve the functioning of local markets.

## **Recommendations**

- I. Given the high cost per beneficiary of the operation, a clear case is made for investment in early warning, greater developed preparedness planning, and renewal of flood protection measures within Somalia.
- II. Agencies should be called upon to adopt consistent standards in reporting achievements. A specific and agreed set of reporting formats, shared between all agencies could be devised, with input from sector managers across all organisations. This would facilitate transparency, accountability and processes of evaluation within

the system, with performance being easily recognised. Recent work undertaken by the SPHERE project may be of assistance in this regard.

III. If humanitarian agencies are to defend their appeals to donors for resources, agencies need to be able to demonstrate a measurable impact of their operations on peoples lives and livelihoods over time. A rigorous system of base-line measurement and impact determination should form an integral part of emergency operations. Consideration should be given to commissioning of empirical detailed research of the kind undertaken by The Refugee Policy Group and the Centres for Disease Control and Prevention after the 1991-1992 famine emergency (Hansch et al, 1994 November), as a normal part of large-scale emergency operations.

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<sup>1</sup> The reconciliation of fixed-wing operational costs had not been fully completed by WFP at the time of writing.

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## **MAPS**

1. Map A: October-December 1997. Experimental Climate Forecast Division, International Research Institute for Climate Prediction
2. Radar Satellite Image, South Somalia Flooded Areas, 12<sup>th</sup> November 1997, FAO, UNDOS
3. FloodTrack: Southern Somalia: 29 November 1997
4. Website Image, November 1997, (University of California)
5. Comparison of Estimated 1997 and Normal Rainfall in Somalia, FEWS
6. Difference between 1997 and Normal Rainfall in Somalia, October 1997
7. Difference between 1997/98 and Normal Rainfall in Somalia, November 1997
8. Flooded areas in Somalia 1997-98, UNDOS
9. Aerial Survey: Flooded areas Lower and Middle Jubba: Part One
10. Part Two
11. Part Three
12. Part Four
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15. Heavily Flooded areas along the Shabelle
16. The Somali Regions 1998
17. FSAU Field Data Gathering Network, Somalia
18. Organisation and Needs, UNDOS
19. Relief Items delivered


### No Clear Link Between ENSO Warm Events And Flood Disasters?

In 1995, Dilley and Heyman, examined the links between ENSO events and droughts or floods that trigger international disasters. Their analysis found that world-wide, disasters triggered by droughts are twice as frequent during year two of ENSO warm events than during other years. No relationship is apparent in the case of flood disasters. There is no significant difference in the average frequency of flood disasters during ENSO warm events versus other years. Drought disasters occur during year two of ENSO warm events significantly more frequently than in other years in Southern Africa and Southeast Asia. No regional pattern emerges from a comparable analysis of flood disasters. Climate variations due to ENSOs can have agricultural or hydrological effects leading to substantial economic loss and suffering, even while remaining at sub-disaster levels. (Dilley, M. and Heyman, B.N., 1995)

# IRI INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR CLIMATE PREDICTION

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
Map A October - December 1997



IRI is a cooperative agreement between NOAA Office of Global Programs, Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory of Columbia University and Scripps Institution of Oceanography/University of California, San Diego.

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La Jolla, California 92093-0225 - USA  
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Cloud coverage on 12/11/1997  
 The thick coverage necessitates the use  
 of radar imagery which is the only  
 remote sensing device not affected  
 by clouds

**RADAR SATELLITE IMAGE  
 SOUTH SOMALIA  
 FLOODED AREAS  
 12 NOVEMBER 1997**

PROPERTY OF UNITED NATIONS COORDINATION UNIT



**FAO AFRICOVER East Africa**  
 Image acquisition - pre processing




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water reflection associated with very wet soil reflection associated with dry soil  
 radar false colour interpretation


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**FloodTrack: Southern Somalia, 29 November 1997**

RADARSAT ScansAR Narrow Image with FloodTrack Analysis




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 Data received by the Canadian Centre for Remote Sensing (CCRS)  
 Processed and distributed by RADARSAT International  
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


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
# COMPARISON of ESTIMATED 1997 and NORMAL RAINFALL in SOMALIA



Rainfall in  
October-December 1997



Normal Rainfall in  
October-December




Rainfall in October-December 1997  
minus Normal Rainfall in Oct-Dec




Source: NASA data  
FEWS/Somalia


# DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 1997 and NORMAL RAINFALL IN SOMALIA



October 1-10, 1997 minus  
Normal October 1-10



October 11-20, 1997 minus  
Normal October 21-31




October 21-31, 1997 minus  
Normal October 21-31




Source: NASA data  
SAU-FEWS/Somalia


# DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 1997/98 and NORMAL RAINFALL IN SOMALIA



November 1-10, 1997 minus  
normal November 1-10



November 11-20, 1997 minus  
normal November 11-20





November 21-30, 1997 minus  
normal November 21-31

Source: NASA data  
FSAU-FEWS/Somalia



# FLOODED AREAS IN SOMALIA 1997-98





**FLOODED AREAS IN  
LOWER AND MIDDLE  
JUBBA FROM AERIAL  
SURVEY  
3/11/1997 AND 12/11/97**

**Affected estimate population**  
**5,100 as at 3/11/1997**  
**1,900 as at 12/11/1997**

- Limit of flooded area as at 12/11/97
- Limit of flooded area as at 03/11/97
- 350 Pre-war estimated population  
(should be increased by 25%)





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**PART 1 OF 6**

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**FLOODED AREAS IN  
LOWER AND MIDDLE  
JUBBA FROM AERIAL  
SURVEY  
3/11/1997 AND 12/11/97**

**Affected estimate population**  
**15,500 as at 3/11/1997**  
**16,950 as at 12/11/1997**

- Limit of flooded area as at 12/11/97
- - - - Limit of flooded area as at 03/11/97
- 350 Pre-war estimated population  
(should be increased by 25%)





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**FLOODED AREAS IN  
LOWER AND MIDDLE  
JUBBA FROM AERIAL  
SURVEY  
3/11/1997 AND 12/11/97**



**Affected estimate population**  
**16,800 as at 3/11/1997**  
**21,600 as at 12/11/1997**

- Limit of flooded area as at 12/11/97
- ..... Limit of flooded area as at 03/11/97
- 350 Pre-war estimated population  
(should be increased by 25%)





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**FLOODED AREAS IN  
LOWER AND MIDDLE  
JUBBA FROM AERIAL  
SURVEY  
3/11/1997 AND 12/11/97**



**Affected estimate population**  
5,650 as at 3/11/1997  
4,300 as at 12/11/1997

- Limit of flooded area as at 12/11/97
- - - Limit of flooded area as at 03/11/97
- 350 Pre-war estimated population  
(should be increased by 25%)




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**FLOODED AREAS IN  
LOWER AND MIDDLE  
JUBBA FROM AERIAL  
SURVEY  
3/11/1997 AND 12/11/97**

**Affected estimate population**  
 5,650 as at 3/11/1997  
 4,300 as at 12/11/1997

- Limit of flooded area as at 12/11/97
- .... Limit of flooded area as at 03/11/97
- 350 Pre-war estimated population  
(should be increased by 25%)





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**FLOODED AREAS IN  
LOWER AND MIDDLE  
JUBBA FROM AERIAL  
SURVEY  
3/11/1997 AND 12/11/97**



**Affected estimate population**  
**1,300 as at 3/11/1997**  
**1,200 as at 12/11/1997**

— Limit of flooded area as at 12/11/97  
 - - - Limit of flooded area as at 03/11/97


350 Pre-war estimated population  
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**PART 6 OF 6**

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Heavily flooded areas by the Shabelle River

Slightly flooded areas by the Shabelle river

Probable limits of flooded areas by rainfall

Flooded areas due to rainfall. Estimated water depth 20-40 cm

Levels of flooded areas by rainfall as at 23/11/1997 from ARC aerial survey

**FLOODED AREAS IN SHABELLE RIVER FROM AERIAL SURVEY 19/11/1997 AND ARC AERIAL SURVEY 23/11/1997**

ALTITUDE FEET  
0 to 1000  
1000 to 2000  
2000 to 3000  
3000 to 4000  
4000 to 5000

PERMANENT WATER  
SEASONAL WATER  
DRAINAGE CANALS  
DRAINAGE CANALS

ROADS  
RAILWAYS  
CROSSING POINTS

POSSIBLE LIMITS OF FLOODING  
DRAINAGE CANALS




SOMALIA INTER-AGENCY FLOOD RESPONSE OPERATION


United Nations Development Office for Somalia - 1997  
A project of United Nations Children's Fund  
Operational Support to the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance  
Operational Support to the United Nations Office for Humanitarian Assistance  
UNICEF Somalia

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# THE SOMALI REGIONS 1998




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**SOMALIA**  
**FSAU FIELD DATA GATHERING NETWORK**

- FSAU/FEWS MARKETS
- NUTRITION SURVEILLANCE CENTRES
- FSAU MONITORING (FIELD TEAM)
- ACF AGENCY

Major road    River    Regional boundary    District bound




**FSAU - FOOD SECURITY ASSESSMENT UNIT**

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FSAU is managed by the WFP-Somalia, funded by the EC-Somalia Unit, the Italian Cooperation and WFP-Somalia and supported by USAID-Somalia and FAO  
 FSAU partners are WFP-Somalia, FEWS-Somalia, FAO SCF/UK, ACF/Paris and Terra Nuova.

The boundaries and names on these maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations





	Airstrip open
	Airstrip closed
	Boat

SOMALIA INTER-AGENCY FLOOD RESPONSE OPERATION  
 UPDATE 2 DECEMBER 1997

### RELIEF ITEMS DELIVERED

PREPARED BY UNDOCS

The boundaries and names on these maps do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

NUMBER OF FAMILIES REACHED

	15,000 families
	500 families

	tarpaulins
	blankets
	jerrycans
	supermix
	BP5 biscuits
	HPB biscuits
	human daily rations
	food

## **APPENDIX A**

### **El Niño**

In 1997 and 1998, many parts of the World experienced unusual storms and floods or disastrous droughts. Many of the events have been attributed to El Niño. The name stems from the warming of ocean surface temperatures near the end of each calendar year along the coasts of Ecuador and northern Peru. Local residents referred to this seasonal warming as “El Niño”, meaning The Boy, or Christ Child, in Spanish, a term employed as long ago as the seventeenth century by the local fisherman, due to its appearance around the Christmas season. Most of the time the coast of Peru has a cold current flowing from south. The cold water suppresses convection and makes the climate very dry, but it provides excellent anchovy fishing, since the nutrient-rich up-welling of cold water allows plankton populations to bloom, benefiting the anchovy and sardine fisheries.

Every two to seven years a much stronger warming occurs, which is often accompanied by beneficial rainfall in the arid coastal regions of these two countries. When El Niño arrives the cold Peru Current sinks far below the surface and is replaced by a much warmer low-nutrient flow from the north and the anchovy harvest plummets. Over time, the term El Niño began to be used in reference to these major warm episodes.

El Niño is closely related to a global oscillation known as the Southern Oscillation (SO), a link demonstrated in 1969. In most years the pressure over the Pacific is low in the region of Indonesia/Australia and high around Tahiti. This causes trade winds to converge upon the Indonesian low, which also has the warmest seas in the Pacific. The combination of converging winds and warm seas produces heavy convective rainfall over the Western Pacific. Meanwhile, in the Eastern Pacific cold waters keep the coast of South America dry.

In tropical regions El Niño has a direct effect on the climate; it reverses the normal pattern, bringing drought to normally rainy areas and vice versa. Outside the tropics, the changes caused by El Niño are chiefly due to the way it alters the pattern of upper winds. These high-level winds dominate the weather, producing quiet dry weather under ridges, but generating wet and stormy weather near troughs.

El Niño became fully re-established in 1997. In the western Pacific the cooler seas, rising pressure and subsiding air combined to produce a widespread drought over Indonesia, Papua New Guinea and Australia. The drought usually extends westwards to parts of Africa, which it did, in the South of the continent, though not as severely as anticipated. However, a characteristic of ENSO is that conditions, in this case drought in one area may be balanced by floods in another, and Southern Somalia and northern Kenya suffered severe flooding. Over the eastern Pacific, where the seas became much warmer, there was severe weather in Chile, which had heavy snowfall in June. Floods occurred in the normally arid Atacama Desert. On the other side of South America some areas east of the Andes had six months of drought. Even further east, Rio de Janeiro had heavy rain resulting in emergency conditions. In the Amazon rain forests, people traditionally burn trees, relying on the rain to keep fires

under control. During the prolonged drought the fires spread disastrously. The NOAA-12 satellite spotted 24,000 fires between early August and mid-September 1997; a 28% increase on the previous year. The situation grew worse in 1998. In Indonesia their drought was the worst for half a century, and their usual forest fires got out of control, an immense pall of smoke was trapped under the inversion. The smoke drifted across Borneo and Sarawak to Singapore and Malaysia, where airfields were closed and a state of emergency declared. El Niño changed both the frequency and location of severe tropical storms. In the Atlantic, the number of hurricanes was much reduced. Some hurricanes grow out of squall lines which move west from Africa. This source failed with the El Niño induced drought inhibited the squall lines, along with a block in the upper wind flows, which became strong and westerly, preventing tropical disturbances growing into hurricanes as they head towards the Caribbean. A similar effect was seen in the Pacific. During a cold ENSO the zone between 120 and 180 degrees west is normally free from severe storms. Most northern Pacific typhoons start well to the west of longitude 180 and move towards Asia, turning north-west and then north-east as they approach land. When El Niño warmed up the eastern Pacific the hurricanes appeared off the coast of Mexico. By early autumn 1997, there had been three fierce storms in this region: Linda, Nora and Pauline. Linda hit the Mexican coast with winds of up to 190 knots. This was their severest storm ever.

Changed sea temperatures alter the area of heavy cumulo-nimbus clouds and convective rain. These big clouds carry heat and momentum aloft and alter the air flow at jet stream level. The altered jet streams influence the development and movement of major weather systems far outside the tropics. During the 1997/98 El Niño torrential rain caused flooding and set off mud slides in California. Numerous tornadoes caused damage and casualties in the southern States. Warm air spread up the east coast to give New York a remarkably mild January. For the first time in over a century they had no snow that month. In Canada, which tends to suffer colder winters in El Niño episodes, the rain in January froze as it fell, building up ice to a depth of 13cm, an unprecedented amount, which severely damaged power supply systems.

While it is unlikely that El Niño is the only factor in these dramatic swings of global weather, it may just supply the final push which upsets a delicate balance. The mathematics of chaos show that tiny changes can produce huge and lasting effects. Recent satellite scans have shown that the warm pool is no longer so wide along the coast of South America, as energy is transferred from the ocean to the atmosphere via rainfall processes, and all indices are diminishing. From a peak of 33cm above normal (a proxy for sea-surface temperature), the sea level off the South American coast has lowered 15cm as the ocean is beginning to rise again in the western Pacific, and anchovy and sardine catches have returned to normal off coastal Peru south of 14° S. This may mark the demise of El Niño and the return of so-called La Niña or "cold-episode" ENSO conditions. The latest forecasts from the US National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP), July 1998, indicate a return to near-normal conditions in the tropical Pacific during the next 3-6 months. However, other sources differ, and there appears to be considerable uncertainty about the rate of weakening. One can anticipate observed anomalies to continue for some time. A much weaker episode in 1991 lingered on till 1994.

## **APPENDIX B**

### **Evaluation and Documentation of Lessons Learned of Inter-Agency Response to 1997-98 Somalia Flood Emergency**

#### ***Terms of Reference***

Draft, 23 April 1998

#### **1. Background**

In October 1997, a flood emergency swept through southern and central Somalia - from the Shabelle river in central Somalia to the border with Kenya in the south and west, and from the Ethiopian border eastwards to the sea. Floods were caused by overflowing of the Juba and Shabelle rivers due to heavy rains in Ethiopia and Somalia, and directly by the heavy rainfall itself. The floods dramatically affected the lives of around one million people. An estimated quarter of a million people were displaced, and around 2,100 people died from drowning and flood-related exposure to malnutrition and diseases, including respiratory tract infections, malaria, diarrhoeal diseases, cholera and Rift Valley Fever. Homes, crops and reserve stocks buried underground in and around the Juba Valley were wiped out, and many heads of livestock died. Thousands of people scrambled for their lives to higher ground as the rains relentlessly poured down marooning them on islets or dykes formed by the disappearing river banks.

On 7 November 1997, UNICEF was designated by the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) as the coordinator for the Inter-Agency Flood Emergency Response Operation for the Phase I or acute phase of the emergency, while WFP was made responsible for logistics of the operation. A Joint Flood Response Management Team, comprising of representatives of donors, NGOs and UN agencies, was established. An Appeal was launched and close to US\$ 13 million was received, of which more than US\$ 4 million was allocated specifically to UNICEF.

The Operation was considered to be very successful by the SACB. The Management Team submitted to the SACB a report of the first phase of the Operation (covering the period October-December 1997), in which the key lessons learned were summarised. These include, among other things, the importance of prepositioning emergency supplies in easily-accessible locations. The experience also proved that increased decentralisation of emergency operations is needed to allow decisions to be made on the ground by those people and organisations most in touch with the specific situation in each location. The experience of partners on the ground proved essential to the success of the operation, resulting in rapid needs assessments, in-depth knowledge of the exact location of vulnerable populations, and quick distribution of supplies. The involvement of Somali communities and their leaders in the planning and implementation of emergency activities proved important to the success of the emergency operation.

In subsequent discussions with donors, and in particular the Government of Sweden, it was felt that a more in-depth analysis of the operation and documentation of the lessons learned are required to guide future emergency operations in Somalia, and possibly elsewhere.

The evaluation is initiated by a group of donors, and will be carried out in close coordination with the SACB. The evaluation concerns an independent evaluation carried out by external evaluators.

#### **2. Objectives, Scope, and Expected Output of the Consultancy**

The objectives of the consultancy are:

1. To evaluate the Phase I Inter-Agency Flood Emergency Response Operation in Somalia; and

2. To draw lessons learned from the findings of the evaluation with a view to informing strategies for future emergency operations in Somalia, and possibly elsewhere.

The evaluation should - at a minimum - investigate the following issues:

- Content and adherence to the principles guiding the operation, in particular to the principle of *international assistance not becoming a source of damaging conflict, never weakening or undercutting legitimate local authorities, and never replacing or suppressing local initiatives.*
- Effectiveness of the operation, including, among other things: was the target population reached (how many people were reached, what kind of people, etc.), cost-effectiveness of the operation.
- Early warning system; modalities for assessment of emergency situation and target beneficiaries.
- Coordination of the operation among partners involved, at Nairobi level, at field level, and among Nairobi and field levels.
- Implementation of the operation, including, among other things: levels of decision making; number and location of bases in Somalia; logistics (distribution modalities and channels, air operation, boat operation, etc.); supervision of implementation; access to target population.
- Supply issues, including, among other things: timing of arrival of supplies; preparedness plan; prepositioning of supplies; appropriateness of types of supplies (incl. donations in-kind)
- Fund raising strategy and modalities.
- Involvement of and participation by local partners and communities on the ground.
- Security implications and arrangements.
- Mobilisation and role of the media.
- Monitoring of the operation.

At the end of the consultancy the evaluators are expected to produce a concise report containing the main findings of the evaluation and the lessons learned of the flood emergency operation. Elaboration of specific issues should be provided in Annexes as required.

### **3. Methodology**

The investigation will take place both at the Nairobi level and at the field level in Somalia.

At the Nairobi level, the following research methods will be applied:

- Desk review of reports and other written materials on the Flood Emergency and related materials deemed relevant by the consultants.
- In-depth interviews and focus group discussions with key informants, including members of the Inter-Agency Flood Emergency Response Team, relevant members of the SACB, relevant staff of UN agencies and international NGOs, members of the Flood Emergency implementation team (who worked on the ground but may now be in Nairobi, such as boat operators, logistics coordinators, flight operation personnel, etc.)

At the field level, the following methods will be applied:

- In-depth interviews and focus group discussions with key informants located in Somalia, including relevant international agency staff still on the ground, community leaders and elders, representatives of other local partners, and beneficiary communities.

Telephone interviews with agency headquarters staff involved in the operation can be held as required.

#### **4. Implementation Arrangements**

##### **\* Evaluators:**

The evaluation will be carried out by a team of two independent (external) consultants.

The consultants should have a strong background in social sciences (at least Master's degree) and at least eight years of working experience in programming, including emergency experience, at the international level, as well as experience in conducting evaluations. At least the lead evaluator, and preferably also the co-evaluator, should be familiar with the Somalia context. Consultants should have excellent analytical, communication, and writing skills.

##### **\* Organisation and supervision of the evaluation:**

The evaluation will be carried out under the aegis of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (to be confirmed). The Consultants will report to the SACB/donors and the day-to-day guidance will be provided by a coordinator to be designated by the SACB. If mandated by SACB, UNICEF would provide secretarial support: including logistical and administrative support, advice on sources of information as and when necessary, access to the various informants, documents, etc.,

##### **\* Travel:**

The evaluation team is expected to visit various locations in central and southern Somalia, covering a period of around two weeks. Consultants have to strictly follow UNICEF security regulations in Somalia.

##### **\* Timing and tentative workplan:**

The consultancy will cover a period of two months, starting \_\_\_ May upto \_\_\_ July 1998.

Week 1	Meeting with supervisor and other organisers of the evaluation Review of existing documentation
Week 2-3	Interviews and group discussions with relevant staff from parties involved
Week 3-5	Interviews and group discussions with relevant parties in Somalia
Week 5-6	Follow-up visits with relevant parties in Nairobi Preparation of draft evaluation report
Week 7	Review and discussion of draft report by relevant parties
Week 8	Finalisation of evaluation report and overview of lessons learned.

## **APPENDIX C:**

### **PEOPLE INTERVIEWED**

#### **NAIROBI**

##### **UNDP**

Maria Frauenrath, Information Officer  
Philippe Gourdin, UNCU  
Rubina Haroon  
Mo Hussein  
Dominik Langenbacher, Humanitarian Coordinator  
Wayne Long, Security Officer  
Denis Lazarus  
John Spring, UNCT

##### **UNDOS**

Georgio Sartori, Information Systems and G.I.S  
Imanol Berakoetxea, Health Coordinator (SACB Health Sector Committee)

##### **UNICEF Somalia**

Douglas Booth, Base Manager, Kismayo  
William Condie, Security Officer  
Aida Girma, Planning Officer  
Dr Pirkko Heinonen, Project Officer (Health and Nutrition)  
Deen M. Kaphle, Admin/Finance Officer  
Robert Mwangi Kihara, Assistant Reports Officer  
Sarah Mwakiuna Kilemi, Assistant Project Officer  
Jean-Ludovic Metenier, Project Officer  
Dr Augustino Paganini, Representative.  
Said S. Al-Nammari, Project Officer  
Madeleine Klinkhamer, WES Consultant

##### **UNPOS**

David Stephen, Representative of the UNSG for Somalia  
Babafemi A. Badejo, Senior Political Advisor

##### **UNCTAD**

Russell Baggerly, Assistant Projects Manager

##### **War-Torn Societies Project**

Matt Bryden, Project Coordinator  
Ahmed Farah Yusuf, Research Coordinator

##### **UNOPS**

Doug Higgins

##### **WFP Somalia**

Steve Glunning, Security Officer  
Saskia Von Meijenfheldt, Logistics Officer  
Burkard Oberle, Country Director  
Louise Seaman, Programme Officer

##### **WFP Regional Office**

Russ Ulrey, Regional Logistics Officer  
Stig Larsen, Air Logistics Specialist

##### **WHO**

Dr R. Shoo, Acting Representative

#### FSAU

Christine Cambrezy, Nutritionist  
Renato Marai, Agronomist  
Jane McAskill, Food Economist  
Erminio Sacco, Project Manager  
Owen Calvert, Food Security Consultant

#### British High Commission

Paul Maddinson, Second Secretary (Political/Economic).

#### Embassy of Sweden

Bengt Herring, First Secretary (Senior Regional Humanitarian Advisor)

#### European Union, Somalia Unit

Theo Kaspers

#### ECHO

Eddie Boyle  
Mathew Sayer

#### USAID

John Bierke, Representative to the Somali People  
Maura Barry, Project Specialist

#### ITALIAN EMBASSY

Flavio Lovisolo, Head of Development Cooperation Office

#### FEWS

Phil Steffen

#### FAO

El-Zein M. El-Muzamil, Emergency Coordinator for Somalia

#### ICRC

Pascal Cuttat, Deputy Head of Delegation for Somalia  
Rod Charters, Delegate  
Christoph Langenkamp, Agronomist  
Giorgio Nembrini, Consultant, Water and Sanitation Unit

#### ICAO

Athanas Wanyama (ATS Expert-Operations/Deputy Project Manager)  
Chris Mensah, Legal Advisor

#### ACORD

Theo Kloppenburg, Programme Coordinator

#### Action Contra la Faim

Karin Lagard

#### American Refugee Committee

Andrew Rosaur, Country Director

#### CARE International

Mustaque Ahmed, Programme Manager  
Wendy Driscoll, Press/Policy, Africa Region  
Rick Henning, Assistant Country Director  
David Neff, Country Director

DBG

Jurgen Priske, Field Director

Eco Terra International

Prof. Julian Bauer

Hussein Musa

International Medical Corps

Caroline Abla, Representative

Wendy Carson,

Juba Women's Development Centre

Hawa Aden Mohamed, Executive Director

Life and Peace Institute

Hassan Farah Egal, National Programme Officer

Elias Habte Selaasie, Senior Programme Officer and Regional Advisor

Johan Svensson, Representative

Mercy International USA

Abdinasir M. Nur, Deputy Country Director

Save the Children UK

Anne Mulcahy

Swedish Church Relief

Inga Lisa Tornblom, Health Coordinator

Terra Nuova

Vittorio Cagnolati, Animal Productionist

Trocaire

Kathleen Fahy,

World Vision International

Mario Roderigues

Enzo Vechio,

Dr Ismail Centre for Human Rights

Hassan Shire Sheik

Somali Community Services International

Abdi Hussein

Somali Human Rights Action Group

Yusuf Abdi Salah

**BARDERA**

UNICEF

Roger Carter, OIC

Nurta Abdulqadir

Bardera District Council

Hassan Ugas, DC

Bardera Hospital Staff

Development Management Group

FSAU

Abdinasir Zoppe

SomAction

Abdiaziz Abdirahman

Villagers of Tobacco

Villagers of Marda

**BELETWEYNE**

UNICEF

Abdullahi Mohamed Ali

UNOPS

Elmi Ahmed Nur, Project Officer

Elias Otioda, Security Officer

FSAU

Abdi Hussein Roble

Regional/District Council

Abdullahi Abdi Ali, Vice Governor

Ugas Khalif

Beletweyne Hospital

Dr Halane

International Medical Corps

Aboker Yusuf

Jaffer Aminullah

SCF UK

Nur

Abdillahi Warsame

Fergus Boyle

West Yugulle, Agricultural Project Officer

Life and Peace Institute

Abdi Abdulla

Villagers of Baad

Bakool Region

Dr Ali Mohamed Sheik-Abdulla

**MERCA**

ACORD

Omar Sherif, ACORD Kurtunwaarey

COSY

Istarlin Abdi Arush

Dr Anna Kavali

Mujhudin

Magda & Nur

Water for Life

Alideero

Villagers of Habatlei, Bullogarrai, Janaale District  
Residents at El Jalle, Merca  
Villagers Bufow Osoble, Qorioley District  
Hussein Moalim, District Committee and Elders, Qorioley

**JOWHAR**

UNICEF

Marian Sheik H. Abkow, Assistant Project Officer/Education  
Faduma Haji Nur, UNICEF EPI Team  
Leslie McTyre, UNICEF RPO  
Halima Mohamed Haji, UNICEF EPI Team  
Mohamud M. Mohamud, Radio Operator  
Nur Olow  
Ahmed Osman Nur, Logistics  
Abukar Sheik Madoobe, Assistant Project Office, WES

MSF-Spain

Grant Babitz  
Marcus Diac  
Javier Goiri  
Abdi Khalif

Regional Council

Nur Mohamed Mohamoud, Governor Middle Shabelle

Jowhar Women's Organisation

Jowhar Hospital

Dr Abdullahi Sheik Hussein

Villagers of Mandhere

Villagers of Nukay

MOGADISHU (by telephone)

Mohamed Mahmoud Shirwac, NERCOS

**GENEVA**

Edouard Beigbeder, Project Officer, UNICEF-EMOPS  
Joel Boutroue, Head of CAP Section, CERCAP, OCHA  
Chris Kaye, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, CERCAP, OCHA  
Guillaume de Montravel, Senior Humanitarian Affairs Officer, MCDU/DRB, OCHA  
Brigitte Troyon, Head of Sector, Horn of Africa, ICRC